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ABSTRACT
The United States is an important global player in resource depletion, energy use, waste
production, and other indicators that contribute to economic threats to humanity’s
ecological future. Critical theory provides conceptual tools that are uniquely well-suited
to more fully comprehend the links between economic progress and ecological
deterioration. In key regards, the present situation is the continuation as well as
amplification of political-economic, social and cultural features that took hold during the
Cold War, and which demand rigorous sociological focus, scrutiny and analysis. To date,
however, sociology has barely begun to assess the consequences that resulted from the
Cold War for the condition in which modern societies find themselves in the early
twenty-first century, and for their ability to meet both persistent and new challenges. The
purpose of this dissertation is to elucidate the present predicament, especially with regard
to the link between modern society and natural environment, by introducing the concept
of “sociobiophysicality” as a promising tool to address related issues in ways that
highlight the importance of sociology today. To do so, however, the specific importance
of the tradition of critical theory—especially as represented in the writings of Lukàcs,
Adorno, and Postone—for sociology in general, and with regard to the link between
human-ecological transformation and contemporary ecological subjectivity in
particular—must be reconstructed and made explicit.
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INTRODUCTION:
THE PATTERN OF PROGRESS IN MODERN SOCIETY AND THE
PROGRESSIVE DESTRUCTION OF NATURE
When viewed in light of the history of planet Earth—which is estimated to be
over 4.5 billion years old—the human-ecological legacy of the Industrial Revolution in
the nineteenth century is difficult to exaggerate. Indeed, human activities have
fundamentally altered earth system processes to such an extent over the past 250 years
that scientists are currently debating whether or not to add a new epoch of geologic
time—the Anthropocene.1 The etymological roots of the term (anthropo meaning
“human” / cene meaning “new”) is meant to capture a change in the history of the planet,
namely that for the first time in history its course will be determined by the question of
what humanity will become.
The transition to the Anthropocene also coincides with the expansion of bourgeois
society—the society in which the productivity of humanity moved from the rural forms
of peasant production to production in cities and the rise of a new class of “commoners”
who were to be judged not on the basis of tradition or divine orders, but on their capacity
to “work.” While the idea of an era of planetary history driven by humanity would have
been viewed as a great accomplishment by thinkers of the Enlightenment, it has come to
be associated with the potential demise of all life on earth. The legacy of the nineteenth
century Industrial Revolution and what Dutch atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen terms
“the Great Acceleration”—the spike in human activities and its interaction with earth
system processes following the Second World War—has not, after all, lead to the
opening of human capacities and the flourishing of ecosystems, but rather the seeming
diminishment of both. The onus on humanity to shape the course of history seems only to
lead to increasingly unsuccessful attempts to avoid planetary disaster.
1

The term, “Anthropocene,” was first coined in the 1980s by biologist Eugene F. Stoermer and was
popularized in 2000 by atmospheric scientist Paul Crutzen, who the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 1995 for
his research on the link between anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and decomposition of ozone in
the atmosphere (see Steffen et al., 2011 for a succinct conceptual overview of the Anthropocene).
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American society, in actuality (existing the world-over through global capitalism
in addition to other systematic means) as well as in the guise of its weird and distorted
mythological ideal self-understanding (its ideological existence), is an important driving
force contributing to humanity’s predictable ecological apocalypse. Critical theory, I
contend, provides us with the conceptual tools needed to fully comprehend this situation,
although not, unfortunately, with the means to do anything about it. Something similar
occurred during the cold war, which we stupidly survived despite our lack of selfunderstanding. Our current situation is even less optimistic, for humans are not the
masters of the earth in the same way that some can be vis-à-vis the products of their own
alienated societies. As it turns out, things are getting worse along the road to catastrophe,
both in the objective sense of worsening harm to increasing numbers of living beings,
human and otherwise, and in the subjective sense of increasing self-deception, which
masks the fact that nothing new under the sun ails us but the alienated core of our modern
being. This dissertation aims to elucidate this most urgent of all human concerns via a
study of what I will call “sociobiophysicality.”
The Environment-Society Problematic
Faced with what appears to be a mounting human-induced ecological crisis, social
scientists have devoted an increasing amount of intellectual energy to understanding the
link between human society and the biophysical environment in recent years. Efforts to
elucidate the social processes energizing antagonisms between society and environment
have been framed in various ways—from the political (Brulle, 2000; Markowitz and
Rosner, 2002; McWright and Dunlap, 2011) and economic (Foster et al., 2010;
O’Connor, 1998; Schnaiberg and Gould, 2000), to degrees of pro-environmental attitudes
and behaviors (Dunlap, 2002; Routhe et al., 2005); from social domination under modern
patriarchy (Merchant, 1980, 1995) to science and technology, or lack thereof (Mol, 2003;
Mol and Spaargaren, 2002; York et al., 2003). Despite this fragmentation—a trend that
cannot be isolated from social scientific treatments of the environment—these efforts are
unified in their aim to include the biophysical as a critical factor in social analysis. An
important aspect of this research has been the focus on the socio-historical drivers of
2

environmental problems (see e.g. Black, 2012; McNeill, 2000; McNeill and Unger, 2010;
Pred and Watts, 1992). This work shows that the relationship between modern society
and the environment continues to be detrimental to sustainability. The specific form this
relationship has taken during the contemporary era is characterized by general
antithesis. That is to say, modern society posits “nature” as an external object which may
then be quantified, manipulated, and controlled.
One of the most unnerving characteristics of the relationship between modern
society and the environment is that the role of modern society in perpetuating
environmental problems is becoming increasingly visible, yet less and less
understandable. To perceive the link between society and environment at the beginning
of the twenty-first century does not require an effort of great abstraction. Indeed,
environmental issues and problems are all around us—e.g. in erratic weather patterns and
resource depletion, on the one hand, and reflected in advertisements and political
discourse, on the other. What remains paradoxical, however, is the fact that the intensity
and scale of societally-induced environmental degradation, which rose to historically
unprecedented levels during the latter half of the twentieth century (McNeill, 2000), is
synchronous with an equally impressive increase in public concern for and attention to
the biophysical world (Schnaiberg, 1994). In other words, although people are clearly
paying more attention to the biophysical than ever before, key indicators suggest that
developments are pointing in the opposite direction.
The problem my dissertation examines is what I call the environment-society
problematic. This involves the paradox of increased environmental destruction amid
increasing environmental attention and concern, as two coterminous developments
throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, which continue today. What is
paradoxical about the parallel development of these two processes, I suggest, is that the
expansion of ecological consciousness has not yet translated into revolutionary
transformation of human culture worldwide in the face of the objective imperative to do
so. Admittedly, one could suggest that this is not paradoxical at all—and one could
provide all sorts of explanations for why this is the case, including, for example, vested
3

“interests,” denial, cynicism, and so on. However, what I am interested in is critical
theory’s take on this situation, and in the dissertation I will attempt to render plausible my
contention that while environmental destruction is becoming increasingly visible and less
deniable, the paradoxical process at work remains largely concealed.
The environment-society problematic involves two processes, which I will refer
to in terms of an objective dimension (actual, concrete human-ecological transformation)
and a subjective dimension (the social conception and understanding of the natural
environment). Within the environmental sociology literature, pertinent research tends to
focus on either the objective dimension of the environment-society problematic or the
subjective dimension of the environment-society problematic. Yet, the interrelationship
between the subject-object dimensions has not been made an explicit object of concern.
This research gap is both real and frustrating, since it is precisely the synchronicity of the
subject-object dimensions, as they have developed throughout the latter half of the
twentieth century, that today remains paradoxical. The purpose of this dissertation is
therefore twofold. First, it advances a critical theory of the environment in order to
critique the inextricable linkage between the domination of human and non-human
natures. The second goal of my dissertation is to contextualize the environment-society
problematic both historically and societally. In order to do so, I examine post-World War
II American society so as to better understand why contemporary environmentalism and
contemporary American environmentalism in particular fails to engender the types of
changes expressed by its need and desire to move beyond the environmental destruction
that characterizes its own sociohistorical context.
Chapter Breakdown
Chapter one reviews key aspects of environmental sociology by focusing on the
distinction between affirmative and critical approaches. The chapter then engages a
critique of values-based and traditional Marxist-oriented environmental sociology in the
USA in order to highlight the necessity of critical theory for environmental sociology.
Chapter two specifies the methodology of critique that informs the dissertation by
focusing on dialectics, the methodological function of mediation, and immanent critique.
4

In the third chapter I contextualize the environment-society problematic
theoretically. This chapter moves toward a critical theory of the environment through a
reading of 1) Georg Lukács’s critique of reification; 2) Theodor W. Adorno’s critique of
identity thinking; and 3) Moishe Postone’s critique of traditional Marxism. Considering
the fact that Lukács (1885-1971), Adorno (1903-1969), and Postone (1942 - ) each wrote
successively, I suggest that we view the core critique of each theorist as an attempt to
“name” central aspects of the nature-society relationship at different, successive stages of
the development of modern capitalist society. Against this background, I advance the
concept of sociobiophysicality (SBPh) as an attempt to “name” central aspects of the
nature-society relationship, and the critique of modernist SBPh as an attempt to “name”
the elusively dynamic nature of the environment-society problematic in particular. Within
environmental sociology, there is no critical theory of the environment, and the
dissertation moves toward remedying this deficit. What distinguishes a critical theory of
the environment, as opposed to a critical sociology of the environment, is the immanent
critique of the inextricable connection between inter-human domination and the
domination of biophysical nature. SBPh is significant in this regard because it provides a
critical, dynamic, and reflexive account of 1) the objective drivers of environmental
destruction; 2) why environmental destruction has been increasing at an accelerating rate;
and 3) how such destruction is intrinsically related to subjectivity.
Chapter four situates the environment-society problematic in historical and
societal context in order to elucidate the conditions of possibility of a contemporary (i.e.
post-World War II) social conception of nature. I do so through an immanent critique of
contemporary American environmentalism’s misrecognition of its own sociohistorical
context. The chapter advances the concept “critique containment” and the category of
“contemporary ecological subjectivity” and in doing so moves toward an explanation of
why contemporary environmentalism and contemporary American environmentalism in
particular fail to engender the types of changes expressed by its need and desire to move
beyond the environmental destruction that characterizes its own sociohistorical context.
The failure of contemporary American environmentalism, I argue, must be understood
5

with reference to its objective sociohistorical context. However, insofar as this
sociohistorical context is defined by a regime of critique containment that emerged in and
through the cold war, it is characterized by an apparent decontextualization and is
therefore misrecognized as such. My critique of contemporary American
environmentalism focuses on the linkage between cold war science and technology, on
the one hand, and a specifically contemporary social conception of nature, on the other.
In order to elucidate the significance of this linkage the chapter grounds and elaborates
the following three propositions: 1) cold war science and technology are mediated by a
regime of critique containment; 2) cold war science and technology were crucial in the
production of a contemporary social conception of nature, which today remains central to
contemporary environmentalism; 3) contemporary American environmentalism is
mediated by critique containment, although it does not recognize itself as such.
The fifth chapter discusses the significance of the dissertation and elaborates
some of the project’s theoretical and empirical implications. The chapter identifies points
of contact between sociobiophysicality and current research in both environmental
sociology and critical theory.

6

PART I. HUMAN-ECOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION:
CONCEPTUALIZING “SOCIOBIOPHYSICALITY”

7

CHAPTER 1: ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY
This chapter reviews key aspects of environmental sociology, which I have
delimited in accordance with the distinction between affirmative and critical approaches
to environmental sociology. The chapter does not provide a comprehensive or exhaustive
account of the field of environmental sociology. Section one compares the seemingly
critical approach of treadmill of production theory with the affirmative approach of
ecological modernization theory. Reflexive modernization and risk society are discussed
as well. Section two provides a more pointed and critical review by examining valuesbased and traditional Marxist-oriented approaches to environmental sociology in the USA
in order to assess whether or not – and if so, how exactly – these approaches help us
make sense of the paradoxical nature of the environment-society problematic. Section
three argues that in order to further research efforts accordingly environmental
sociologists must be able to grasp objective drivers of human-ecological transformation
and forms of subjectivity as synchronous yet non-identical forms unfolding in and
through space-time.

8

1. “Critical” and Affirmative Approaches
Critical and affirmative approaches to environmental sociology, notwithstanding
their many differences, hold two elements in common. First, both approaches start from
the assumption that societally-induced environmental degradation is severe and in need
of amelioration.2 Second, both critical and affirmative approaches share a normative aim,
or vanishing point, which involves upholding the possibility of nature-society
reconciliation.3 What, then, distinguishes an affirmative approach from a critical
approach? Put simply, affirmative approaches assume that the possibility of naturesociety reconciliation can be actualized in and through existing patterns of social change,
whereas critical approaches assume that existing social conditions prevent (i.e., are
antithetical to) actualizing the possibility of nature-society reconciliation.
1.1 Treadmill of Production
According to Buttel (2004: 323), “The treadmill of production is arguably the
single most important sociological concept and theory to have emerged within North
American environmental sociology.” While the validity of this claim may be disputed, it
is certainly the case that treadmill of production theory is one of the most well-known
critical approaches to environmental sociology.4 The treadmill of production was first
outlined by Allan Schnaiberg in order to better understand the relationship between the
spike in environmental degradation throughout the latter half of the twentieth century and

2

I have refrained from using the term “sustainability” given the term’s somewhat ambiguous meaning (for
critical assessments, see, e.g., Amsler, 2009; Luke, 1997).
3
It is important to note that presupposing the possibility of nature-society reconciliation is not logically
related to assumptions regarding the likelihood of such reconciliation. Moreover, the possibility of naturesociety reconciliation should not be understood in zero-sum terms. For example, although efforts aimed
toward ameliorating the current rate at which environmental destruction increases (implicitly or explicitly)
presuppose the possibility of nature-society reconciliation, this presupposition does not (logically, or
necessarily) imply a positive or negative likelihood regarding the possibility of nature-society
reconciliation becoming actual.
4
Buttel (2004: 324) indicates that the treadmill of production can be thought of in four ways: (1) as a
concept “parallel to a concept such as the self-expansion of capital”; (2) as a sociological theory “with a
causal or interpretive system involving chains and relationships among social forces/variables”; (3) as
outlined in the work of Allan Schnaiberg; and (4) as found in “the work of Schnaiberg and of his three
main coauthors: David Pellow, Ken Gould, and Adam Weinberg.” Following Buttel, I employ the first and
second meanings conterminously and, unless otherwise noted, I therefore leave aside the more complex
questions involved in determining what constitutes a (social) theory and, relatedly, whether or not the
treadmill of production can be considered a (social) theory based on such (un)specified criteria.
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the reconfiguration of business, labor, and government in post-World War II American
society (see Schnaiberg, 1975, 1980). Schnaiberg later fleshed-out the treadmill’s
theoretical and empirical implications in collaborative work with David Pellow, Kenneth
Gould, and Adam Weinberg (see e.g. Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg, 2004, 2006, 2008;
Gould, Schnaiberg, and Weinberg, 1996; Pellow, 2002; Weinberg, 2002).5
The treadmill of production theory is rooted in the Marxist tradition, although, as
Buttel (2004) points out, the theoretical ground of the treadmill approach is perhaps more
aptly described as a unique variety of neo-Marxisms (see e.g. Schnaiberg, 1994). Buttel
(2004: 326) characterizes the neo-Marxism of the treadmill of production as “extraMarxist political economy”—that is, “a style of critical or radical political-economic
reasoning that borrows eclectically from Marx’s concepts and insights while eschewing
other aspects of Marx’s work or those of contemporary Marxists.” The treadmill’s extraMarxist political economy approach to the environment combines work on state
capitalism with the analysis of monopoly capitalism (see, for example, Baran and
Sweezy, 1968; Foster, 1986; O’Connor, 1973), though as a theoretical conceptual devise,
the treadmill of production is quite distinct from both O’Connor’s second contradiction
thesis and Foster’s more recent work on metabolic rift (Buttel, 2004: 326).6 Table 1
below, adapted from Gould et al. (2004), illustrates the main elements treadmill of
production theory keeps and eschews from neo-Marxism.

5

It is important to be aware that the treadmill of production theory has developed and changed since its
inception (see Buttel, 2004 for an overview of these changes). While much of my review focuses on
Schnaiberg and Gould’s Environment and Society (2001), I have attempted to make references to changes
in the theoretical/conceptual development of treadmill of production where appropriate. Schnaiberg first
put forth the treadmill of production theory in his (1980) The Environment.
6
O’Connor’s (1998) second contradiction, which is an extension of Marx’s first contradiction between
capital and labor, states that the capitalist mode of production ultimately undermines the conditions of
production. Foster’s metabolic rift will be discussed in section two below.
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Table 1. Neo-Marxist Elements of Treadmill of Production
Keeps
Importance on class and inequality
Importance of the corporate form and its
effect on social organization
Tendency toward concentration and
centralization of capital
Instrumental view of the state

Eschews
Labor theory of value
Proletariat as the historical agent of
progressive change
-------

In Environment and Society: The Enduring Conflict, Schnaiberg and Gould
(2001) extend Schnaiberg’s (1980)7 theoretical agenda by developing a model of
environment-society interaction within which notions of finitude, ecological limits, and
ecological “overshoot” play a central role.8 The authors start from two sets of ecological
organizing principles, which they suggest are analogous to the first two laws of
thermodynamics: 1) matter cannot be created or destroyed; and 2) as energy is
transformed from its potential to kinetic (societal) form, entropy occurs (Schnaiberg and
Gould, 2001: 4). Schnaiberg and Gould conceptualize ecological problems as problems
of (1) additions and (2) withdrawals in accordance with the two laws of thermodynamics.
According to treadmill of production theory, modern industrial forms of social
organization accelerate both the quantity and quality of additions and withdrawals,
thereby disrupting ecological organization and perpetuating societally-induced ecological
disorganization.
The concept of treadmill of production refers to the “industrial logic” of capitalist
societies, which is in direct opposition to the ecological organizing principles outlined

7

It should be noted that Schnaiberg’s The Environment (1980) is perhaps the most systematic presentation
of his ideas on the treadmill of production. Chapter V of this book is perhaps the most thorough explication
of Marxian political economy as it relates to treadmill of production.
8
These notions all rely on some measure(s) or set(s) of indicators of biocapacity. Biocapacity refers to the
capacity of an area to provide resources and absorb wastes. When a population’s resource demand and use
exceeds its biocapacity, “unsustainability,” or overshoot, occurs. On the societal implications of overshoot,
see Catton (1982).
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above (Schnaiberg and Gould, 2001). Schnaiberg and Gould (2001: 69) identify the
following seven elements as central to the logic of the treadmill of production:
1) Increasing accumulation of wealth, through ownership of economic
organizations that successfully use ecological resources to expand
production and profits.
2) Increasing movement of workers away from self-employment, into
positions of employees who must rely on expanded production to gain
jobs and wages.
3) Increasing allocations of the accumulated wealth to newer technologies in
order to replace labor with physical capital, thereby generating more
profits for wealth-holders, in order to sustain and expand their ownership
in the face of growing competition from other wealth-holders.
4) Increasing activities of governments to facilitate expanded accumulation
of wealth for “national development,” on the one hand, and “social
security,” on the other.
5) The net result of these processes is an increasing necessity for ever greater
ecological withdrawals and additions in order to sustain a given level of
social welfare.
6) The ecological obverse of no. 5 is the increasing likelihood of an industrial
society creating ecological disorganization as economic pressures push
toward greater extraction of market values from ecosystems.
7) Extending no. 6, societies become increasingly vulnerable to
socioeconomic disorganization as their ecological “resource base” itself
becomes disorganized.
According to treadmill of production theory, the industrial logic of the treadmill
encapsulates both economic production and environmental protection enforcement. In
this sense, industrial logic is also conceptualized as a reference frame that reflects
economistic models of progress and legitimizes the superiority of the market.9 Put

9

According to Schnaiberg (1993), “The political economic perspective on environmental issues poses these
as dialectical conflicts, with competing sets of social interests in natural resources: use-values involving
direct utilization of natural resources for subsistence, habitat, or recreation by citizens, versus exchangevalues, which require transformation of natural resources into commodities that can be marketed.
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somewhat hyperbolically, the industrial logic of the treadmill of production is a way of
circumscribing the hegemonic principals operating within a global capitalist system,
which justify blatant contradictions and discrepancies in the name of so-called economic
rationality. The “objectivist, materialist, realist” orientation of treadmill of production
theory is consistent with most Marxist-oriented approaches to environmental sociology in
the USA, which maintain a firm commitment to realist epistemological and ontological
positions (Buttel, 2004: 327).10 It is important to note that this so-called “objectivist,
materialist, realist” approach places analytic weight on the objective dimension of the
linkage between environment and society and therefore (over)emphasizes the objective
dimension of the environment-society problematic. As argued below, this objectivist
position is not simply flawed; rather, it is reflective of the paradoxical nature of the
environment-society problematic itself.
Given Schnaiberg’s (1980) original theoretical aim of explaining the relationship
between the dramatic spike in environmental degradation following the Second World
War and related changes in American society, treadmill of production theory is relevant
to the aim of this dissertation, which examines the environment-society problematic in
theoretical, historical, and societal contexts by focusing on American society, in
particular. According to Schnaiberg and Gould (2001), the expansion of production in
postwar American society, driven in and through an array of political and economic
factors, is correlated with an increase in environmental throughput and ecological
withdrawals, leading to increased environmental degradation (i.e., “ecological
disorganization”).
Expanding production systems transformed the relationship between American
society and the biophysical environment in deep, fundamental ways. For one, the
quantitative increase in production throughout the latter half of the twentieth century
relied on ever-increasing levels of biophysical throughput, effectively necessitating
Dialectical struggles to maximize the "value" of ecosystems and their components thus characterize modern
societies, and especially modern states.”
10
As I note again below, commitment to the realist position was reinforced throughout the 1990s with the
onset of post-modern theories, which most Marxist-oriented environmental sociologists perceived as a
subjectivist and/or idealist threat.
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virtually exponential levels of ecosystem withdrawals (see Schnaiberg et al., 2002: 16).11
At the same time, new factories required a dramatic increase in the use of chemicals
related to the spike in ecosystem additions (Schnaiberg et al. 2002: 17).12 According to
Schnaiberg et al. (2002: 17-18), these changes and the social-environmental outcomes
they produce and reinforce hinge upon economic expansion via large firms; increased
consumption; solving social and economic problems by speeding up the treadmill; and
alliances among capital, labor and government.
Schnaiberg and his colleagues (Schnaiberg et al., 2002: 17-18) circumscribe the
roots of expanded production in post-World War II American society by referring to the
following processes, each of which correspond to reconfigurations of business, labor, and
government at greater intensity and geographic scale:
1) The increasing portability of production, as sources of energy became
more separable from their applications in production (e.g., stream power
versus steam, and then diesel and electric power).
2) The portability of instruments of finance, increasing the “circulation”
speed of production and distribution, by establishing national and
international banking networks.
3) Improvements in transportation, allowing for more rapid and easier
movement of raw materials, sources of energy, products, workers, and
distribution agents.
4) Improvements in communication, leading to a reduction in the transaction
costs of producing for distant and less familiar markets, and increasing the
pace of economic activity.
5) Increased availability of credit from financial institutions, and insurance
from such institutions and government agencies in order to permit taking
longer distance risks.
6) The rise of technological specialties (e.g., applied scientists or engineers),
which would have skills at redesigning capital equipment in production.
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I elaborate the “inner logic” of this dynamic in chapter three.
Treadmill of production theory stresses the fact that the toxicity of chemicals used during the second half
of the twentieth century, such as pesticides, is qualitatively different from those used during the first half of
the twentieth century.
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7) The rise of financial-organizational specialties (e.g., systems analysts and
industrial engineers), which permit reallocation of financial and human
resources.
8) Political control over international and domestic trade, through the use of
government instruments, ranging from patent and property rights to the
use of “gunboats” and armies, as well as trade consuls and small business
administrations.
According to Schnaiberg et al. (2002: 19-20), structural changes in the U.S.
political economy during the late 1960s and early 1970s, especially the reduction of labor
costs in order to increase returns, result in an increase in adverse social and ecological
outcomes. As the authors explain, (Schnaiberg et al., 2002: 19-20), three processes play a
significant role in exacerbating these structural shifts 1) production shifts to energy and
chemical intensive forms; combined with 2) a decline in the share of the workforce
involved in the production process; which led to 3) the increased deskilling of the
majority of remaining workers. Economic expansion and the acceleration of increases in
biophysical throughput brought about new qualitative treadmill forms, social as well as
ecological (Schnaiberg et al., 2002: 21-23). Consequently, the new ecological treadmill
form was characterized by the corresponding increase in ecological withdrawals, whereas
the new social treadmill form was driven by labor-saving technologies (Schnaiberg et al.,
2002). The latter social treadmill form not only deskilled workers within new emerging
labor market hierarchies, it also induced ever-greater incorporation of the American
workforce into the treadmill of production upon which their survival depended.
Enmeshed in these structural shifts, the state is caught in a “double-bind,” as the
its existence, according to treadmill of production theory, depends on a logic that
increasingly displaces workers from production while increasing demand for social safety
nets (Schnaiberg et al., 2002: 20). From a treadmill of production perspective, the social
and environmental costs of capitalism place ever greater pressure on the state to provide
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assistance to the poor, who, in turn, bear such costs because the political avenues
currently available remain bound by the treadmill of production.13
Although according to Fisher and Freudenburg (2004) most treadmill theorists
view the relationship between state, society, and environment as contradictory, in
general, treadmill of production theory operates with an instrumentalist view of the state.
From this perspective, the so-called “environmental,” or “green,” state (i.e., institutions
of governance conducive to effecting or bringing about environmental action aimed
toward ameliorating existing environmental destruction) is an organization whose
economic decision-making would include equal considerations of ecological and social
impacts (see Schnaiberg and Gould, 2001; Schnaiberg et al., 2002).14 Because treadmill
of production theory views “unlimited expansion of production” as a necessary
precondition for the organizational structure and healthy functioning of the state, “any
state environmental protection is experienced as a form of scarcity” (Schnaiberg et al.,
2002: 23). State environmental policy is therefore viewed as largely symbolic—that is, as
window-dressing devoid of substantial content.
Schnaiberg and Gould (2001) note that the currently weak degree of
environmental regulation is primarily a result of the logic of profitability, where
everything is placed within the context of competition: “Governments must appear to be
doing something to protect the environment, mainly to appease their environmental
interest groups, who can cause political troubles otherwise” (Schnaiberg and Gould,
2001: 55).15 Moreover, production facilities are typically far removed from the majority
of those consuming the products. As Schnaiberg and Gould (2001: 65) explain, “freedom
of movement of capital increasingly disconnects facilities that engender ecological
additions and withdraws from those investors whose capital undergirds these facilities.”
In other words, environmental degradation is unequally distributed, and this unequal
13

Here the influence of James O’Connor’s (2001 [1973]) aforementioned work on fiscal crisis and the state
is quite obvious.
14
From within the theoretical framework of treadmill of production, the distinction between institutional
and organizational forms is not entirely clear (cf. Weber, 1978 [1922]: 48-56). For useful analyses of the
environmental state, see Dobson (2000), Eckersley (2004), Münch et al. (2001), and Scott (1990).
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See also Gould, Weinberg, Schnaiberg (1993)
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distribution can affect the perceived seriousness of environmental problems.16 Still,
scholars working within the treadmill of production framework have defended the
primacy afforded to the production process. According to Gould et al. (2004: 302), the
focus on production is especially important for environmental sociology because
decision-making with regard to biophysical throughput is contingent upon producers’ (1)
access to capital, (2) access to labor, (3) assessment of potential liability, (4) assessment
of marketability, and (5) assessment of profitability.
This emphasis on production, including related Marxist conceptions of the role of
the state and the concrete prospects for an environmental state, is quite different from
ecological modernization theory. As we shall see, these and related differences between
treadmill of production theory and ecological modernization theory are reflective of
different, often unspecified, assumptions about the nature of modern societies. In contrast
to the Marxism(s) of the treadmill of production, ecological modernization theory takes a
lead from theories of reflexive modernization and risk society. In order to illuminate the
theoretical roots of the divergence between treadmill of production theory and ecological
modernization theory, I will next outline the theory of reflexive modernization, focusing
on Ulrich Beck’s theory of risk society, before discussing ecological modernization
theory.
1.2 The Greening of Modernity? Reflexive Modernization, Risk Society, and Ecological
Modernization Theory
According to Joas and Knöbl (2004: 463), the discourse on modernity within the
discipline of sociology changed during the 1980s in part because of the growing
criticisms put forth by theorists of postmodernity, which led many sociologists to reflect
on the concept of modernity and modern rationality. The theory of reflexive
modernization, and world risk society in particular, is illustrative of this change in
discourse—a change which has its counterpart in real processes of social change, to be
sure. My engagement with these theories focuses primarily on the work of Anthony
16

There is a growing body of literature on environmental justice and equality within environmental
sociology. See, e.g., Agarwal, 1992; Banerjee, 2006; Brulle and Pellow, 2006; Buckingham and Kulcar,
2009; Bullard, 2008; Shrader-Frechette, 2002.
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Giddens and Ulrich Beck—two sociologists whose theoretical contributions have had a
significant impact on environmental sociology, although this impact has been less
prominent in the US.
1.2.1 Reflexive Modernization
For social theorists such as Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck, the latter half of
the twentieth century and the turn of the twenty-first century, in particular, coincide with
fundamentally new aspects of modernity. Anthony Giddens (1991a: 1) suggests that
within the contemporary context of globalization (a period he also refers to as “high” or
“late” modernity), the connections between the emergence of sociology as a discipline
and the emergence of modern social institutions is much more complex and precarious
than was previously realized. Reflexive modernization theory claims that processes of
nineteenth century modernization have profoundly undermined the very structures of
industrial society, giving rise to new and emergent social transformations, which are
profoundly altering social life. Scholars working within this framework stress the need
to rework the basic premises of sociological analysis accordingly.17
For Giddens (1991a, 1991b, 1993), there are three key interrelated sets of
elements that account for modernity’s unique dynamism: 1) separation of time and space,
2) disembedding mechanisms, and 3) institutional reflexivity. According to Giddens
(1991a), processes of globalization accelerate and intensify the interrelations between
these elements. As a consequence, in modern social life, the linkage between the
phenomenological (i.e. experiential) and global level is marked by “profound processes
of the reorganization of time and space, coupled with the expansion of disembedding
mechanisms – mechanisms which prise social relations free from the hold of specific
locales, recombining them across wide time-space distances” (Giddens, 1991a: 2).
Institutional reflexivity refers to an inherent element of modernity characterized by “the
regularized use of knowledge about circumstances of social life as a constitutive element
in its organization and transformation” (Giddens, 1991a: 20). Although Giddens contends
that newly emerging threats and opportunities, such as global climate change and
17
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sustainability, are created by the increased scale and scope of change between the
separation of time and space, disembedding mechanisms, and institutional reflexivity, he
does not (contra post-modernism) view “high” modernity as marking a new phase of
social development “beyond modernity” (Giddens, 1991a: 27).
According to reflexive modernization theory, although newly emerging threats
and possibilities undermined the “older” processes of nineteenth and early-twentieth
century modernity, such as industrialism, these transformations were generated by
changes in earlier forms of modernity. Hence, a defining characteristic of modernity from
within the framework of reflexive modernization is that its historical specificity is
“fluid,” with no clear disjuncture between the “new” and the “old” (see Baumann, 2000).
Institutional reflexivity, for example, both undermines and is a product of the certainty of
knowledge characteristic of Enlightenment thought (Giddens, 1991a: 21). According to
Giddens (1991a: 27-28), the contemporary widespread questioning of “providential
reason”18 is coupled with a growing recognition of the “double-edged nature of science
and technology” (i.e. the notion that both science and technology are generative of new
dangers and risks as well as new opportunities and possibilities).
Giddens has extended his work on reflexive modernization to the issue of global
climate change, which he contends is unlike any other socio-political issue. According to
Giddens (2009), one of the unique features of global climate change is that it is primarily
an issue of abstract, future risk and therefore difficult for people to relate to in their
everyday lives. As such, he contends that the key political task is to put the issue on the
mainstream political agenda in order to bring a concern for climate change in line with
the “ordinary” concerns of everyday actors. Giddens (2009) argues that Western
industrialized nations must take a unified stand on climate change mitigation.
While I agree with Giddens that a unified effort addressing global climate change
on behalf of the industrialized nations is much needed, I contend that his argument that
developing nations will not do much in this regard without a model from the West misses
18

By “providential reason,” Giddens is referring to “the idea that increased secular understanding of the
nature of things instrinsically leads to a safer and more rewarding existence for human beings” (Giddens,
1991: 27).
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the point.19 A more pressing issue is the fact that the post-World War II, cold war
configuration of economy, state, and society in the industrialized West is unlikely to be
able to reconcile the tension between its model of economic growth and climate change
mitigation, which would require cutting-back aggregate industrial output (Barnes and
Gilman, 2011). And while it is both understandable and probably true that the issue of
climate change is absent from the everyday concerns of most people, there has also been
a growing consensus among policymakers and citizens around the world that societallyinduced climate change poses a very serious long-term threat to human well-being
(Barnes and Gilman, 2011: 45).20 Despite his explicit recognition of the barriers
inhibiting environmental action, Giddens’s (2009) recent work on climate change politics
relies on the mistaken assumption that increasing concern for and attention to the reality
of climate change is itself grounds for improvement.21
Although mounting environmental destruction can translate into mounting
concern and frustration, there appears to be a general sense among environmental
sociologists that increasing attention and concern is itself a good thing, perhaps indicating
that matters are improving. To reiterate, what is counter-intuitive about this assumption is
not that greater destruction corresponds with greater attention and concern but that
increasing attention and concern is somehow logically related to less destruction (or at
least a decline in the rate of destruction). Herein lies the paradoxical nature of the
environment-society problematic—people think there is a link between paying attention
and improvement.22 Indeed, it appears that even though people are clearly paying more
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At the same time, sociologists must be aware of the potential “unreflexivity” (more on this below)
involved in championing non-Western peoples, groups, communities, and/or indigenous groups from
within the modern capitalist system (for examples of this type of unreflexivity, see Foster, 2005b, 2009).
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Barnes and Gilman (2011: 45) argue that it is not very likely that this consensus will be converted to
political action unless the modern conception of political legitimacy is revolutionized.
21
Giddens therefore conflates the presupposition of the possibility of nature-society reconciliation with the
likelihood of this reconciliation becoming actual.
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This paradox, which itself is effected by the dynamic and contradictory processes energizing the
environment-society problematic can be further specified as follows: Proposition 1: Increasing destruction
has led to increasing awareness; Proposition 2: Increasing awareness leads to less destruction (or at least a
decline in the rate of destruction). These two propositions are independent of each other (i.e. they belong to
separate reference frames), although there is the assumption (especially in environmental movements) of
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attention to the well-being of the environment—perhaps generating the felt need to think,
act, and live sustainably—key indicators suggest that developments are pointing in the
opposite direction. What is it, then, that we do not understand about the dynamic link
between increased environmental destruction and humankind’s awareness of this
destruction?
1.2.2 Risk Society
The category of risk indicates “a systematic way of dealing with hazards and
insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself” (Beck, 1992: 10). More
specifically, risk “represents the perceptual and cognitive schema in accordance with
which a society mobilizes itself when it is confronted with the openness, uncertainties
and obstructions of a self-created future and is no longer defined by religion, tradition, or
the superior power of nature but has even lost its faith in the redemptive powers of
utopias” (Beck, 2010: 4). According to Beck, the social production of wealth associated
with nineteenth and twentieth century modernization simultaneously generated the social
production of risk. Although Beck sees the social production of risk as an
epiphenomenon of the unintended consequences of the control of nature through the use
of science, he contends that his category of (world) risk society is historically specific.
The term risk society refers “to the emergence of new risks which began in the latter half
of the twentieth century, and hence to the historical experiences of environmental crises
and the retrenchment of welfare state guarantees, etc.” (Beck, 2010: 235, note 2). The
meaning of the category of risk society is the thematization of “the process of
problematizing the assumption that it is possible to control and compensate for
industrially generated insecurities and dangers” (Beck, 2010: 7). As such, risk is
essentially double-sided: risk both exacerbates and creates the possibilities for
ameliorating the adverse effects of future risk.
Although Beck’s theory of risk society is rooted in the theory of reflexive
modernization, Beck (2010) distinguishes his own perspective of reflexive modernization

Proposition 2 logically following from Proposition 1. When Proposition 2 turns out to be incorrect, we are
confronted with a paradox.
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from the work associated with Anthony Giddens. Beck pinpoints the crucial distinction
between his perspective and that of Giddens by examining the meaning of the words
reflection and reflexive (Beck, 2010: 119-122). Giddens’s version of reflexive
modernization views the social processes of reflexive modernization primarily in terms of
knowledge (reflection) and is concerned above all with “the foundations, consequences
and problems of modernization”, whereas Beck contends that his approach situates
reflexive modernization as “primarily the result of side effects of modernization” (Beck,
2010: 119).
In Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992 [1986]), Beck elaborates the
rebound effect of both risks and side effects, which he contends are produced by
industrial societies back onto these societies, as it were. Where and when such
rebounding occurs, says Beck (1992 [1986]: 76), “modernization risks have successfully
passed through the process of social (re)cognition.” This also allows Beck to distinguish
his approach to social change from theorists of postmodernity. As he explains,
[G]lobal risks are the main triggers of an explosive transformation that is rendering
visible the contours of society in the twenty-first century. The theory of world risk
society addresses the increasing ubiquity of globally manufactured uncertainty. The key
institutions and actors of the first modernity, who are responsible for judging and
controlling manufactured uncertainties, are being undermined by the growing awareness
that they are ineffective, indeed that their measures are counterproductive. This does not
occur haphazardly, but systematically. The radicalization of modernity gives rise to this
irony of risk: the sciences, the state and the military are becoming part of the problem
they are supposed to solve. This is the meaning of the expression ‘reflexive
modernization’: we are not living in a post-modern world but in a hyper-modern world. It
is not the crisis but the victory of modernity which is undermining the basic institutions
of first modernity due to unintended and unknown side effects. (Beck, 2010: 55)

Beck (2010: 119) argues that his perspective of reflexive modernization
encompasses the “more narrow” perspective concerned with the foundations,
consequences, and problems of modernization, but his perspective also is extended to
include “the idea of a ‘reflex’ in the sense of the (preventive) effect of not knowing.”
Beck (2010: 115-123) explains that his more encompassing conceptualization of reflexive
modernization represents an advance because it allows for a more accurate grasp of the
contours of our contemporary moment (i.e. [world] risk society). This is in part because,
on Beck’s account, reflexive modernization takes into account the fluid boundary
22

between knowing and non-knowing by specifying how this boundary itself is
increasingly made ambiguous in and through (world) risk society (Beck, 2010). As he
explains:
World risk society is a non-knowledge society in a very precise sense. In contrast to the
premodern era, it cannot be overcome by more and better knowledge, more and better
science; rather precisely the opposite holds: it is the product of more and better science.
Non-knowledge rules in the world risk society. Hence, living in the milieu of
manufactured non-knowing means seeking unknown answers to questions that nobody
can clearly formulate. (Beck, 2010: 115)

According to Beck, the more narrow perspective of reflexive modernization (i.e.
the perspective Beck associates with Giddens and Lash) focuses on processes that can, at
least to some degree, apply to both pre-modern and modern societies: “some form of
knowledge, consciousness, reflection, communication and self-observation is relevant not
only for all modern but also for all traditional societies”(Beck, 2010: 120). For Beck, if
the concept of reflexive modernization is theorized trans-historically, then the historical
specificity of reflexive modernization is masked. This theoretical and conceptual
shortcoming is significant since reflexive modernization, according to Beck, is the result
of a completely new social and historical situation. Whereas industrial society had
previously systematically produced its own threats and dangers “without thematizing
them publicly as political conflicts” (Beck, 2010: 109), risk society confronts itself in and
through the activity of thematizing such threats and dangers. According to Beck (2010:
109), “The institutions of industrial society create and legitimize risks that they cannot
control. Industrial society then sees and criticizes itself as risk society.”
However, I contend that Beck is unable to provide an adequate account of the
conditions of possibility of his own theory (i.e. an adequately reflexive account of the
sociohistorical within which his theory operates and inevitably refers to), which, despite
its aims, renders his critique of Giddens less than plausible. Specifically, Beck does not
recognize that the distinction between pre-modern society and modern society is
meaningful only from within its immersion in time and space (i.e. the contextual
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framework of modern society).23 The contextual framework of modern society implies
that the historical trajectory of modernity is itself historically specific. Furthermore, the
possibility of “non-modern” conceptualizations (of nature, for example) is rooted in
modern society’s historical specificity. In other words, it is by virtue of the historically
specific historical trajectory of modernity that the distinction between “pre-modern” and
“modern” can be conceptualized, including the retrospective projection of such
conceptualization. Beck (2010) criticizes Giddens and Lash for their supposedly
undifferentiated concept of reflection by arguing that the very universality of the concept
of reflection requires one to further differentiate “reflexive modernization.” This criticism
might be well taken, but what Beck apparently does not recognize is that the very concept
of universality is historically specific.24
The work of Giddens (2009) and Beck (2010) is significant in part because both
theorists attempt to grasp new and emergent threats, such as global climate change,
within the context of globalization from a theoretical sociology perspective. While there
is insight to be gleaned, a central problem confronting the research efforts of both
Giddens and Beck is that of the proverbial “throwing the baby out with the bath water.”
Both Giddens’s theory of reflexive modernization and Beck’s theory of risk society are
more coherent than some anti-theoretical versions of postmodernism, to be sure.
However, the extent to which the processes these theorists identify differ from the
dynamic and contradictory logic of capitalist development remains unclear. Although
both Giddens and Beck recognize the historical synchronicity of capitalism, reflexive
modernization, and (world) risk society, without more rigorous theoretical criteria for
delineating what constitutes change we are left wondering in the dark. If the multifaceted
and simultaneous nature of changes in capitalist society has been increasing throughout
the twentieth century (which it has), then we must be able to distinguish between
qualitative changes within capitalism (see Dahms, 2000). Otherwise, construction of
(additional) “new” theories seeking to account for changes in the nature of change itself
23
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not, see Dahms, 2008.
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I shall return to this issue when I discuss Marx’s mode of presentation in chapter two.
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may prove to be futile. According to Joas and Knöbl (2004: 474), “The rhetoric of
historical rupture certainly exercises a certain fascination, but (…) it tempts one to
produce overly crude contrasts.” Others (e.g., Alexander, 1996; Sica, 1997) have gone a
step further by contending that “reflexive modernization” is simply modernization theory
in new dress.
In chapter three, I attempt to explain why there might be reason to (re)situate
processes energizing the environment-society problematic at the beginning of the twentyfirst century within the contextual framework of modern capitalist society. At the same
time, it is important to acknowledge that contemporary discourse on modernity within
sociological theory (which includes concepts such as risk society and reflexive
modernization) does in fact resonate with the seemingly paradoxical nature of the
environment-society problematic. This resonance is reflective of the vicissitudes of our
current moment, namely, its dynamic, decontextualized character. We must therefore
scrutinize the possibility that these theories reflect more than challenge our ability to
scrutinize the present.
1.2.3 Ecological Modernization Theory
Ecological modernization theory has made a significant impact on environmental
sociology discourse in recent years. The timing of ecological modernization theory’s
ascendency and incorporation into environmental sociology is instructive, as it was not
until the mid to late 1990s, during the acceleration of “globalization” following the
official end of the cold war, that ecological modernization theory gained its current
prominence within environmental sociology. In this regard, it is also interesting to note,
as Buttel (2004) details, that the reception of ecological modernization theory coincides
with a decline in the treadmill of production’s established theoretical foundation within
the field of environmental sociology.
Table 2 below shows some of the main characteristics of the three waves of
environmental concern and reform. The rise of ecological modernization theory, as Mol
(2003: 57) explains, occurred during the third wave of environmental concern and reform

25

during the late 1980s.25 During this period, the notion of “global change” took on an
increasingly significant role with regard to environmental concern and reform (Mol,
2003: 47-59), as the notion of global change began to play a central role in defining
environmental concern and reform during this period insofar as it “underlined the
growing importance of (…) environmental problems that concern and challenge the
entire world” (Mol, 2003: 54). The shift from “limits to growth” in the 1970s to “global
change” in the late-1980s parallels the growth of a number of institutional organizations
and international commissions like the Brundtland Commission and the WorldWatch
Institute, whose mission is to protect and manage the global environment.26
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For a critique of this institutional and organizational development, see Luke (1997).
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Table 2. Some characteristics of the three waves of environmental concern and reform
Beginning
Central notion
Focal point
Geographical
range
Results

First Wave
Ca. 1900
Nature conservation
Protection of
reserves and species
Industrializing
nation-states
Protected areas and
species

Second Wave
Ca. 1970
Limits to growth
Minimizing additions
and withdrawals
Industrializing
nation-states
National
environmental
agencies, laws,
NGOs

Third Wave
Late 1980s
Global change
Sustainable
development
Globalizing world
Ecological reform
of modern
institutions around
production and
consumption
Ecological
modernization

--Deindustrialization,
Major social
neo-Marxism
theories on
environment
Source: Mol, Globalization and Environmental Reform: Ecological Modernization of the
Global Economy (Cambridge, 2003), pg. 49

This theoretical development was undoubtedly influenced by “actual
environmental restructuring” (Mol, 2003: 56) in wealthy nations, particularly Western
European nations such as Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Mol cites a variety of
empirical studies that, although inconclusive, point toward a break in the coupling of
economic growth and “ecological disruption,” which had characterized development in
most advanced countries during the previous decade. The break in the link between
economic growth and environmental destruction, referred to as “decoupling,” has been a
primary area of concern for ecological modernization theorists.27 Some ecological
modernization scholars argue that technological development and institutional
modernization lead to dematerialization of production (see e.g. Tapio 2005). In
contradistinction to the concept of decoupling, dematerialization “is a joint concept
including both eco-efficiency and substitution and refers to a decoupling of economic
27

The issue of decoupling has also been a key point of contention between ecological modernization theory
and Marxist-oriented environmental sociology (see e.g. Næss and Høyer 2009: 74).
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growth from resource consumption and negative environmental impacts” (Næss and
Høyer 2009: 74).
The concepts of decoupling, dematerialization, and the more general notion that
economic growth is positively related to a nation’s ability to offset global ecological
challenges are central to the aim and underlying theoretical premises of ecological
modernization theory. Viewed in this light, Mol’s gloss on the fundamental premises of
ecological modernization theory is important and is worth quoting at length.
The basic premise of the Ecological Modernization Theory is the centripetal movement
of ecological interests, ideas and considerations involved in social practices and
institutional developments, which results in the constant ecological restructuring of
modern societies. Ecological restructuring refers to the ecology-inspired and
environment-induced processes of transformation and reform going on in the central
institutions of modern society. Institutional restructuring is of course not a new
phenomenon in modern societies, but a more continuous process that has accelerated in
the phase that is often labeled late, reflexive or global modernity. The present phase
differs from the pre-1980s phase, however, in the increasing importance of environmental
considerations among the triggers for these institutional transformations. Within the
Ecological Modernization Theory this process is conceptualized at an analytic level as
the growing autonomy or independence of the ecological sphere and ecological
rationality with respect to other spheres and rationalities. (Mol, 2003: 59 [emphasis
added])

According to Mol (2003: 60-61), the growing independence of the ecological
dimension referred to above applies to both the economic and sociological dimensions of
modern society as well. This implies that “economic processes of production and
consumption are increasingly analyzed and judged, as well as designed and organized,
from both an economic and an ecological point of view” (Mol, 2003: 60). Since the mid1990s, the aim of ecological modernization theory has been to better understand the
global dynamics energizing the various ecological responses of modern societies; these
responses are collectively termed “ecological modernization.”
Given ecological modernization’s relatively optimistic view of the potential
brought about by the most recent development of capitalism, it should be noted that
scholars working within the ecological modernization framework have curbed their
initial, perhaps overly optimistic position regarding environmental sustainability within
capitalism. As Mol and Spaargaren (2002: 36) explain, the potential compatibility
between environmental sustainability and capitalism does not necessarily mean that the
28

capitalist system is “inherently sustainable or will develop more or less automatically into
an environmentally sound production and consumption system.” Ecological
modernization theory, however, does not provide a critique of capitalism. Indeed, the
underlying theoretical premises of ecological modernization require an affirmation of the
global capitalist system.28
According to Mol and Spaargaren (2002: 36), “ecological modernization theory
identifies both actual and further possibilities to transform the current institutional order
into one that takes environmental considerations and interests increasingly into account”.
This “more balanced” position toward capitalism puts ecological modernization theorists
in the position to make the following claims:
(i) capitalism is changing constantly and one of the main triggers are environmental
concerns and interests, (ii) significant environmental improvements in production and
consumption are possible under different ‘relations of production’, and (iii) all major,
fundamental alternatives to the present economic order have proved unfeasible according
to various (economic, environmental, and social) criteria. (Mol and Spaargaren, 2002: 38)

For ecological modernization theorists, these claims point toward “redirecting and
transforming ‘free market capitalism’ in such a way that it less and less obstructs, and
increasingly contributes to, the preservation of society’s sustenance base in a
fundamental/structural way” (Mol and Spaargaren 2002: 38). For ecological
modernization theorists, such as Mol (2003: 59-60), “ecology” has the potential to
emerge as the new emancipatory grand narrative.
In contrast to the aforementioned theoretical progression within ecological
modernization theory, Buttel (2000: 58) contends that the rise of ecological
modernization, and its subsequent incorporation into environmental sociology in the
1990s, owes much more to a variety of external political and economic factors than to the
approach’s internal theoretical/conceptual achievements.29 For Buttel (2004), it is no
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On this issue, ecological modernization theorists have constructively responded to criticism from
Marxist-oriented environmental sociologists (see e.g. Mol and Spaargaren, 2002).
29
These external factors include: (1) the resurgence of the environmental movement during the 1980s; (2)
ecological modernization theory’s ability to address problems of the more widespread concept of
sustainable development; (3) the much needed argument regarding the potentiality of future environmental
improvements; and (4) ecological modernization theory’s explanation of some of the environmental
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coincidence that ecological modernization theory grew out of the concept of sustainable
development. Indeed, ecological modernization’s optimistic outlook resonated
particularly well during the 1990s because, according to Buttel (2000: 60), it provided a
needed counterpoint to what was perceived as a tendency toward structural
determinism.30 Following Buttel (2004), I contend that the ascendancy of ecological
modernization theory and its incorporation into the field of environmental sociology
during the 1990s is a reflection of the (unrecognized) immersion of ecological
modernization theory in time and space31 rather than an indication of theoretical
progression.32
Not surprisingly, there have been several theoretical and empirical criticisms of
ecological modernization theory. Focusing on the empirical level, York et al. (2003)
found that factors drawn from ecological modernization theory, including state
environmental regulation, had no impact in their empirical analysis of cross-national
variation in environmental impact. Fisher and Freudenburg (2004) found ecological
improvements during the 1980s, as evidenced by progress in Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland
(Buttel 2000: 59-60).
30
As Buttel (2004) indicates, the treadmill approach was particularly vulnerable to the accusations of
structural determinism during this time.
31
On the immersion of mainstream approaches to sociology in time and space see Dahms (2008).
32
In response to these shortcomings, Buttel (2000: 60) offers five propositions, which he claims are
intrinsic to ecological modernization theory and which he contends have the capacity to be framed in terms
of a distinctive, coherent ecological modernization perspective: (1) capitalism’s institutional flexibility, (2)
the potential role of capitalist eco-efficiency and rationalization in environmental reform, (3) critique of
radical environmentalism, (4) the potential for the environment to be an autonomous or “disembedded”
area of decision-making, and (5) analyses of specific policy environments part and parcel of the
restructuring of the state. Despite this potential, Buttel argues that ecological modernization theory is
weakened insofar as its proponents, specifically Mol (2003) and Mol and Spaargaren (2002), attempt to
link the approach with the theories of reflexive modernization and risk society discussed above. According
to Buttel (2000), attempts to elucidate these theoretical similarities are most likely reflective of efforts to
establish ecological modernization’s theoretical legitimacy. Although there are identifiable similarities
between the two approaches, Buttel (2000) suggests that certain inconsistencies between ecological
modernization theory and theories of reflexive modernization and risk society are too great to be
theoretically consistent. Specifically, Beck’s notion of risk society (1992 [1986], 2010) relies on key
disjunctures between risk society and industrial society while the conceptual core of ecological
modernization theory rests on the idea that environmental progress can be made without major structural
change (Buttel 2000: 62). According to Buttel (2000: 64), ecological modernization theory is “ultimately a
political-sociological perspective” that has its closest relations to the neo-Weberian tradition of embedded
autonomy (see e.g. Jänicke 1990) and state-society synergy (see e.g. Evans, 1997). Buttel suggests that the
potential influence of ecological modernization theory depends on developing these similarities as opposed
to legitimizing itself in reference to the current popularity of Beck (1992, 2010) and Giddens (1991a, 2009)
writings.
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efficiency, but not environmental institutionalization measures, to be a strong predictor of
emissions reduction.33 The assumption that the shift from a more production-based
economy to a service-based economy corresponds positively with increased societal
ability to ameliorate environmental problems has been confounded both empirically34 and
conceptually. Moreover, many of the empirical studies that have found supporting
evidence for ecological modernization theory’s basic assumption that modernization is
necessary for ecological sustainability have been isolated in geographic and historical
scope since ecological modernization theory has focused primarily on modern, advanced
North American and Western European countries during the 1990s. As a result, these
studies grasp neither dynamic processes of social change (Isaac and Lipold, 2012) nor
ecological impacts that inevitably extend beyond national borders—an assumption
tellingly referred to as the “Netherlands fallacy” (York and Rosa, 2003). Frey (1998), for
example, has utilized world-system analysis to show that not only do core nations draw
on the periphery for raw materials and cheap labor but they also export hazardous wastes
back to the periphery—a process illustrative of a circuitous dynamic intrinsically bound
to the mutual reinforcement of global environmental damage and social destruction
within the capitalist world-system.35 It is perhaps in response to the criticisms put forth
by scholars utilizing world-system analysis that more recent ecological modernization
research has attempted to incorporate empirical and case study work on non-core nationstates in order to evaluate the key tenants of ecological modernization theory.36
Another consequence of ecological modernization theory’s limited focus is that
the majority of empirical studies that examine the link between modernization and
ecological sustainability have been confined to analyses of advanced Western European
nations with relatively strong welfare states. This delimitation ignores historical,
33

The so-called “Jevon’s Paradox”—that is, the notion that increased efficiency in the use of a natural
resource as an energy source, such as coal, will actually increase demand for that resource since
improvements in efficiency lead to further economic expansion—also appears to undermine some of the
fundamental premises of ecological modernization theory. On the Jevons Paradox, see Buttel (2006), Foster
et al. (2010: 139-142, 169-181), and York (2006)..
34
See, e.g., Jorgenson and Burns, 2007 and the contributions in Journal of Environment and Planning,
volume 2, issue 4, a special issue devoted to ecological modernization theory.
35
See also Bunker, 1985; Bunker and Cicantell, 2005; Gellert, 2010.
36
See, e.g., Huber, 2008; Warner, 2010; Zhang et al., 2007.
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institutional, and cultural differences between nation-states—factors that may,
comparatively speaking, impede or facilitate the development of an environmental state.
The United States is a prime, if not anomalous, example of how historical, institutional,
and cultural factors have combined to impede strategies to pursue even the most
minimalist environmental reform efforts.37 America’s history of strong anti-state
sentiments, deeply engrained in the very fabric of American society and therefore its
intrinsic social relations, is an unintended yet highly effective deterrent against welfare
state regulation, especially environmental regulations, which are typically perceived as
being in conflict with the two primary elements of American mythos: free enterprise and
individual liberty.38
1.3 The Incommensurability of Treadmill of Production and Ecological Modernization
Theory?
Ecological modernization theory and treadmill of production theory appear to be
in direct opposition to one another. Although ecological modernization theory and
treadmill of production theory may indeed be incommensurable, I contend that the
contemporary debate between the two theoretical positions is not indicative of their
commensurability. In fact, the type of dialogue that would need to be established in order
to engage the issue of the commensurability between the two theoretical positions is not
currently possible. As a step in the direction of such dialogue, I would like to indicate that
part of the confusion currently preventing communication between the two theoretical
positions is related to comparative differences between Western European societies,
where ecological modernization theory originated, and American society, where the
treadmill of production theory was first developed.
I will develop this point along two lines. First, it is important to bear in mind that
treadmill of production theory originated in American society and that Schnaiberg (1980)
37

This is supported by Fisher and Freudenburg (2004), who have shown that although the overwhelming
majority of today’s top scientists agree on the need to reduce emissions, environmental protection measures
in the US can be resisted by key economic actors within the nation-state (see also Münch, 2001).
38
McWright and Dunlap (2011), for example, have analyzed the American conservative movement’s
success in undermining climate science and policy. (On the contradictory nature of American mythos, see
Wuthnow, 2006).
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initially developed this theory in order to explain the relationship between the
reconfiguration of American business, labor, and government and the dramatic spike in
societally-induced environmental degradation throughout the latter half of the twentieth
century. Ecological modernization theory, on the other hand, emerged from and
responded to different circumstances in Western Europe, where today the approach
remains far more influential than in the US. The reasons for this divergence can be
explained with reference to the historical specificity of these two societal contexts,
although I will not develop such a comparative analysis here. Rather, I would suggest that
one of the reasons ecological modernization has gained a stronger footing in the
European societal context39 is because the institutional infrastructure is more favorable,
relative to American societal context, to instituting ecological modernization.40
Compared to American society, welfare state social institutions, in addition to the
public expectations and perceptions regarding state involvement in economy and society
in Western Europe, are certainly much more conducive to pursuing environmental
regulation. This statement of difference is not meant to glorify the European context, for
the differences between the American and the European societal contexts are themselves
social and historical. For example, American society was born out of revolt against
authority, and this ethos became entrenched in the very fabric of American society and is
reflected in widespread opposition to state involvement in economy and society.
Furthermore, large parts of the geographic USA (namely, the south) remained a more or
less agrarian slave society until relatively recently. In contrast to Western European
nation-states, which have a long history of authorial rule, America has never had to fully
confront the problem of the social, as it were, in ways its Western European counterparts
have. While empirical analyses informed by ecological modernization theory have been
limited in scope, American environmental sociologists who are keen to identify this
39

By European societal context I am referring to the EU nations.
Within the European context it is common to distinguish between “strong” ecological modernization,
which substantially changes the direction of environmental dimension in modern society, and “weak”
ecological modernization, a term referring to the continuation of convention approaches dressed up in green
garb. (See Schermer, 2008 for an empirical exemplar within the context of the EU, and Austria in
particular).
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shortcoming have been less precise in pinpointing the comparative sociohistorical factors
that mediate the degree of ecological modernization across nations. By the same token,
ecological modernization theory has not adequately taken into account how its conditions
of possibility are fully immersed in time and space, namely the acceleration of various
processes that, since the 1990s, have been subsumed under the heading “globalization.”
Another reason for the confusion currently preventing an adequate debate on the
commensurability of treadmill of production theory and ecological modernization theory
revolves around the meanings associated with the term “constructionism,” specifically as
they differ from the American to the European societal context. American environmental
sociology is, for the most part, rooted in a specific version of scientific realism associated
with empiricist philosophy, which has given American environmental sociology an
(overly) objectivist, “materialist” emphasis.41 This emphasis is upheld in response to
theories of ecological modernization and risk society, which question traditional
Enlightenment assumptions such as the certainty of knowledge. As I will note again
below, not only does the commitment to this objectivist approach reaffirm itself in light
of perceived threat (e.g. from reflexive modernization and postmodern theories, or from
subjectivist and interpretive approaches) but also it is reflective of the objective
dimension of the environment-society problematic. From this perspective, social
constructionist approaches to environmental sociology are delegitimized, as
“constructionism” is mistaken as code for extreme subjectivism and/or idealism whose
epistemological and ontological position(s) inevitably risk(s) downplaying the reality of
global ecological threats and the material interaction between society and environment.
However, from the perspective of European environmental sociology the social
construction of nature is not necessarily incompatible with critical materialism (see e.g.
Cook, 2006, 2011; Eder, 1996; Görg, 2011). In fact, approaches to environmental
sociology attuned to the question of the social construction of nature are in many ways
more critical and more materialist insofar as they are able to scrutinize the ideational and
material nature dimensions of the processes whereby modern society posits “nature” as
41

See, e.g., York and Clark, 2010.
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an external object that may then be quantified, manipulated, and controlled.
Consideration of the two aforementioned lines of confusion is nonetheless necessary in
order to assess whether or not – and if so, how exactly – ecological modernization theory
and treadmill of production theory are incommensurable.
Despite the many differences between the two approaches, both ecological
modernization theory and treadmill of production theory share at least one significant
assumption. Both theoretical positions are motivated by a common normative
commitment—namely, care for the well-being of biophysical nature and an equally
strong concern regarding the socio-ecological consequences of societally-induced
environmental degradation. This shared commitment implies that in light of the current
anti-thesis between modern society and the well-being of biophysical nature both
treadmill of production theory and ecological modernization theory uphold the possibility
of nature-society reconciliation. In other words, the commonalities between ecological
modernization theory and treadmill of production theory, particularly care for the wellbeing of the environment and concern for related nature-society dynamics, suggest both
theories share a related normative aim, or vanishing point—namely, the possibility of
nature-society reconciliation.
However, in part because of different ideological affiliations, ecological
modernization theory assumes that the possibility of nature-society reconciliation is
currently being actualized, as indicated by so-called “actually existing ecological reform”
and the related potential brought about through processes of reflexive modernization.
Treadmill of production theory, on the other hand, assumes that social relations under
capitalism, such as class exploitation, and other forms of domination within modern
society greatly inhibit the possibility of nature-society reconciliation from being
actualized. Viewed in light of their mutually-shared normative aim and commitment,
ecological modernization theory assumes the possibility of nature-society reconciliation
can be actualized in and through existing social conditions and is therefore essentially
affirmative. Treadmill of production theory, on the other hand, assumes that existing
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social conditions prevent the actualization of the possibility of nature-society
reconciliation and, therefore, takes a critical stance toward existing social conditions.
Although it is certainly not without its shortcomings, I contend that the critical
approach of the treadmill of production is a theoretical advancement over affirmative
approach of ecological modernization theory, which, as I have indicated, relies on an
argument whose explanans do not provide a full or relevant explanation of the
explandum. The more significant shortcomings of the affirmative approach, which cannot
be evaluated in terms of descriptive analytic criteria and which I shall discuss separately
below, will become clearer as this dissertation proceeds. Compared to ecological
modernization theory, treadmill of production theory appears to be a more theoretically
sound and analytically-useful approach to the study of the environment. The treadmill of
production theory is situated within historical and societal contexts, allowing for a
specific explanation of the relationship between increasing environmental degradation
and some of the most important political and economic changes in post-WWII American
society. Espousing the ecological potential of neoliberalism in face of its ecological
challenges, ecological modernization theory appears to reflect (as opposed to critically
reflect on) the problematic and contradictory nature of accelerating processes of
globalization since the 1970s. This passive reflection/unrecognized maintenance is also
why ecological modernization theory is inadequate to this dissertation’s aim of
deciphering the environment-society problematic in theoretical, historical, and societal
contexts. The treadmill of production approach certainly lends a more focused lens by
critically reflecting on the problems and contradictions brought about in and through
institutional and structural changes in American society throughout the latter half of the
twentieth century. To reiterate, the treadmill of production approach analyzes the increase
in environmental degradation following the Second World War as an outcome of specific
reconfigurations between business, labor, and government. As such, the treadmill of
production is theoretically instructive insofar as it is capable of grasping the relationship
between modern society and biophysical nature as one of intrinsic opposition.
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While treadmill of production theory is to be applauded for its significant
contribution to environmental sociology, I must now inquire further into the possibility of
nature-society reconciliation, including how the treadmill theory evaluates and explains
related efforts toward ameliorating current environmental destruction. Where exactly
treadmill of production theory locates the possibility of nature-society reconciliation is
not entirely clear. With regard to the explanation and evaluation of related efforts aimed
toward ameliorating current environmental destruction, Schnaiberg and Gould (2001:
221) indicate an obligation to force the treadmill of production to yield to concerns for
preserving the environment other than those required for the perpetuation of its own
perpetuation. Schnaiberg and Gould (2001) note the importance of activism and the need
to develop realistic alternatives to the current anti-ecological economic system. As they
explain,
Environmentalists will have to recognize and address the real socioeconomic tradeoffs
involved in treadmill modification, using sound political persuasion and sound economic
planning (Redclift 1987). Mechanisms to distribute the economic costs of environmental
protection more equitably throughout the stratification spectrum will have to be
developed (…) To underestimate or to ignore the potentially regressive social impacts,
the depth and breadth of the tradeoffs or the resistance of those powerful actors whose
interests may be threatened is to invite political defeat.
To press for voluntary reduction on a mass scale based on concern for the intrinsic rights
of ecosystems, species, and individual nonhuman organisms is also to invite defeat in the
public political arena (…) The best hope for making gains based on sustaining the
environment for its own sake will be to raise consciousness on a mass scale through
success in achieving sustainability for other social uses. (Schnaiberg and Gould, 2001:
221-222)

For reasons I have yet to discuss and which will be elaborated separately in
chapters two and three below, the critical stance of treadmill of production theory is not
critical enough, insofar as it does not engage the type of critical, dynamic, and reflexive
(immanent) critique required to comprehend the fact that domination of biophysical
nature is also domination of inner human nature. In other words, treadmill of production
is a critical sociology of the environment; it is not a critical theory of the environment.
Although the necessity of a critical theory of the environment will be elaborated in the
unfolding of this dissertation, the difference between a critical theory and a critical
sociology of the environment can be illustrated by considering the treadmill’s focus on
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exploitation and vested “interests.” As mentioned above, treadmill of production theory
assumes social relations under capitalism, such as class exploitation, and other forms of
domination within modern society greatly inhibit the possibility of nature-society
reconciliation from currently being actualized. For example, with regard to the (socioecological) emancipatory potential of science and technology, treadmill theorists
emphasize the significant role played by elite decision-makers within social institutions
such as universities, states, and corporations (see e.g. Gould, 2009). From a critical
sociology perspective, which again is consonant with treadmill of production, these
institutions reflect the “interests” powerful individuals at the top of the social pyramid,
who benefit from the perpetuation of the treadmill. A critical theory perspective, on the
other hand, would view elite decision-making in terms of an external social necessity
created by, yet imposed on all members of society.42 This is not to deny the fact that
certain individuals and groups benefit from the way the system is organized. However,
the inner workings of the system cannot be explained by this fact.43
Regarding the issue of science and social institutions, the critical sociology of the
treadmill of production should be cognizant of its socio-historical embeddedness, but it is
deficient in this regard. The critical theory approach advanced in this dissertation, on the
other hand, allows us to reflect upon approaches in the sciences that are even more
oblivious to their embeddedness and how they perpetuate certain features of modern
societies that they are not consistent with, e.g., in terms of their analyses. This, of course,
raises the question of how we might appropriate the analyses and representations of what
is real provided by “science” (e.g., the Anthropocene discourse) in a way that recognizes
42

The notion of an external social necessity created by, yet imposed on social action is contradictory. The
methodological-theoretical significance of mediation (elaborated in chapters two and three below), which is
crucial to critical theory, allows us to confront this contradiction head-on. The external social necessity to
which I refer is a process of mediation. Conceptualized in terms of mediation, this “external” social
necessity operates within and through all members of society. Critical sociology, which focuses on the fact
that certain members of society benefit from the social structure thus created, is therefore unable to explain
“external” social necessity as a process of mediation. Lukács’s critique of reification, Adorno’s critique of
identity-thinking, and Postone’s critique of labor (via his critique of traditional Marxism), which I discuss
in chapter three below, are different attempts to specify various aspects of historically specific heteronomy,
or “external” social necessity.
43
For recent theoretical efforts aimed toward specifying social institution, see Boltanski (2011: 50-82). On
the unspecified, problematic nature of “interests,” see Dahms (2000: 1-30).
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the severity of our current ecological situation without affirming this information as if
science were above critique, which it cannot be, logically, according to critical theory.
While this is a complex issue that goes beyond the more specific aims and purpose of this
dissertation, the reader must be aware that what established scientific approaches present
as real is always in danger (and even likely) to reflect ideological context, which is not to
suggest that what established scientific approaches present is simply “wrong”, but that, at
a deeper level of analysis and critique, related constructions of what is real would need to
be scrutinized.
2. Moving beyond Prevailing Conceptions of Environmental Sociology in the USA
This section moves toward a more pointed and critical review of aspects of
environmental sociology by examining values-based and traditional Marxist-oriented
approaches to environmental sociology in the USA in order to assess whether or not –
and if so, how exactly – these approaches help us make sense of the paradoxical nature of
the environment-society problematic. I argue that in order to further research efforts
accordingly, environmental sociologists must be able to grasp objective drivers of
human-ecological and forms of subjectivity as a synchronous yet intrinsic oppositional
unfolding in space and time.
2.1 The Formation of American Environmental Sociology and the Values-Based
Approach
The “official” development of environmental sociology in the USA began in the
late 1970s and was initiated by Catton and Dunlap, whose 1978 essay, “Environmental
Sociology: A New Paradigm,” is now commonly recognized as the first formal attempt to
delineate an environmental sociology proper.44 Catton and Dunlap’s (1978, 1980)
“human exemptionalist paradigm” (HEP) presents a set of fundamental assumptions they
believe point toward an underlying anthropocentrism uniting even the most divergent
sociological approaches and theoretical orientations. For Catton and Dunlap, the HEP
illustrates how the entire sociological tradition, especially the classical cannon (i.e. Marx,
44

The following provides only a brief sketch of the “official” development of the sub-discipline in the USA
initiated by Riley E. Dunlap, William Catton, and others. For a more comprehensive review of the field see
Villancourt (1995).
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Durkheim, Weber), is devoid of systematic insight into environmental problems.
Approaches that fall within this domain, according to Catton and Dunlap, analyze social
factors, forces, and institutions separate from the biophysical environment. Following
Kuhn (1962), Catton and Dunlap claimed that this supposed “impasse” signified a
scientific crisis that marked the opportunity for a paradigmatic shift (i.e. environmental
sociology).
Questioning what they considered to be sociology’s inherent anthropocentrism,
Catton and Dunlap developed a New Environmental Paradigm (NEP), later termed the
New Ecological Paradigm. The fundamental premises of the NEP revolve around three
basic assumptions listed below:
1) Human beings are but one species among the many that are
interdependently involved in the biotic communities that shape our social
life.
2) Intricate linkages of cause and effect and feedback in the web of nature
produce many unintended consequences from purposive human action.
3) The world is finite, so there are potent physical and biological limits
constraining economic growth, social progress, and other societal
phenomena. (Catton and Dunlap, 1978: 45 [emphases added])
While the initial attempt to circumscribe an environmental sociology proper in the
late 1970s was fueled by the felt need to incorporate biophysical factors into sociological
research, the historical (and dialectical) genesis of contemporary concern for the
environment was left unquestioned. Although Catton and Dunlap’s appropriation of
Kuhn is certainly questionable, especially in light of the debates regarding the
applicability of Kuhn’s scientific revolution thesis to the social sciences (see e.g.
Habermas 1983 [1981]; Hassard, 1993; Lakatos, 1970, 1980); today, we may ask: does
an overarching anthropocentrism connect sociology generally and the classics, which
represent different agendas respectively (cf. Buttel, 1978; Foster, 1999)? If so, does this
represent an impasse worthy of Kuhnian revolution? As I will endeavor to demonstrate,
the push to establish environmental sociology’s niche within the discipline, far from
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signifying scientific crisis, is perhaps more indicative of the incorporation and projection
of environmentalism’s ideological concerns (Bloor, 1991 [1976]: 79-83; cf. Luhmann and
Fuchs, 1994: 129). For the origins of environmental sociology, this involved the twin
tasks of demarcating the uniqueness of a specialization’s territory (environmental
sociology) while simultaneously legitimizing the new approach. As a consequence,
efforts to establish environmental sociology as a new sub-discipline eschewed the most
important theoretical insights of the classical tradition in an effort to legitimate the
specialization’s novelty.
It appears that from the retrospective position of more than thirty years later, the
early efforts to ecologically revolutionize sociology have resulted in the uncritical
incorporation of problematic epistemological assumptions of U.S. environmentalist
discourse, as evidenced by the values-based approach to environmental sociology. These
assumptions rest on the notion of an unmediated relationship between concrete humanecological transformation and the social perception and understanding of the natural
environment. When the history of U.S. environmentalism is taken into account, for
example, it is typically couched within the basic notion that the cumulative effects of
human-induced environmental degradation in post-World War II American society
reached a significant level where public attention to the environment coalesced with a
variety of specific political and cultural factors during the 1960s (see Dunlap and Mertig,
1992; Gottlieb, 2005 [1994]). On this basis, a normative framework is constructed from
which solutions to environmental problems are located within the realization of
individual ecological consciousness. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the valuesbased approach is driven by a strong normative commitment aimed toward increasing
individual environmental awareness.45 Unfortunately, the NEP-influenced, values-based
approach treats environmental concern (taken here to be a “surface-level phenomenon”)
as if it is somehow directly indicative of more fundamental, underlying social dynamics.
According to the critical theoretical perspective elaborated in this dissertation, however,
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Catton and Dunlap (1994), for example, contend that the vitality of environmental sociology itself
depends on individual concern for the biophysical environment.
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in order to understand contemporary environmental concern effectively, environmental
sociologists must recognize concern for the environment as an historical manifestation of
underlying social dynamics.
2.1.1 The Values-based Approach
Although the concept of values has been defined in various ways, when
researchers talk about environmental values they are usually referring to “the various
ways in which individuals, processes and places matter, our various modes of relating to
them, and the various considerations that enter into our deliberations about action”
(O’Neill, Holland, Light, 2008: 2).46 To study the specific ways individuals or groups
relate to environmental values is to examine the ways these relationships bring about
different sources of environmental concern (O’Neill, Holland, Light, 2008: 2).47 The
values-based approach typically follows a two-fold formula: (1) measurement of
individual environmental values and (2) analysis of their relationship to behavior deemed
“environmentally consequential” (Dietz, Fitzgerald, Shwom, 2005: 336).
The system of value measurement developed by Rokeach (1973) and Wicker
(1969) has laid the foundation for the majority of empirical work on environmental
values, and research based upon Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1980) theory of reasoned action,
having been determined statistically valid, remains essential for analysts trying to explain
the somewhat tenuous relationship between environmental values and behavior.48
Survey-based methodology (e.g. mass phone or mail public opinion surveys) is favored
among values researchers, who use this technique to uncover the effect of group
differences (race, class, gender, etc.) on so-called “environmentally consequential
behavior” (e.g. recycling, driving behavior, support for environmental legislation, and so
on). Environmental values, measured by regression and treated as dependent variables,
are then explained with reference to various factors such as age, race, class, sex, and
46

For a comprehensive review of the environmental values literature, see Dietz, Fitzgerald, Shwom (2005).
Since the values-based approach tends to be atheoretical (Stets and Biga, 2003), and because there is a
wide variety of diverse claims regarding the exact definition of environmental values (see e.g. Schultz et
al., 2005), I use the term “values-based” environmental sociology to refer to survey-based public opinion
research on environmental attention, concern, awareness, and the like.
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Statistical analyses of the relationship between environmental attitudes and behavior continue to yield
inconsistent results.
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political party orientation (among various other demographic control variables). These
values are then employed in conclusion sections of journal articles where they are
typically invoked in discussions of how to develop a more sustainable relationship with
the environment.
One of the most striking and problematic features of the values-based approach is
that it simply assumes environmental values have the ability to influence decisions
relating to individual environmental behavior in practically meaningful and politically
significant ways. By relying on data derived from public opinion surveys, for instance,
this approach effectively reifies the “public” by expecting a select group of survey
respondents, as they answer questions related to environmental problems or issues, to
somehow represent the public in a way that can actually be transposed into effective
political action (cf. Adorno 2005 [1965]). If people’s opinions and individually-oriented
actions, such as recycling, have a meaningful political effect on environmental
degradation, then how do we explain the positive correlation between increased
destruction and growing attention and concern in recent decades?
Is it possible that this research may unintentionally support a homogenizing
ideology presupposed by the assumption of “free” normative action, particularly in
American society? The originality of democracy, as Lefort (1988) tells us, is that its
legitimacy is rooted in “the people,” which is at the same time connected to an “empty
space” impossible to occupy; that is, the distinction between legitimacy/illegitimacy is
essentially open-ended. Public opinion surveys, on the other hand, are an implicit attempt
to unify the social domain by seeking a more or less uniform acceptance of what the
social is under the aegis of freedom of opinion. This is not an entire over-exaggeration
because it is worth recalling the fact that “public” opinion (in the sense I have been using
the term) originated as a decision technology for policy formation produced by and for
the American cold war military-industrial complex (Amadae, 2003). In this sense,
indicators pointing to the recent rise in public attention and concern for the
environment—far from indicating signs of improvement—are actually rooted in ideology
and violence.
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By not critically reflecting on its own incorporation in social time and space, the
values-based approach to environmental sociology produces a positivistic
misrepresentation of the “subjective” dimension of the environment-society problematic
severed from its material connections to the “objective” capitalist system. This approach
affirms the ideology of “free” normative action, which hides the real divisions between
environment and society. In fact, the ideal of a practically meaningful and politically
significant relationship between environmental values and behavior is ultimately
undermined by the values-based approach itself.
2.2 Marxist-oriented Environmental Sociology
Unlike the values-based approach, Marxist-oriented environmental sociology
operates with an explicit theory of history. While this should be a welcome relief in light
of the preceding discussion, I contend that Marxist-oriented environmental sociology
falls short insofar as it remains confined to what Moishe Postone (1993) calls “traditional
Marxism,” which, as we shall see, takes the relationship between capitalism,
environment, and society for granted and treats Marxism as an a priori theory of
society.49 I identify two related shortcomings of “traditional Marxist” environmental
sociology: (1) non-reflexivity and (2) the treatment of Marxism as an analysis of
capitalist exploitation and domination within modern society as opposed to an analysis of
the form of modern society itself.50 Given the variety of work that may be subsumed
under the “traditional Marxist” heading, the following discussion will focus primarily on
the work of John Bellamy Foster and his colleagues, whose Marxist-oriented
environmental sociology (particularly Foster’s concept of “metabolic rift”) has made a
significant contribution to the field in the U.S.51
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I elaborate Postone’s theory, including its potential contribution to environmental sociology in greater
detail in chapter three below.
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This is central to Postone’s (1993: 66) distinction between “traditional” and “critical” Marxism,.
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The concept of metabolic rift has been employed in a number of empirical studies that examine actual
environmental destruction (see e.g. Austin and Clark, 2012; Longo, 2012). My aim here, however, is to
locate various disconnects between actual ecological conditions and its subjective side.
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2.2.1 Non-reflexivity
John Bellamy Foster’s concept of metabolic rift, rooted in his interpretation of
Marx as a social theorist concerned with the fundamental metabolism between humans
and nature, is an attempt to conceptualize nature-society interaction within capitalist
society (Foster, 1999, 2000). Foster explains the theoretical premise of his approach as
follows:
It was in Capital that Marx’s materialist conception of nature became fully integrated
with his materialist conception of history. In his developed political economy, as
presented in Captial, Marx employed the concept of “metabolism” (Stoffwechsel) to
define the labor process as ‘a process between man and nature, a process by which man,
through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between
himself and nature.’ Yet an ‘irreparable rift’ had emerged in this metabolism as a result of
capitalist relations of production and the antagonistic separation of town and country.
Hence under the society of associated producers it would be necessary to ‘govern the
human metabolism with nature in a rational way,’ completely beyond the capabilities of
bourgeois society. (Foster, 2000: 141)

The concept of metabolic rift advances several propositions. First, ecosystems are
characterized by complex relationships of interchange that aid in their regeneration and
continuance. Second, the labor process constitutes a dialectical, metabolic relation
between humans and the biophysical environment; thus, the economic system can be
characterized as a social metabolic order. Third, an economic system predicated on
constant growth and reproduction on larger scales undermines natural cycles and
processes. From this, the social metabolism is increasingly separated from the natural
metabolism, producing metabolic rifts in natural cycles and processes. Finally,
technological development employed to increase productivity intensifies the metabolic
rift.
While these propositions are potentially significant for environmental sociology,
we must be careful to ascribe the theory of metabolic rift to Marx since he did not use this
terminology and was not driven to develop a theory based on such terminology. The issue
here has less to do with the “correct” interpretation of Marx and more with whether or not
Foster’s theory of metabolic rift risks reducing the complexity of nature-society dynamics
to a static, rigidified, and anachronistic form of scientific dialectics. Adorno (1974: 268;
in Cook, 2011: 25-26), for example, contends that Marx did not develop a theory of
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humanity-nature metabolism for philosophically sound reasons. According to Adorno,
the absence of a scientific theory of humanity-nature metabolism in Marx may have been
an intentional analytic move on Marx’s part in order to indicate that “nature” is
irreducible to the human conception of it (Cook, 2011: 26). Perhaps because of this, and
as Cook (2011: 25) points out, Foster does not recognize that his own concept of
metabolic rift requires interpreting Marx’s mention of natural history in the preface to the
first edition of Capital as alluding to capitalism as first—not second—nature. Adorno, on
the other hand, shows the concepts “history” and “nature” are both thoroughly dialectical.
Juxtaposing these two concepts, he thereby sheds light on an historical dynamic in order
to critique the present. Susan Buck-Morss’s (1977: 56-57) gloss on Adorno’s idea of
natural history is particularly apt in this regard: “if the biophysical takes the appearance
of an ontological first, or a static permanence, then history severs this illusion. If history
appears as linear progress, then history as an extension of ‘first nature’ illustrates modern
society’s severance from the biophysical as a form of contemporary destruction and
domination.”
Foster’s appropriation of the concept of nature may also be reflective of American
environmental sociologists’ more general aversion to “constructionism,” which is
sometimes viewed as constituting a threat posed by European and “postmodern”
environmental sociologists to the mainstream American commitment to “scientific
realism.” For example, addressing his American colleagues on the twenty-fifth
anniversary of U.S. environmental sociology, Foster (2005a: 57) writes,
Environmental sociology in Europe tends to be influenced to a greater extent by
postmodernist theory and to take a more cultural/constructionist direction. Such radical
constructionism often resembles, in certain ways, the human exemptionalism of the past.
Partly for this reason, U.S. environmental sociology, which is predominantly realist, has
had relatively little influence within Europe, and the spread of postmodernist
environmental sociology predominantly from Europe often appears as a threat to what
has been achieved here (...) Once we abandon realism, our capacity to deal with the real
ecological crises arising out of the dialectical interaction of nature and society are much
reduced. (Foster, 2005a: 57)

The irony of this defense, especially for Marxist-oriented environmental
sociology, is that it is anti-materialistic insofar as it relies on a wholly abstract concept of
“nature.” “Nature,” I contend, must be understood in terms of Marx’s concept of
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alienation, which in turn demands an understanding of the dialectical reciprocity of the
biophysical environment and production (see Mészáros, 2005 [1970]: 116). In this sense,
nature does not refer to external, or trans-historic, “nature” but to a process whereby
capitalist production works in and through both the biophysical, or so-called “external
nature,” and the human body/consciousness, or so-called “internal nature,” thereby
transforming both (see e.g. Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002 [1947]). This reflexive
approach is not necessarily at odds with Foster’s “objective” analysis of capitalism’s
destruction of the environment. However, because Foster divorces Marx’s “scientific”
approach from his overall critical theory of modern society Foster is unable to go the
extra step to show the powerful role played by capitalist production in shaping the
possibilities of subjective experience,52 and he is therefore unable to grasp the concept of
metabolism in Marx (Stoffwechsel) to be referring to a process of co-evolution between
nature and history (Cook, 2011, 2006).
2.2.2 Marxism as an Analysis of Capitalist Exploitation and Domination within Modern
Society
Related to this lack of reflexivity is the “traditional” Marxist treatment of
Marxism as an analysis of exploitation and domination within modern society rather than
an analysis of the form of modern society itself (Postone, 1993: 66). Foster and his
colleagues Clark and York (2010) illustrate the problematic nature of such an approach
quite well when they combine the concept of metabolic rift with the so-called
“Lauderdale Paradox,” thereby constructing a meta-theoretical amalgam that they
contend is not too dissimilar from an ecological reading of Marx’s distinction between
use-value and exchange-value, which Foster and his team then apply to critique the
shortcomings of orthodox economics.
The “Lauderdale Paradox” is derived from the work of James Maitland, Earl of
Lauderdale, who in 1819 distinguished between “public wealth” and “private riches.” As
ecological economist Herman Daly (1998: 22) notes, “Lauderdale called attention to the
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Adorno’s (1973 [1966]: 183-186) discussion of the preponderance of the object is especially important in
this regard.
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paradox that private riches could expand while public wealth declined simply because
formerly abundant things with great value but no exchange value become scarce, and
thereby acquired exchange value and were henceforth counted as riches.” Put simply, the
so-called “Lauderdale Paradox,” as employed by Foster and his colleagues, is shorthand
for the idea that there is an inverse correlation between public wealth and private riches,
which means that if things such as air and water are given exchange value then these
items will be diminished at the expense of the public wealth (Foster, Clark, York, 2010:
55).
Foster does not explicitly endorse public distribution over private appropriation,
to be sure. Indeed, he has been advocating what he calls “ecological revolution” for the
past few years (see e.g. Foster, 2005b, 2009). Yet, his Marxist critique of capitalism,
albeit with an environmental twist, is rooted in a “traditional Marxist” understanding of
the labor theory of value; in other words, it is framed in terms of a critique of private
property and the market that is overly simplistic, superficial, and distorting. For example,
Foster’s aforementioned ecological critique of neoclassical economics is rooted in his
argument that the capitalist market valuation of nature is fundamentally inadequate and
anti-ecological (Foster, Clark, York, 2010; see also Burkett, 1999, 2006). The only reason
the environment has so easily become a lucrative field of capitalist investment geared
toward sustainability is because of “a distorted accounting deeply rooted in the workings
of the system that sees wealth entirely in terms of value generated through exchange”
(Foster, Clark, York, 2010: 53 [emphases added]). Given that this is indeed the case, it
seems rather self-defeating to assume that Marxist-oriented environmental sociology
should be geared towards showing the system as flawed, as if to tell the so-called
“neoliberals,” “I told you so.” Instead of identifying capitalism’s exploitation and
domination with particular individuals and/or groups, a more useful analysis, I contend,
would direct our attention away from particular individuals and groups and toward the
form of society guided by the logic of capital itself. For it is certainly not the case that if
individuals were simply informed of capitalism’s destruction of the earth they would then
recalibrate their self-identity and live a different, more ecologically-friendly life. From
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the perspective of capital—the defining logic of modern societies—the production of
value is rational.53
Foster and his collaborator Paul Burkett have attempted to debunk the narrative
that Marxism is unconcerned with ecology (Burkett, 1999, 2006; Burkett and Foster,
2006; Foster and Burkett, 2004), and their efforts have made a significant contribution in
this regard. According to Burkett (2006: 130), “It is one thing to point out formal
contradictions between nature’s material forms and capitalism’s monetary and market
forms; it is quite another (but equally necessary) to establish tensions between
capitalism’s own material requirements and the reproduction of natural wealth. The latter
task demands that the ecological critique of money and markets be grounded in a critique
of wage-labour and capital.” But notice that the object of analysis for both Foster and
Burkett is private property and the market, which is then critiqued from the standpoint of
labor. The problem is that this approach fails to grasp the coercive aspects of labor, which
under capitalism structure a form of abstract domination that penetrates into the very
nature of what the social is.
By employing Postone’s (1993) distinction between “traditional” and “critical”
Marxism we can further specify the shortcomings of “traditional Marxist” environmental
sociology. As indicated, this approach assumes the standpoint of the proletariat as the
normative and historical basis for the critique of capitalism. The “traditional Marxist”
critique of capitalism is essentially positive in that it affirms the structure of labor already
in existence. The implications of this affirmation become strikingly clear when we
consider the issue of social change. Postone (1993: 66) explains the “traditional Marxist”
approach to this issue as follows: “the capitalist class is to be abolished in socialism, but
not the working class; the private appropriation of the surplus and the market mode of
distribution are to be negated historically, but not the mode of production.”
In contrast to “traditional Marxism,” and as Postone (1993) has convincingly
argued, value is not necessarily tied to a historically-specific mode of distribution.54
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I am not dismissing the ideal of reason itself, to be sure. A more adequate understanding of the
relationship between structure and practice, as we shall see below, can be gleaned from a critical
appropriation of Lukács’s categorial approach to Marx’s categories outlined in Capital.
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Value is, instead, a historically-specific form of social wealth, which means the labor that
constitutes value is historically specific as well. The determinateness of alienated labor as
such cannot therefore be captured in terms of concrete forms of exploitation and
domination within modern society, nor can this dynamic be understood by relying on an
undifferentiated notion of “labor.”55 The critical Marxian approach put forth by Postone
grasps the historical specificity of labor under capitalism as structuring a form of abstract
social domination, which in turn allows us to scrutinize the form of modern society itself.
Like the opposition of use-value and exchange-value expressed as two poles of a
contradictory unity that acquire immediacy in the commodity, the labor embodied in the
commodity possesses this double character in the form of abstract value-creating labor
and concrete useful labor (Marx, 1976 [1867]: 131-137). This so-called “doublecharacter” is a defining feature of labor under capitalism as commodity-determined labor:
it consists of isolated individual labor while simultaneously assuming “the form of
abstract generality” (Marx, quoted in Postone 1993: 47). As a particular use-value, the
commodity is the product of a particular concrete labor; as a value the commodity is the
objectification of abstract human labor (Postone, 1993: 154; Marx, 1976 [1867]: 125131). Despite the “critical” efforts of traditional Marxism, socio-ecological domination
under capitalism is impossible to grasp in terms of objective appearances alone because,
under capitalism, concrete labor as a “first-order mediation” (i.e. the self-mediation of
humanity with nature) interacts with abstract labor as an alienated “mediation of the
mediation” (Mészáros, 2005 [1970]: 79), thereby transforming both.
Socio-ecological domination in contemporary capitalist society cannot be
understood simply by pinpointing the anti-ecological character of the market; in other
words, the market is unable to express the “value” of the biophysical. Insofar as
“traditional Marxist” environmental sociology roots its critique of capitalism in the
54

“Once fully established socially, it [value] can be distributed in various ways” (Postone, 1993: 45). This
would include non-market modes of distribution, such as planning.
55
Following Postone, I use “labor” in quotes to indicate a trans-historic conception of labor as the
metabolism between humanity and nature. For Postone, the explanatory power of this overly general
conception of labor is rather narrow, and he insists that we root our analysis in terms of the historical
specificity of capitalist labor, namely its double character.
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existing structure of labor, it is unable to capture reification as a thoroughly social
process of mediation.56 The environment-society problematic (i.e. the paradox of
increased global ecological despoliation amid wide-spread attention and concern during
the latter half of the twentieth century) must be discerned at the theoretical level because
it neither can be captured directly at the level of immediate experience nor can it be
grasped with reference to processes taking place at the “surface level” of social reality. In
other words, we cannot adequately understand this paradox by solely relying on the
objective facts of actual ecological destruction. We must also be able to take into account
the synchronous development and reciprocal interaction of the subjective dimension of
the environment-society problematic. So although Foster’s claims that the only solution
to the environment-society problematic is a socialist ecological revolution may be
correct, these claims do not, however, mean that such stated goals are a possibility (see
Foster, 2005b, 2009).
3. The Environment-Society Problematic Reconsidered
Due to the elusive nature of the environment-society problematic, the underlying
dynamics fueling the synchronicity of (1) increased environmental degradation and (2)
widespread growth of environmental attention and concern since the Second World War
must be understood must be understood theoretically with regard to the relational
specificity of these dynamics. The gap between the subjective dimension and the
objective dimension, as reflected in the research gap between the values-based approach
and traditional Marxist-oriented environmental sociology, is both real and frustrating
since it is precisely the synchronicity of these two dimensions as they have developed
throughout the latter half of the twentieth century that remains paradoxical.
One of the key tasks for environmental sociology, and one of the areas where
critical theory promises to make a distinct contribution, is in the development of a
theoretical framework capable of grasping the relational specificity of the subjective and
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The traditional conception of reification, as illustrated by Lukács (1971 [1923]), views reification as the
covering up of true social nature as embodied in productive capacities of the proletariat. To anticipate my
argument below, the issue of the relationship between ontology and anthropology appears in a new, more
productive light once we understand alienation as “the origin and the conceptual core of reification”
(Vogel, 1996: 34).
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objective dimension of the environment-society problematic. Chapter two outlines my
methodology of critique, which I contend is capable of understanding the conditions for
this subjective-objective severance as necessary but not sufficient while at the same time
recognizing why such an understanding demands the negation of these conditions in
order to transform them.
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CHAPTER 2: THE METHODOLOGY OF CRITIQUE

When sociologists speak of methodology, they typically are not actually referring
to methodology per se but to a particular method or set of methods. The accepted
definition of methodology currently propagated within the social sciences is that of the
so-called “scientific method.” Although the scientific method as methodology is
essentially positivistic,57 over the past few decades, the term “positivism” has gained an
increasingly pejorative connotation within the social sciences, particularly sociology.
Because of this negative connotation, sociologists are today unlikely to openly embrace
positivistic research, preferring instead to affiliate themselves with any one of the many
available methodological approaches (e.g. ethnography, comparative-historical analysis,
world-system analysis, textual analysis, network analysis, etc.) (Steinmetz, 2005).
Despite the proliferation (and fragmentation) of various research methods since the
1970s, positivism remains the dominant methodological approach within the discipline of
sociology (Steinmetz, 2005).
In light of the fragmentation and proliferation of research methods, it is important
to distinguish between methodology, on the one hand, and methods, on the other.
Methodology, as Strydom (2011: 8) explains, refers to “the systematicity of methods in a
certain domain, the logic or theory governing methods for the purposes of knowledge and
theory production,” whereas methods refer to the “related procedures and techniques.”
Following Adorno (see Adorno et al., 1972), who contended that methodology should be
appropriate to the object of study, the received reduction of methodology to the scientific
57

Although Auguste Comte is credited with coining the terms “positivism” as well as “sociology,” the
meaning of the term positivism and its relation to the discipline of sociology has become increasingly
opaque since Comte’s day. Following Benton and Craib (2001: 23), positivism may be delineated as a term
that describes approaches that “share the following four features: 1) The empiricist account of the natural
sciences is accepted; 2) Science is valued as the highest or even the only genuine form of knowledge (since
this is the view of most modern empiricists, it could conveniently be included under 1); 3) Scientific
method, as represented by the empiricists, can and should be extended to the study of human mental and
social life, to establish these disciplines as social sciences; 4) Once reliable social scientific knowledge has
been established, it will be possible to apply it to control, or regulate the behavior of individuals or groups
in society. Social problems and conflicts can be identified and resolved one by one on the basis of expert
knowledge offered by social scientists, in much the same way as natural scientific expertise is involved in
solving practical problems in engineering and technology.”
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method is simply inappropriate this dissertation, which attempts to identify the elusive
nature of the dynamics fueling the antithesis between modern capitalist society and the
natural environment, particularly the paradoxical nature of the environment-society
problematic. Insofar as the dominant methodological reductionism is unable to reflect
upon its immersion in time and space (see Dahms, 2008), it is unable to critically reflect
upon its own knowledge production as constitutive of the evolution of social reality.
This chapter outlines the methodology of critique that informs this dissertation.
Critical theory as methodology, I argue, must be able to critically and reflexively account
for
1) the conditions of its own possibility (i.e. its own social context) and
2) the immanent possibility of the fundamental transformation of this context
(i.e. the notion that the theory’s condition of possibility is itself generative
of its own supersession).
The chapter begins with a discussion of Piet Strydom’s (2011) Contemporary
Critical Theory and Methodology, which is perhaps the most exhaustive examination of
the overall methodological program of critical theory to date, in order to introduce the
reader to the types of issues and problems with which critical theory as methodology
must confront. The second section discusses dialectical methodology and, therefore,
focuses on the methodological function of mediation and alienation as social mediation.
In the third section of the chapter, I distinguish immanent critique as the core of critique
as methodology and engage a discussion of Horkheimer’s (1937) essay, “Traditional and
Critical Theory.” The chapter concludes by indicating the necessity of critical theory.
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1. Methodology within Critical Theory
Piet Strydom’s (2011) Contemporary Critical Theory and Methodology is perhaps
the most exhaustive examination of the overall methodological program of critical theory
to date. Strydom traces the development of critical theory from its classical foundations
in Kant and Hegel to the left-Hegelians and to Peirce and Kierkegaard, while also
presenting a detailed account of the relation between the appropriation of the classical
foundations by pragmatists like Royce, James, Dewey, Mead, and Mills and early critical
theorists such as Korsch, Lukács, Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse. Although Strydom
is concerned primarily with the relationship between the pragmatist tradition and
contemporary critical theory,58 his detailed attention in locating methodology within the
architecture of the critical theory tradition is instructive for the purposes of introducing
the reader to the sorts of methodological issues and problems that critical theory must
confront.
In contrast to Morrow and Brown (1994), whose Critical Theory and
Methodology presented the methodological core of critical theory as a mode of analysis
geared toward analyzing the relationship between structure and agency, Strydom
contends that since the late 1980s “immanent transcendence” has emerged as the key
methodological concept of critical theory primarily because it links contemporary critical
theory to its classical foundations in Kant and Hegel, the left-Hegelians, and the
pragmatists. Table 3 shows the architectonic structure of critical theory as a social
scientific theoretical research program. Following Strydom (2011), it is important to
emphasize the interrelations between each dimension since the methodology of critical
theory finds its place within this context.
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Contemporary critical theory is distinct from the first generation of critical theorists associated with the
so-called “Frankfurt School.” Contemporary critical theory refers to the second generation (e.g. Apel and
Habermas) third generation (e.g. Wellmer, Eder, and Honneth), and fourth generation (e.g. Celikates and
Jaeggi) of critical social theorists. The methodological approach of this dissertation, however, is rooted in
the framework put forth by the first generation of critical theorists. In order to avoid possible confusion, I
refer to this approach as Frankfurt School critical theory. It is important to be aware, however, that the
notion of a unified, collective Frankfurt School (methodological) approach is quite problematic, as
Abromeit (2011), Tarr (1977), Wheatland (2009), and others have pointed out.
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Table 3. Architectonic structure of Critical Theory
Dimension

Focal Concern

Transcendental

Conditions of Possibility

Dialectic

Goal Pursued

Normative

Guiding moral-ethical-political principles

Ontological

Character and scope of social reality and its relation to nature

Epistemological

Cognitive and knowledge production processes, the interest guiding
its pursuit, kind of knowledge, modes of inference, and context of
intersubjective justification

Methodological

Logic of knowledge and theory production, social scientific
employment, intersubjective testing, justification and practical use
Source: Strydom, Contemporary Critical Theory and Methodology (Routledge, 2011), pg. 8.

The transcendental dimension of critical theory, as Strydom (2011: 9) explains, is
rooted in the assumption that “humans are practical, corporeal beings who engage with
the world in a restricted number of ways which allow the opening up of different
perspectives, interests in knowledge, categorical lines of questioning and constitution of
corresponding objects of knowledge as well as intersubjective reflection in the form of
argumentation or discourse.” On this basis, critical theory engages reality in accordance
with the aim of enhancing social existence (Strydom, 2011: 9). That social existence
might be enhanced is a possibility immanent to the theory’s social context.59
The dialectical and normative dimensions of critical theory are inseparable from
the transcendental dimension. The normative dimension of critical theory should be
understood from within a framework that views morality and ethics as operative in
59

It is important to note at this point that meaningful experience hinges on the possibility of an
emancipated socio-cultural-biophysical existence.
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everyday life as well as in the activity of social research. From this perspective, both
everyday life and the activity of social research are seen as “being structured by ideas of
reason or regulative ideas that operate simultaneously as immanent moral obligations and
transcendent guidelines or critical standards for autonomous agents’ ethically informed
orientations and actions” (Strydom, 2011: 9; cf. Boltanski, 2011; Bourdieu, 2004). As
Strydom (2011: 9) explains,
Critical Theory aims at enlightenment, emancipation and transformation, including selftransformation. Its goal is to clarify the processes of the constitution of society by
accounting for the mechanisms at play in the process and, particularly, in the deformation
or blockage, and to do so in a way that facilitates problem solving and world creation.

With regard to the concept of immanent transcendence, Strydom (2011: 96)
emphasizes, “it is necessary to recognize that the transcendent ideas present in all human
forms of life are not absolutely transcendent, but point towards a state beyond the present
which could be realized, with the result that the actual situation is transformed in some
crucial respect.” In terms of the (immanent) possibility of nature-society reconciliation
discussed above, the actualization of this possibility entails a qualitative transformation to
the nature of existing environment-society dynamics. In this sense, a critical theory of the
environment is emphatically radical and revolutionary.
According to Strydom (2011), the dialectical tension between immanence and
transcendence must be registered in a dimension of potentiality deep-seated in social
reality. As he explains,
This deeper dimension of social reality would be an abiding form of human engagement,
experience, interests or practices which simultaneously makes social reproduction
possible and points beyond all forms of social organization so that it time and time again,
not just here and now in the present, gives rise to situation-transcending claims.
(Strydom, 2011: 104)

Critique, then, is grounded in the “accumulated historical potential” of human
agency, which critical theory then seeks to make apparent so that this potential is or could
be achieved to some extent through social practices (Strydom, 2011: 135). Such critical
recognition, in turn, demands the negation of these social conditions in order to transform
them. This context-transcendent moment is at the heart of what Strydom refers to as
immanent transcendence.
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At the theoretical level, Strydom (2011: 11) distinguishes between versions of
critical theory that, on the one hand, are concerned with “the process of the constitution,
reproduction, organization, transformation and evolution of society” (see e.g. Habermas,
1979) and theories that are concerned with “interfering forces, factors or processes which
allow the intrusion of an element of distorting or blocking violence into social relations
and the process of the factual realization of the potential of counterfactual socio-cultural
ideas of reason.” Although Strydom stresses that the overall structure of critical theory as
an intellectual tradition requires both types of theories, I would like to draw attention to
this division since it has been ossified somewhat in and through the work of second,
third, and fourth generation critical theorists.
According to Nelson (2011), in attempting to deal with the failure of Marxism
many contemporary critical theorists, such has Habermas and Honneth, have largely
abandoned a focus on materiality in favor of “linguistic or communicative idealism”
(Nelson, 2011: 125), which, as Nelson (2011) explains, drastically lessens the potential
contributions contemporary critical theory might make toward a critical theory of the
environment capable of providing insight into today’s worldwide ecological crises.60
While the Frankfurt School’s emphasis on the theoretical dichotomy between subject and
object has been recast by Habermas and others in intersubjective, communicative terms,
the approach of this dissertation aims toward a critical engagement with the fundamental
intricacies of the subject-object model, which, I argue, is a model more appropriate for
engaging the environment-society problematic from a critical theoretical perspective.
There are at least three main reasons why such an approach is appropriate for
critically engaging the environment-society problematic. First, such an approach
indicates the parameters of a methodology of critique and a critique of methodology
capable of grasping the interplay between the subjective dimension and the objective
dimension of the environment-society problematic without privileging one over the
other.61 Second, the resolution of the dialectical tension between immanence and
60

See also Biro et al. (2011).
This is comparable to Postone’s (1993) approach. His reinterpretation of Marx’s critical theory of
modern society has significantly influenced my work on the environment-society problematic. Postone
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transcendence via communicative mediation downplays the mediation between social
subjectivity and social objectivity; conversely, the more critical approach sees the
mediation between social subjectivity and social objectivity as both structuring and
structured forms of social practice. On this basis, communicative action could be
theoretically re-conceptualized in terms of the social relations thus constituted.62 Third,
the communicative framework of contemporary critical theory presupposes what needs to
be established, namely the actuality of meaningful communication, which, as indicated, is
linked intrinsically to its social context.
Epistemologically, critical theory requires self-reflexive awareness and critical
recognition of the fact that the scholar’s active participation in social research represents
“a moment of participation in the evolution of reality – that is, of society and nature”
(Strydom, 2011: 12). This critical reflexivity therefore demands responsible engagement
with reality, indicating critical theory’s pragmatic-realist dimension (Strydom, 2011: 12).
Strydom explains that from within the methodological framework of critical theory
theoretical knowledge production is employed for explanatory purposes, which are
simultaneously geared toward concrete engagement and transformation. Thus, critical
theory does not claim to adhere to a dualism between the purely analytic and the purely
political (Strydom, 2011).
At the ontological level, Strydom stresses that critical theory sees the dividing line
between society and nature as relatively fluid. Although not necessarily at odds with this
proposition, the theoretical and methodological approach of this dissertation responds to
ontology by returning to the methodological function of mediation, which redirects
attention to the fact that the so-called “ontological” dimension is always already socially
mediated. Approaches that engage ontology without explicit recognition of its social
mediation do so at the risk of denigrating themselves into ideology (see e.g. Archer,

(1993: 5) explains his approach as follows: “Such an approach recasts the question of the relation between
culture and material life into one of the relation between a historically specific form of social mediation and
forms of social ‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity.’ As a theory of social mediation, it is an effort to overcome
the classical theoretical dichotomy of subject and object, while explaining that dichotomy historically.”
62
This dissertation does not pursue the communicative problematic further. For a critical assessment of the
so-called “communicative turn” within contemporary critical theory, see Morris (2001).

59

1995; Bhaskar, 2008; Searle, 1995). The methodological function of mediation would
therefore suggest that if discussions of ontology are to have theoretical-empirical
purchase they must first concede the analytic and political priority of social mediation.
2. Prolegomena to Dialectical Methodology: The Methodological Function of
Mediation
In order to explicate the methodological function of mediation, which is central to
the dialectical approach of this dissertation, I must first turn briefly to Hegel. I should
emphasize the brevity of this engagement in no way does justice to the intricacies of
either Hegel’s philosophy or the methodology of the dialectical approach. As such, and
for the sake of clarity, I will rely on Marcuse’s (1960) Preface, “A Note on Dialectic,” of
his book, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, which was among
the first texts to engage in a detailed study of Hegel’s system and its implications for
Marxian theory 63
Hegel represents an important break in the history of Western thought not only
because he recognized that ideas themselves are historically constituted but because his
work represents a mode of cognition—negative thinking—that Marcuse (1960 [1941]:
vii) notes, “is in danger of being obliterated.”64 It is telling that today one would be
presuming too much to claim that even the Marxist tradition upholds the power of
negativity. Marcuse provides a superb gloss on the significance of negativity, which is
worth quoting at length:
[The] world contradicts itself (…) Philosophical thought begins with the recognition that
the facts do not correspond to the concepts imposed by common sense and scientific
reason – in short, with the refusal to accept them. To the extent that these concepts
disregard the fatal contradictions which make up reality, they abstract from the very
process of reality. The negation which dialectic applies to them is not only a critique of a
conformistic logic, which denies the reality of contradictions; it is also a critique of the
given state of affairs on its own grounds – of the established system of life, which denies
its own promises and potentialities. (Marcuse, 1960 [1941]: vii [emphases added])
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On the theoretical and sociological significance of Marcuse’s book, see Anderson (1993).
For a more recent discussion of negative thinking, see Noys (2010).

60

The negativity of dialectical thought is therefore inherently revolutionary; its
critique of the status quo is grounded in the internal inadequacy of the existing state of
affairs. As Marcuse further explicates,
Dialectical thought starts with the experience that the world is unfree; that is to say, man
and nature exist in conditions of alienation, exist as ‘other than they are.’ Any mode of
thought which excludes this contradiction from its logic is a faulty logic (…) While the
scientific method leads from the immediate experience of things to their mathematicallogic structure, philosophical thought leads from the immediate experience of existence to
its historical structure: the principle of freedom (…) and the very process of existence in
an unfree world is ‘the continuous negation of that which threatens to deny (aufheben)
freedom.’ Thus freedom is essentially negative (…) [Dialectical thought functions] to
demonstrate that unfreedom is so much at the core of things that the development of their
internal contradictions leads necessarily to qualitative change: the explosion and
catastrophe of the established state of affairs. (Marcuse, 1960: ix)

To demonstrate the perpetuation of unfreedom in a world that claims to be free is
an effort of what Hegel termed “determinate negation”: “The negation is determinate if it
refers the established state of affairs to the basic factors and forces which make for its
destructiveness, as well as for the possible alternatives beyond the status quo” (Marcuse,
1960: xi-xii). Hegel’s philosophical notion of truth, for instance, does not rest simply on
the correspondence between the concept and external reality but is itself an attribute of
reality as process. Marcuse explains this aspect of Hegel’s dialectical philosophy:
Something is true if it is what it can be, fulfilling all its objective possibilities. In Hegel’s
language, it is then identical with its notion. The notion has a dual sense. It comprehends
the nature or essence of a subject-matter, and thus represents the true thought of it. At the
same time, it refers to the actual realization of that nature or essence, its concrete
existence. All fundamental concepts of the Hegelian system are characterized by this
same ambiguity. They never denote mere concepts (as in formal logic), but forms or
modes of being comprehended by thought. (Marcuse, 1960 [1941]: 25 [emphases added])

As Strydom (2011: 23) explicates, for Hegel, “‘the Idea’ (e.g. freedom) (…)
means the concept together with the actualization of that concept.”65 The idea of freedom
refers to its rational dimension, whereas the process of actualization refers to its
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According to Marcuse (1960 [1941]: xii), “it is the idea of Reason itself which is the undialectical
element in Hegel’s philosophy.” The implications of Marcuse’s claim are, in many ways, fleshed-out in my
discussion of Adorno’s negative dialectics and negative philosophy of history in chapter three, although I
do not address the similarities and differences between Adorno’s and Marcuse’s studies on Hegel. The
issue Marcuse raises ultimately revolves around the relationship between history and freedom. For Adorno,
the very historical moment that gave rise to the idea of humanity actualizing freedom as a concrete
possibility is precisely that which prevents the actualization of this historical possibility (see Adorno, 1998
[1962]).
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immanent dimension (Strydom, 2011: 23). Hegel links the concept to the concrete, or the
process from the rational to the actual, through mediation (Strydom, 2011: 23). Hegel
unfolds this dialectic in the first subdivision of his Science of Logic, which concludes that
there is a qualitative basis to the changes of quantity and quality (Hegel, 1969: 474; cf.
McTarggart, 1964: 92). Hegel’s conception of essence refers to this qualitative
foundation, but essence, according to Hegel, is by no means impervious to the changes of
quantity and quality. The second major subdivision of the Logic explicates the relation
between appearance and essence as an internal relation not to be understood in a dualistic
manner. For Hegel, the shifts from the Logic to Philosophy of Nature and then to the
Phenomenology are themselves an unfolding of the dialectic (see Marcuse, 1960 [1940]:
24-25).
Although Marx’s critical social theory certainly represents a break from Hegel,
the idea that Marx set Hegel on his feet is somewhat distorting.66 While a comparative
assessment of the social, historical, and theoretical relationships between Hegel and Marx
and how these relationships are linked to the similarities and differences between their
respective dialectical methodologies is well beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is
important to bear in mind the specificity of the different socio-historical contexts within
which Marx and Hegel lived and wrote. Considering this background, I would suggest
that Marx remained committed to the dialectical conceptual approach developed by
Hegel, especially the central role played by negative thinking, although he did so in and
through a socio-historical context quite distinct from Hegel’s.
Although Marx is often interpreted as a theorist of social class, particularly within
sociology (see, e.g., Wright, 1993), to the extent that Marx articulated a concept of class,
this concept was essentially critical (Postone, 1993). It is clear that Marx’s approach to
class, in particular, is in accordance with negative thinking and the dialectic approach
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The idea that Marx stood Hegel on his feet or, put differently, turned Hegel on his head, is Engels’s
although it is often mistakenly attributed to Marx himself. Discussing the shift from idealism to
materialism, Engels explained, “Thereby the dialectic of concepts itself became merely the conscious reflex
of the dialectical motion of the real world and thus the dialectic of Hegel was turned over; or rather, turned
off its head, on which it was standing, and placed upon its feet” (Engels, 1946 [1886]).
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more generally.67 The famous opening line of the Communist Manifesto, “the history of
all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles,” while written as a piece of
agitation, is, from the perspective of critical theory (and Marx was perhaps the first
critical theorist), a critique of history itself. As Marcuse points out,
Marx’s materialistic ‘subversion’ of Hegel, therefore, was not a shift from one
philosophical position to another (…) but rather a recognition that the established forms
of life were reaching the stage of their historical negation (…) From this stage on, all
thinking that does not testify to an awareness of the radical falsity of the established
forms of life is faulty thinking.
No method can claim a monopoly on cognition, but no method seems authentic which
does not recognize that these two propositions are meaningful descriptions of our
situation: ‘The whole is the truth,’ and the whole is false. (Marcuse, 1960: xiii, xiv)

In order to unpack the methodological implications of Marcuse’s statement, “‘The
whole is the truth,’ and the whole is false,” we must again return to Hegel since the first
part of this statement is Hegel’s. According to Reichelt (2005: 33), Hegel’s philosophy
remains distinct within the context of modern Western philosophy because “it conceives
of reality as an inverted world that is in-itself self-contradictory”—a distinction that
Adorno would later incorporate in his notion of society as “objective appearance.”
According to dialectical methodology, appearances neither cover up essence nor are they
less “real” than essence. This dialectic between essence and appearance is crucial to
understanding the methodological function of mediation as essentially dynamic. For
Marx, following Hegel, appearance and essence are internally related. As Richard Gunn
(1982: 3) makes clear, “The relation between appearance and essence (…) is nondualistic inasmuch as it is in and through its appearance that essence is.” For Hegel,
actuality is the unity of appearance, or significance of a thing, and its essence, or
existence. Appearance involves the dialectic of form (the internal organization of the
content of a thing) and content (the totality of relations and potentialities of the same
thing).68 For Marx, essence, which necessarily appears, is socially and historically
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To the extent that Marx articulated a concept of class, his aim was to foster a form of historical
consciousness that would engender recognizing the present as a moment of the possible—the possibility
that people may control, rather than be controlled by, that which they create.
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On this terminology, see http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/help/glossary.htm
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constituted. Phenomena, according to Marx, both express and veil underlying historical
dynamics. This is evident in Marx’s mode of presentation in Capital, Volumes 1-3.69
The methodological function of mediation in Marx’s (mature) theory, as operative
in his unique mode of presentation, is perhaps most clearly illustrated in Marx’s
discussion of the commodity in the first volume of Capital.70 Capital, Volume 1 was
written after volumes two and three and, according to Sperber (2013: 421), reflected
Marx’s methodology after 1850, especially “his ambivalent feelings about the
increasingly dominant positivist understanding of knowledge.” Marx’s discussion of the
commodity is notoriously difficult. Although Marx begins Capital with a general
discussion of the commodity, he is interested in the historical specificity of capital’s
social forms, particularly the contradiction between the historically-determined nature of
essence, on the one hand, and appearance, on the other. For example, although Marx
writes about labor as the substance of value and labor time as the measure of its
magnitude, he also notes, “The form, which stamps value as exchange-value, remains to
be analyzed” (Marx, 1976: 131).
Deciphering the complexity of Marx’s mature theory is further complicated by
Marx’s unique mode of presentation.71 This is evident in the first chapter of Capital,
Volume 1, which should not be interpreted as a causal historical development (Postone,
1993: 128-130). Rather, Marx’s mode of presentation is essentially retrospective: “each
category presupposes those which follow” (Postone, 1993: 128). This peculiar mode of
presentation is not provisional. As Postone explains:
Marx explicitly states that his categories express the social forms not as they first appear
historically but as they exist, fully developed, in capitalism (…) To the extent that a
logical historical development leading toward capitalism is presented—as in the analysis
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As Postone (1993: 134) explains, “Whereas Marx’s analysis of value in Volume 1 is the analysis of
capitalism’s essence, his analysis of price in Volume 3 is of how that essence appears on the ‘surface of
society.’” .
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Unfortunately, the traditional Marxist interpretation of Hegel too often interprets Geist as completely
abstracted from material and/or sensuous reality (see e.g. Foster, 2000; Paolucci, 2007). Such an ahistorical
interpretation is distorting at best, especially given the experiential element of Hegel’s philosophy (see
Adorno, 1993 [1963]). On the differences and similarities between Hegel and Marx’s concept of mediation,
see Postone (1993: 216-225).
71
I will return to this issue in chapter three when I discuss Moishe Postone’s reinterpretation of Marx’s
critical theory.
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of the value form in the first chapter of Capital—the logic must be understood as being
retrospectively apparent rather than immanently necessary. The latter form of historical
logic does exist, according to Marx, but…it is an attribute of the capitalist social
formation alone. (Postone, 1993: 129)

For Marx, history is not contingent nor is there a universal history or ultimate
“Truth.” Rather, our knowledge of the past is situated within the present, which does
have a logical historical development insofar as the present is shaped by the logic of
capital. This logic also creates the possibility of critical reflection on the present as such,
which must be taken into account in our dealings with the past. Marx does not begin his
analysis with “onto-epistemological assumptions” based on “scientific categories” (see
e.g. Paolucci, 2007: 67-146) nor does his method of inquiry break entirely with his
method of presentation (see e.g. Sayer, 1979). The general logic from which Marx
unfolds his categories is intrinsic to the multi-dimensional dynamic of capital.72 The
historical dialectical logic of Marx’s theory is related to the specifically reflexive
character of his social theory. As such, the presentation of Marx’s theory cannot
contravene historical specificity.
In other words, Marx’s point of departure in Capital can only be justified by the
unfolding of the analysis itself. As CRL James (1947) aptly put it,
Dialectic for Hegel was a strictly scientific method. He might speak of inevitable laws,
but he insists from the beginning that the proof of dialectic as scientific method is that the
laws prove their correspondence with reality. Marx's dialectic is of the same character
(…) he ridiculed the idea of having to ‘prove’ the labour theory of value.73 If the labour
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Paolucci (2007: 87-88), for example, misrecognizes the multidimensional aspect of capital and on this
basis dismisses Postone contra Marx.
73
James is referring here to Marx’s (1868) famous letter to Kugelmann, where he states: “Where science
comes in is to show how the law of value asserts itself. So, if one wanted to ‘explain’ from the outset all
phenomena that apparently contradict the law, one would have to provide the science before the science. It
is precisely Ricardo’s mistake that in his first chapter, on value, all sorts of categories that still have to be
arrived at are assumed as given, in order to prove their harmony with the law of value. On the other hand
(…) the history of the theory of course demonstrates that the understanding of the value relation has always
been the same, clearer or less clear, hedged with illusions or scientifically more precise. Since the reasoning
process itself arises from the existing conditions and is itself a natural process, really comprehending
thinking can always only be the same, and can vary only gradually, in accordance with the maturity of
development, hence also the maturity of the organ that does the thinking. Anything else is drivel. The
vulgar economist has not the slightest idea that the actual, everyday exchange relations and the value
magnitudes cannot be directly identical. The point of bourgeois society is precisely that, a priori, no
conscious social regulation of production takes place. What is reasonable and necessary by nature asserts
itself only as a blindly operating average. The vulgar economist thinks he has made a great discovery when,
faced with the disclosure of the intrinsic interconnection, he insists that things look different in appearance.
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theory of value proved to be the means whereby the real relations of bourgeois society
could be demonstrated in their movement, where they came from, what they were, and
where they were going, that was the proof of the theory. Neither Hegel nor Marx
understood any other scientific proof.

Hence, it is only retrospectively apparent that Marx’s treatment of commodity in
the first chapter of Capital, Volume 1, which he presents by indicating the production and
exchange of the enormous number of goods in the capitalist economy, is something other
and more than external objects produced for market exchange. Only half-way through the
first volume does it become more apparent that Marx’s category of commodity actually
refers to the structuring principle of a historically-specific form of social life. Here
Marx’s mode of presentation is in line with Hegel’s conceptual development (Sperber,
2013: 426). As such, the dual form of the commodity is also the mode of cognition
specific to the historically-determinate form of existence under capitalism. It indicates a
historically-specific form of social life characterized by internal contradictions, such as
the opposition between abstract and concrete, general and particular. Marx’s categories,
such as commodity and value, are not simply economic categories. More essentially these
categories denote alienated modes of being comprehended by thought (see Marcuse, 1960
[1941]: 25). Such a categorial approach can and should be distinguished from a
categorical approach, which treats categories, such as commodity and value, as
essentially “external” (e.g. as market mediated economic categories).
An understanding of Marx’s categorial approach therefore allows for a better
appreciation of his contention in Capital, Volume 1 that the commodity is the economic
cell form of bourgeois society. Marx also notes that as such the commodity is “sinnlich
übersinnlich,” or both “perceptible and imperceptible,”74 which Bonefeld (2012: 31), in
accordance with Hegel’s Phenomenology, translates as “sensuous supersensible.” This is
why, as mentioned above in chapter one, despite the “critical” efforts of “traditional”
Marxist-oriented environmental sociology, socio-ecological domination under capitalism
In fact, he prides himself in his clinging to appearances and believing them to be the ultimate. Why then
have science at all?”
74
As Bonefeld (2012: 31) indicates, this formulation appears only twice in Capital and once in
Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy – where the English version of Capital translates it as
“transcendent” and then as “perceptible and imperceptible.”
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is impossible to grasp in terms of objective appearances alone since, under capitalism,
concrete labor as a “first-order mediation” (i.e. the self-mediation of humanity with
nature) interacts with abstract labor as an alienated “mediation of the mediation”
(Meszaros, 2005 [1970]: 79), thereby transforming both.
The methodological implications of this contradiction can be elaborated by further
examining Marx’s treatment of commodity in Capital in light of the discussion of
mediation thus far. On this basis, the commodity is the mode of existence (the form of
appearance) of the mediation that is the contradictory unity of abstract and concrete labor
it embodies (Marx, 1976 [1867]: 131-137). The historical determinateness of labor under
capitalism is this so-called “double character.” As a defining feature of alienated labor
under capitalism, commodity-determined labor consists of isolated individual labor,
which simultaneously assumes “the form of abstract generality” (Marx, quoted in Postone
1993: 47). Individuals constitute and are constituted by forms of social practice. Yet as an
expression of alienated social relations, commodity-determined labor structures and is
structured by social relations, which, although constituted by individuals, exist “quasiidependently” of these very same individuals (Postone, 1993: 76). This is why, in terms
of use value, the commodity is the product of a particular concrete labor, whereas, as a
value, it is the objectification of abstract human labor time expenditure (Postone, 1993:
154; Marx, 1976 [1867]: 125-131).75
The abstract generality of the commodity, which exists quasi-independently of
individuals who create and are created by it, is Marx’s initial determination of the form of
abstract domination specific to capitalist society (see Postone, 1993). This has
implications for this dissertation’s aim of examining the environment-society
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Although I elaborate Postone’s reinterpretation of Marx as a critical theorist of modern society in chapter
three, it is important at this point to note the distinction between Postone’s categorial analysis, which he
contends is in line with Marx’s critique of political economy, and the categorical analysis of traditional
Marxism. Postone’s categorial interpretation analyzes the double-character of labor in capitalism as
constituting “the basis for a historically specific, abstract, and impersonal form of social domination”
(Postone, 1993: 30), which underlies the fundamental contradiction between value and wealth (or “real
wealth”). A categorical interpretation, on the other hand, posits “an undifferentiated notion of ‘labor’ as the
source of value without having further examined the specificity of commodity-producing labor” (Postone,
1993: 55). This is characteristic of traditional Marxist approaches grounded in a “class-centered”
interpretation and understanding of capitalism.
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problematic. When investigating the environment-society problematic, it is crucial that
we analytically distinguish between the transformation of the objective dimension of the
environment-society problematic (i.e. actual, concrete human-ecological transformation
via labor), on the one hand, and the subjective dimension of the environment-society
problematic (i.e. the social perception and understanding of such transformations), on the
other. As I will argue below, Frankfurt School critical theory exemplifies a level of sociohistorical reflexivity capable of acknowledging the necessary reciprocity between the
subjective and objective dimensions of the environment-society problematic while at the
same time recognizing their distinction. Engaging this dialectic is necessary in order to
pinpoint alienation and reification (discussed in chapter three) as key mediating processes
between the subject-object dimensions. For if environmental sociologists fail to grasp
alienation and reification, then the distinction between the subjective and objective
becomes unrecognized since the subject-object dimensions, in capitalist society, are
always already conflated in the commodity form whereby these dimensions are subsumed
under the identity principle of exchange society (discussed in chapter three). In this sense,
the notion of an unmediated relationship between people’s transformation of the
(socio)biophysical world and our perception and understanding of this transformation not
only fails to recognize these two moments as non-identical but also perpetuates the
contradictory dynamic of capital insofar as it fails to recognize alienation and reification
as structuring concrete social practices that produce and reproduce the
subjective/objective severance in and through space-time.
The categories Marx unfolds in his mature work, such as commodity, value, and
capital, which I elaborate in more detail in chapter three, are likely to be misunderstood
without first engaging Marx’s category of alienation as a key process of social mediation.
Alienation is perhaps the single most significant element of continuity between the
“young” and the “mature” Marx. Although there are important distinctions to be made
between Marx’s early and mature works, one gets an entirely different understanding of
Marx’s later theory of capital if and when severed from his earlier theory of alienation.
Moreover, the categories Marx puts forth in the three volumes of Das Kapital are
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alienated categories (Postone, 1993). As an attempt to grasp the nature of social reality
under capitalism, these categories must be seen as emerging within a context of alienated
social relations.
2.1 Alienation as Social Mediation
The methodological function of mediation in Marx’s critical theory must be
rooted in his theory of alienation. The significance of alienation for Marx was already
evident in his doctoral dissertation on Epicurean philosophies of nature, which Marx
wrote three years prior to the Paris Manuscripts of 1844. In his dissertation Marx
emphasized the contradictory character of the world, focusing specifically on the
contradiction between existence alienated from its essence. Referring to alienation as “an
independent, autonomous mode of existence” (Marx, quoted in Mezaros, 2005 [1970]:
67), Marx noted that “the ‘absolute principle’ of Epicurus’ atomism—this ‘natural
science of self-consciousness’—is ‘abstract individuality’ (Marx, quoted in Meszaros,
2005 [1970]: 67). Marx would elaborate his ideas on alienation in later works, most
notably the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (also referred to as the Paris
Manuscripts of 1844).
One of the most significant elements of Marx’s theory of alienation, which also
distinguishes it from those of both Hegel and Feuerbach, is Marx’s treatment of the
dialectic between ontology and anthropology (Mezaros, 2005 [1970]: 43). Meszaros
(2005 [1970]: 43) emphasizes the significance of this aspect of Marx’s theory of
alienation as follows: “the specific anthropological factor (“humanity”) cannot be grasped
in its dialectical historicity unless it is conceived on the basis of the historically
developing ontological totality (“nature”) to which it ultimately belongs.” With this
contextualization in mind, Marx further developed his theory of alienation through a
critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, where Marx argued that the Enlightenment idea
of a “‘natural’ realization of Triumphant Reason” was the ideological supersession of
religion, which previously had served to justify the status quo (Meszaros, 2005 [1970]:
43). Hence, as Meszaros (2005 [1970]: 47) notes, “no sooner are the achievements of the
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Enlightenment realized than they are liquidated.” Marx fleshed-out the implications of
this statement, especially with regard to Hegel, later in his Paris Manuscripts.
My approach to Marx’s category of alienation as a category of mediation should
be understood in light of the foregoing discussion. According to Marx, alienation is the
determination of the mode of existence (Existenzbestimmungen) under the conditions of
capitalism. As Postone (1993: 224) explains, “Marx developed the theory of alienation as
one of a historically specific mode of social constitution, whereby determinate social
forms—characterized by the opposition of an abstract universal, objective, law like
dimension and a ‘thingly,’ particular dimension—are constituted by structured forms of
practice and, in turn, shape practice and thought in their image.”
As the first critical theorist of modern society, Marx developed his (unfinished)
theory of alienation through a critique of Hegel and Smith, and in the process he
identified and analyzed the intrinsic contradictions constitutive of modern, bourgeois
society (Dahms, 2006: 11). These contradictions, as Dahms (2006: 11) notes, “are most
conspicuous in tensions between the values of democracy (as espoused most explicitly
during and by the French Revolution, in terms of liberty, equality, solidarity) and the
imperative of a market-based economy operating according to the capitalist mode of
production, and foreshadowing industrialization.”
Marx’s category of alienation refers to an inherently dynamic set of social
processes, constituted by the capitalist mode of production that, in addition to estranging
humans from nature, self, consciousness, and others, simultaneously rewrites reality so as
to inhibit these very same humans from consciously recognizing that this estrangement is
indeed the case (Marx, 1988 [1844]). When Marx discusses the estrangement of the
worker from the product of his labor, for example, he is also referring to alienation from
the external sensuous world, which is, at the same time, taken to be “nature.” Likewise,
labor’s relation to the act of production within the labor process (the relation of the
worker to their own laboring activity) is, under capitalism, necessarily alien activity.
Alienation from species-being (i.e. the ontological identity of individual and society)
transforms man’s consciousness from his being as a member of the human species into
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“an independent, autonomous mode of existence” (Marx, quoted in Mészáros [1970]
2005: 67). In this way humans are alienated from other humans.
Alienation is the foundation of the entire complex of social relations under
capitalism, and as such it comprises a set of mediating processes between subject and
object. Alienation as a form of social mediation can be seen as an elaboration of Marx’s
theory of practice, which he had previously outlined in the Theses on Feuerbach
(Postone, 1993: 219). According to Postone (1993), Marx’s theory of practice breaks
with the subject-object dualism of traditional epistemology to conceptualize objectivity
and subjectivity as mediated through social practice. On this basis Marx is able to
elucidate the link between epistemology and normative action as being rooted in the
structure of social relations (Postone, 1993: 219).76 Relatedly, Marx circumscribes his
standards of critique as a function of existing social reality. Since the criterion of validity
is social rather than absolute (Postone, 1993: 219n), Marx is able to ground his critique
without collapsing into relativism.77 This grounding is overlooked by Derek Sayer
(1979), who, in stressing the Kantian impulse in Marx’s theory of knowledge,
misinterprets the role of historical relativity in Marx’s method. According to Sayer:
Marx’s analytic…entails a clear dialectic, again in Kant’s sense of the word. This
dialectic consists in the establishment of the ‘extent and limits’ within which the
categories through which these forms are ordinarily grasped and can be validly applied,
and therewith determination of the boundaries within which theories which assume the
validity of these categories can legitimately purport to hold. If, with Marx, we assume
‘correspondence’ between the categories of thought and the phenomenal forms they
apprehend, then the conditions of validity of the former will strictly coincide with the
conditions of existence of the latter. Both will be historical. (Sayer, 1979: 109-110)

In contrast to Sayer (1979) and in line with Postone (1993), I content that Marx’s
sociohistorical theory of knowledge is something fundamentally other than a relativized
Kantian epistemology.78 Compared to Kant and Hegel, Marx sees social objectivity and
social subjectivity as constituted through social practice. “Praxis,” in this sense, refers to
76

The tenth thesis of Marx’s Theses, for example, asserts that ideas of reason are contained within yet point
beyond existing social reality (Strydom, 2011: 28).
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On Marx’s conception of reality, see Reichelt (2012).
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“Although Marx’s critical theory rejects the possibility of absolute knowledge, it does not imply a sort of
socially and historically relativized Kantian epistemology, for it seeks to grasp the constitution of forms of
social objectivity along with their related forms of subjectivity” (Postone, 1993: 218).
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the process whereby forms of social objectivity and social subjectivity are socially
constituted simultaneously. Praxis, as such, can then analyzed in terms of structures of
social mediation.79 More specifically, Postone explains,
[T]he mediating quality of labor…constitutes alienated social relations characterized by
an antinomy of an abstract, general, objective dimension and a concrete, particular
dimension, even as it objectifies itself in products. This duality gives rise to a sort of
unified field of social being in capitalism. An identical subject-object (capital) exists as a
totalizing historical Subject and can be unfolded from a single category, according to
Marx, because two dimensions of social life—the relations among people and the
relations between people and nature—are conflated in capitalism inasmuch as both are
mediated by labor. This conflation shapes both the form of production and the form of
social relations in capitalism, and it relates them intrinsically. That the categories of
Marx’s critique of political economy express both dimensions of social life in a single
unified form (which is, nevertheless, intrinsically contradictory) stems from this real
conflation. (Postone, 1993: 220)

Moreover, Marx’s socio-historical theory of knowledge is essentially dynamic. In
contrast to approaches that rely on interpreting Marx’s theory as elucidating historical
progression, the dynamic nature of Marx’s theory is not imposed from the outset. Rather,
the dynamism of Marx’s theory is grounded in the dynamic and contradictory nature of
capital—a historically specific motion generated from within the social context of which
the theory itself is an integral part.
3. Immanent Critique
According to Robert Antonio (1981: 330), “Immanent critique is a means of
detecting the societal contradictions which offer the most determinate possibilities for
emancipatory social change. The commentary on method cannot be separated from its
historical application, since the content of immanent critique is the dialectic in history.”
Antonio correctly suggests that critical theory is a not a general theory but rather a
method of analysis whose core is immanent critique. But because immanent critique is
“an historically applied logic of analysis rather than a fixed theoretical or empirical
content” (Antonio, 1981: 330), sociologists understandably (but not legitimately) have
trouble understanding critical theory.
Immanent critique is the most significant element of critical theory as
methodology. I contend that critical theory as methodology (i.e. immanent critique) must
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be able to critically and reflexively account for (1) the conditions of its own possibility
(i.e. social context) and (2) the immanent possibility of the fundamental transformation of
this context (i.e. the notion that social context itself is generative of its own supersession).
Critical theory, as exemplified by Marx’s theory, assumes that people are socially
constituted and rests on the premise that a more just and humane society is possible. In
order for a theory to be critical of society, the theory must view itself as an integral part
of social and historical reality. In other words, a theory that is critical of society cannot
advance from a standpoint outside its own social context (Postone, 1993: 87), hence the
significance of immanent social critique for critical theory.
According to Postone (1993: 88), that the structures and underlying social
relations of modern society are contradictory is what generates the possibility of a critical
stance toward this context. According to Marx’s theory, capital, as the structuring
principle of underlying social relations, both generates and prevents the possibility of its
own supersession. Critical theory’s referent of critique, although generated within
capitalist society, points outside existing social conditions. Critique’s conditions of
possibility are socially constituted by the dynamic and contradictory nature of modern
capitalist society. The referent of critique is emphatically “not yet”—a “not yet”
generated by the existing social conditions which simultaneously undermine this
possibility. The contradictory nature of modern society is what normatively compels and
analytically enables critical theory to develop tools capable of elucidating critical
recognition of the problematic features of modern capitalist society and the related
consequences that result from how our lives are created.
3.1 The Frankfurt School Revisited
It is unlikely that the first generation of critical theorists (Adorno, Marcuse,
Benjamin, Horkheimer, and others) would have developed the kind socio-historical
reflexivity they engaged had it not been for the social and historical conditions in
Germany during the 1920s and 1930s. The experience of the period between the two
World Wars required these theorists to development a theoretical perspective on social
reality that was sufficiently critical and self-reflexive. The early Frankfurt School
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theorists were driven by the need to understand the ways in which the working class in
Germany shifted to the political right instead of the left as traditional Marxists would
have expected. Throughout the 1940s, it became increasingly clear to these thinkers that
there was no direct correspondence between socio-economic contradictions and class
action. They viewed the rise of National Socialism in Germany and the lapse of the
Soviet Union into Stalinism as a demand for the fundamental reconstruction of Marxism
(Morrow and Brown, 1994: 15).
Central to the Frankfurt School reconstruction of Marxism was the availability of
Marx and Engels’s early manuscripts, which were reconstructed and published in German
in 1932 (Morrow and Brown, 1994: 91). Keeping in line with Marx’s materialism, the
Frankfurt School theorists combined, on the one hand, the concept of alienation with
Lukács’s concept of reification and, on the other, Weber’s notion of instrumental
rationality with Freud’s insights into processes of socialization in order to better
understand and acknowledge the contradiction between modern democratic society and
the actualization of human freedom. This theoretical reconstruction marked a decisive
break from the economic determinism characteristic of vulgar Marxism and classical
Marxist theory while simultaneously grounding social research in an uncompromising
recognition of the limits of the Enlightenment project coupled with an acute awareness of
the centralization and concentration of the means of mass manipulation.80
Marx’s dialectical critique is integral to the ideology critique of Frankfurt School
critical theory. The immanent critique of ideology, as Nicholson and Shapiro (1993
[1963]: x) explain in their introduction to Adorno’s book on Hegel, is the core of the
critical approach: “Truth is attained by unfolding both the truth content and the
contradictions of thought through linking it to the truth content and contradictions of its
social context and commitments.” The emphasis on social contradictions within a
historically-specific totality affords a perspective into the dynamic and potentially
regressive tendencies inherent in the historical “development” of modern capitalist
society, which in turn demands the negation of these conditions in order to transform
80

See, e.g., Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002 [1947]; Marcuse, 1991 [1964]; see also Jay, 1993 [1973].
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them. Critique, from this perspective, is grounded in the “accumulated historical
potential” of human agency, the topic critical theory then seeks to make apparent so that
this potential is or could be achieved to some extent through social practices (Strydom,
2011: 135). As such, the context-transcendent moment of immanent critique of ideology
explodes the theory/practice dichotomy, connoting what Celikates (2012) refers to as
“critique as emancipatory practice.”
3.1.1 Traditional and Critical Theory
Early Frankfurt School critical theory represents one of the few traditions of
social theorizing that developed out of and remained committed to a sufficient degree of
self-reflexivity. Max Horkheimer provided the methodological program for such an
intrinsically self-reflexive approach to theory and social research in his 1937 essay,
“Traditional and Critical Theory.” For Horkheimer, “traditional” theory presupposes
society as separate from observation and the activity of social research—not only as a
possibility but also as something desirable. Scientific activity, from a traditional
theoretical perspective, is seen as taking place alongside all other activities in society,
“but in no immediately clear connection with them” (Horkheimer (1972 [1937]: 197
[emphases added]), which means that data can be collected and tested accordingly. This
information can then be used to yield valid predictions of future events related to the
same phenomena. It is perhaps not surprising that the traditional approach to knowledge
production emphasizes applicability. Knowledge production’s aim, as such, is the output
of more and more science/knowledge, which exercises an inherently positive social
function.
The critical theoretical approach, on the other hand, recognizes the necessary
entwinement of history and knowledge and therefore emphasizes the limitations the
former places on the latter. It sees the socio-historical object of sociological analysis
(modern society) to be inseparable from the socio-historical reality of the researcher’s
milieu, which, in turn, defines reality perceived (Horkheimer, 1972 [1937]). For
Horkheimer, this interplay between individual and society literally shapes the perceptual
organ itself, thereby creating a conundrum for the positivist claim that scientific
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explanation alone leads to valid predictions of future events related to the same
phenomena. For critical theorists, the identification of individual and society is marked
by tension, insofar as the latter is not created through collective agency but rather
produced by the world of capital (Horkheimer, 1972 [1937]: 207-208). The critical
theorist’s conceptual apparatus is characterized by this tension as well. In other words,
although critical theory uses concepts to interpret society “exactly as they are interpreted
in the existing order, [regarding] any other interpretation as pure idealism” (Horkheimer,
1972 [1937]: 208), it also refuses to accept this order.
4. The Necessity of Critical Theory
It is in this sense that alienation is located as a key process of social mediation
between the subject-object dimensions of the environment-society problematic. The
elusive dynamic of alienation as social mediation must be grasped at the theoretical level
because it is not obvious at the level of immediate appearance. Against this theoretical
background, the positive correlation between increased environmental destruction and
people’s aggregate attention and concern for the well-being of “nature” is seen in a new
light, which is reflective of the paradoxical nature of social reality in modern society as
expressed through the contradictory reference frames of individual-society-nature. What
alienation means for environmental sociologists is that it is not possible to conceive of the
relationship between society and the environment separate from alienation, regardless of
the fact that, empirically speaking, alienation has eluded the attempts of most
environmental sociologists. The activity of social research is mediated in and through an
alienated form of productive activity. Insofar as the efforts of both social scientists and
natural scientists fail to recognize alienation as social mediation, their knowledge
production will reflect the real severance of the subject-object dimensions of the
environment-society problematic in alienated form. The fact that today we are able to
understand the potentially catastrophic effects of human-induced environmental
degradation more precisely than at any other point in human history and at the same time
remain incapable of reducing the rate at which this destruction continues to increase is a
case in point.
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CHAPTER 3: TOWARD A CRITICAL THEORY OF THE ENVIRONMENT

In the previous chapter, I indicated that the underlying dynamics fueling the
environment-society problematic must be understood at the theoretical level with
reference to alienation, which mediates the reciprocity between the objective dimension
(i.e. actual concrete human-ecological transformation through labor) and the subjective
dimension (i.e. our social conception and understanding of the natural environment) of
the environment-society problematic. I suggested that such a theoretical understanding of
mediation is also a theory of praxis whereby (á la alienation) people create structures
through social practice that in turn dominate them.81 I indicated that although nonidentical, the subject-object dimensions of the environment-society problematic appear
unified under the logic of capital and are therefore unrecognized at the level of immediate
experience, hence the need to understand alienation as social mediation at the theoretical
level. This chapter theoretically grounds and further elaborates these propositions in an
attempt to move toward a critical theory of the environment capable of grasping the
elusive nature of the environment-society problematic. Such a theory not only
understands the conditions for the subjective/objective severance of the environmentsociety problematic as necessary but not sufficient; this approach also indicates why such
an understanding demands the negation of these conditions in order to transform them.
The following chapter outlines the contours of a critical theory of the environment
through a detailed, though not exhaustive, theoretical analysis of 1) Georg Lukács’s
critique of reification; 2) Theodor W. Adorno’s critique of identity thinking; and 3)
Moishe Postone’s critique of traditional Marxism. In light of the fact that Lukács (18851971), Adorno (1903-1969), and Postone (1942 - ) each wrote successively, it is
suggested that, with regard to the potential contribution these theorists might make
toward a critical theory of the environment, we view the core critique of each theorist (i.e.
critique of reification, critique of identity thinking, critique of traditional Marxism), as an
attempt to “name” central aspects of the nature-society relationship at different,
81

On alienation as self-generated domination, see Postone (1993: 30-33, 68, 126, 158-159).
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successive stages of the development of modern capitalist society.82 In order to further
research efforts accordingly, the final section of this chapter advances the concept of
sociobiophysicality, or SBPh, as an attempt to “name” central aspects of the naturesociety relationship, including its elusively dynamic nature, in its dialectical unfolding
and recent incarnation at the beginning of the twenty-first century. As will become clear,
SBPh is less a category or concept to be applied than it is an attempt to “name” and make
visible an inherently dynamic process intrinsic to its “object” of study as an historical
experience whose contradictions and tensions are entwined with those of the thought
attempting to comprehend it.
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I am not suggesting that these theorists themselves conceived of their critical theoretical efforts as such,
to be sure. In contrast to approaches that project contemporary environmentalist ideas onto classical
thinkers, such as Marx (see, e.g., Foster, 2000), the potential contribution of Lukács, Adorno, and Postone
to environmental sociology is precisely their penetrating analyses of the dynamic and contradictory nature
of modern society and its effects on how our lives are created.
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1. Georg Lukács: Critique of Reification
Georg Lukács’s (1923) History and Class Consciousness (HCC hereafter)
represents an important split with the Marxism of the Second International and offers a
critique of the totalitarianism of the latter. As a result, HCC is considered one of the
founding texts of Western Marxism.83 In this collection of essays Lukács (1971 [1923]:
xxlii) explains that he seeks nothing other than to “understand the essence of Marx’s
method and to apply it correctly.” Accordingly, “the problem of commodities must not be
considered in isolation or even regarded as the central problem in economics, but as the
central, structural problem of capitalist society in all its aspects. Only in this case can the
structure of commodity-relations be made to yield a model of all the objective forms of
bourgeois society together with all the subjective forms corresponding to them” (Lukács,
1971 [1923]: 83). Although Lukács’s conclusion regarding the proletariat as the historical
Subject fell victim to the traditional form of theorizing his own theory promised to
surpass (see Postone, 2003), I contend that the conceptual core of his concept of
reification, in addition to his emphasis on the commodity form of social relations,
remains analytically vexing.
The following discussion engages Lukács’s essay, “Reification and the
Consciousness of the Proletariat,” and it is largely organized in accordance with the three
section structure of that essay. In the third section of my discussion below, however, I
break from a close reading of Lukács and shift my focus to the problematic nature of
Lukács’s conclusions, the nature of which will be elaborated more fully in my discussion
of Moishe Postone later in this chapter. I will conclude with a brief discussion of the
contributing potential of Lukács’s concept of reification for an environmental sociology
theoretically informed by a critical theory of the environment.
1.1 The Conceptual Core of Reification
Translated from German, reification (Verdinglichung) literally means “thingification.” While awkward, this translation is instructive nonetheless because it signals an
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The other key text here is Korsch’s (1923) Marxism and Philosophy, published the same year as HCC.

79

apathetic distance from that which makes us social.84 More specifically, the concept of
reification derived from Lukács refers to a form of social life under modern capitalism—
one in which human subjectivity is increasingly shaped in accordance with the objective
commodity form.
As the guiding motif of his oeuvre, the concept of reification is illustrative of
Lukács’s attempt to move beyond—by way of his reading of Hegel85—the subject-object
dualism that continues to plague post-Kantian philosophy and sociology to this day.86
Lukács’s critique of reification is not simply a critique of detached, contemplative
individual forms of bourgeois subjectivity. Rather, Lukács’s seeks to grasp reification as
a process grounded in the intrinsic connection between consciousness and social
structure.
Combining Marx’s critique of alienation and commodity fetishism and Weber’s
theory of rationalization, Lukács puts forth a “critique of capitalism in terms of a critique
of reification as the defining effect of the capitalist mode of production of all aspects of
social life” (Dahms, 2011: 11). Like Marx, Lukács’s analysis presupposes the commodity
as the dominant form of social relations under modern capitalism; these relations
structure and are structured by the intrinsic oppositions inherent in modern capitalism.
Unlike Marx, Lukács developed his critique of reification at a later stage of capitalist
development, during the years following the end of the First World War. As a result,
Lukács’s concept of reification “expresses the effects of the capitalist mode of production
on human beings and society as second nature – at a later stage of capitalist development:
advanced, monopolistic capitalism” (Dahms, 2011: 11). Drawing on Marx’s discussion of

84

On the plausibility of Lukács’s social ontology, see Joós (1983).
Lukács (1999 [1967]: xxiii), in his 1967 preface to HCC, said that his extension of the Hegelian dialectic
was an attempt to “out-Hegel Hegel”: “The proletariat seen as the identical subject-object of the real history
of mankind is no materialist consummation that overcomes the constructions of idealism. It is rather an
attempt to out-Hegel Hegel.”
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See Rose (2009 [1981]) on the ossification of the subject-object dualism within the discipline of
sociology. Rose (2009 [1981]: 29-34) also provides an assessment of Lukács’s attempt to break out of the
subject-object dualism. For a more “sociological” analysis of the phenomena of reification, see Gabel
(1975).
85

80

commodity fetishism in Capital, Volume 1,87 Lukács describes “the reification produced
by commodity relations” with regard to both “the objective evolution of society and for
the stance adopted by men towards it” (Lukcás, 1971 [1923]: 86). Lukács’s focus on the
structure of commodity relations as a model of the intrinsic relation between the subjectobject forms is the defining feature of his categorial appropriation of Marx’s category of
the commodity.
Lukács extends Weber’s analysis of rationalization, identifying it as a force
working in concert with the abstraction embodied in the commodity form. In keeping
with his categorial appropriation of Marx’s mature theory, Lukács’s analysis of
rationalization is concerned not only with the objective aspects of rationalization but also
with the intrinsic relationship between objective processes of rationalization and its
subjective effects as structured by the commodity form of social relations.88 On this basis,
Lukács identifies two key (subjective and objective) changes resulting from the
rationalization of work: (1) the severance of the “organic, irrational and qualitatively
determined unity of the product” (Lukács, 1971 [1923]: 88), which in turn effects an (2)
equally abstract fragmentation of the subject whereby the worker’s activity “becomes less
and less active and more and more contemplative” (Lukács, 1971 [1923]: 89). Lukács
(1971 [1923]: 92) analyzes the effects of economic rationalization in terms of the
dissimulating role played by the value form: “This rational objectification conceals above
all the immediate—qualitative and material—character of things as things. When usevalues appear universally as commodities they acquire a new objectivity, a new
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“The mysterious character of the commodity form,” which Lukács, quoting Marx, identifies as “the basic
phenomenon of reification” (1971 [1923]: 86), is that “the commodity reflects the social characteristics of
men’s own labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural
properties of these things. Hence it also reflects the social relation of the producers to the sum total of
labour as a social relation between objects, a relation which exists apart from and outside the producers.
Through this substitution, the products of labour become commodities, sensuous things which are at the
same time suprasensible or social” (Marx, 1976 [1867]: 164-165).
88
Here is it important to recall sociohistorical context within which Lukács put forth his critique of
reification. Processes of increased rationalization emerged with the consolidation of large-scale industry
and investment banks in the U.S., for example, at the beginning of the twentieth century. The concomitant
rise of the modern bureaucracy within the economy—the so-called “managerial revolution”—gave rise to
increasingly complex corporate hierarchies of organization and control.
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substantiality which they did not possess in an age of episodic exchange and which
destroys their original and authentic substantiality.”
Lukács explains the subjective effects of large-scale industry and the related
objective process of increased rationalization from the perspective of the worker:
[T]he period of time necessary for work to be accomplished (which forms the basis of
rational calculation) is converted, as mechanization and rationalization are intensified,
from a merely empirical average figure to an objectively calculable work-stint that
confronts the worker as a fixed established reality. With the modern ‘psychological’
analysis of the work-process (in Taylorism) this rational mechanization extends right into
the worker’s ‘soul’: even his psychological attributes are separated from his total
personality and placed in opposition to it so as to facilitate their integration into
specialized rational systems and their reduction to statistically visible concepts. (Lukács,
1971 [1923]: 88)

In this passage it is clear that, for Lukács, economic rationalization is not solely
economic. Lukács asserts that the abstract universal dimension of the commodity form of
social relations is analogous with an increasingly dominating force in modern society
expressed through the defining features of modern social life, such as bureaucracy,
instrumental rationality, and atomization. Here exchange value is viewed as a cover-up
whereby true social nature (as embodied in the creative capacity of the proletariat) is
disguised.
Although it appears to be total, the process of rationalization, according to
Lukács, is nonetheless inherently incoherent. Lukács believes this incoherence is inherent
to modern capitalist society because isolated phenomena, such as the increased
specialization of the division of labor and the associated fragmentation of social reality,
are governed by a strict rationality—the rigidity of rationality both structures and is
structured by the fact that these processes are severed from the social whole from which
they were produced and continuously interact. The problem, according to Lukács, is that
as immediate, isolated “surface-level” appearances these processes are misrecognized as
being directly indicative of the social whole itself. Lukács argues,
It is evident that the whole structure of capitalist production rests on the interaction
between a necessity subject to strict laws in all isolated phenomena and the relative
irrationality of the total process (…) This irrationality, this—highly problematic—
‘systematisation’ of the whole which diverges qualitatively and in principle from the
laws regulating the parts, is more than just a postulate, a presupposition essential to the
workings of a capitalist economy. (Lukcás, 1971 [1923]: 102-103)
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For Lukács, (1971 [1923]: 103), the increased specialization and fragmentation of
labor “has the effect of making these partial functions autonomous [so that] they tend to
develop through their own momentum and in accordance with their own special laws
independently of the other partial functions of society.” At the same time, the process of
increased fragmentation leads to “the destruction of every image of the whole” (Lukács,
1971 [1923]: 103). Lukács uses bourgeois economic analyses of crises as an example of
the fundamental misrecognition of this inversion of social reality. “[T]he structure of a
crisis,” he explains, is “no more than a heightening of the degree and intensity of the
daily life of bourgeois society” (Lukács, 1971 [1923]: 101). “Crises” are experienced as
such because “the bonds uniting [bourgeois society’s] various elements and partial
systems are a chance affair even at their most normal” (Lukács, 1971 [1923]: 101). In
other words, what appears to be objectively given, or “natural” (i.e. non-social), is in fact
social. Critical recognition of these processes of reification, according to Lukács, implies
the possibility of qualitative social transformation.
In this sense Lukács’s critique of reification may also be seen as critique of
ideology—one which resists the unproductive base/superstructure dualism typical of
traditional Marxist critiques of ideology.89 In discussing the concept of the individual, for
example, Lukács goes well beyond the now common sociological critique of
individualism to argue that the very idea of the isolated individual presupposes a societal
context defined by the universality of the commodity form (cf. Adorno et al., 1972).
Lukács’s remarks on individualistic ideology, while critical, are not directed at exposing
the idea of the atomistic individual as false. Rather, Lukács seeks to grasp the intrinsic
connection between ideology and historical social structure and to show the former as
mediated in and through the latter. Here ideology is not the veil that covers the “real”
interests of everyday actors because ideology is real; it corresponds to the rational
necessity of the “irrationality of the total process” (Lukács (1971 [1923]: 102), the
irrationality of society as a whole. Ideology, grasped in its social mediatedness, tells us
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For an extensive analysis of reification along these lines, see Gabel (1975).
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something about the underlying historical dynamics of the present insofar as underlying
structural forms are exhibited in and through these surface-level manifestations and
understood as such (Lukács, 1971 [1923]: 153).
1.2 Social Structure and Subjectivity: The Social Constitution of Bourgeois Thought
Lukács extends his critique of reification to modern Western science and
philosophy, disciplines that struggle with “the problems generated by the peculiar
abstract forms of life characteristic of its (capitalist) context, while remaining bound to
the immediacy of the forms of appearance of that context” (Postone, 2002: 79).
Regarding modern Western science, Lukács asserts:
The more highly developed it [modern science] becomes and the more scientific, the
more it will become a formally closed system of partial laws. It will then find that the
world lying beyond its confines, and in particular the material base which it is its task to
understand, its own concrete underlying reality lies, methodologically and in principle,
beyond its grasp. (Lukács, 1971 [1923]: 104)

Lukács here criticizes the economist Tugan-Baranovsky’s90 attempts to explain
production in purely quantitative terms. The formalism of bourgeois thought, according
to Lukács, has political implications:
The reified world appears henceforth quite definitively—and in philosophy, under the
spotlight of ‘criticism it is potentiated still further—as the only possible world, the only
conceptually accessible, comprehensible world vouchsafed for us humans (…) By
confining itself to the study of the ‘possible conditions’ of the validity of the forms in
which its underlying existence is manifested, modern bourgeois thought bars its own way
to a clear view of the problems bearing on the birth and death of these forms, and on their
real essence and substratum. (Lukács, 1971 [1923]: 110)

Lukács then works through the antinomies of bourgeois thought, as indicated by
the problems and contradictions of modern Western philosophy. Here Lukács focuses on
Kant’s concept of the thing-in-itself and the more general notion that the world can be
known to us to the degree to which it is created by us. Lukács (1971 [1923]: 112) regards
the latter as the defining problem of modern Western philosophy. However, Lukács is not
simply interested in the intellectual history of Western philosophy. Rather, his aim is to
90

Tugan-Baranovsky’s student, Nikolai Kondratiev, would later become well known for his theory of longterm cycles of economic expansion and contraction. It is interesting to note here the connection to Arrighi
(1994), whose theory of structural transformation within the capitalist world-system, which draws heavily
from Kondratiev, I critique in chapter four along lines similar to, yet distinct from, Lukács’s critique of
Tugan-Baranovsky.
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grasp “the connection between the fundamental problems of this philosophy and the basis
in existence from which these problems spring and to which they strive to return by the
road of the understanding” (Lukács, 1971 [1923]: 112). When writing about the idea that
the world can be known to us to the degree to which it is created by us, Lukács (1971
[1923]: 112) indicates that the question of “why and with what justification” we should
view this human-created world as constitutive of human reason never arises. According
to Lukács, the reason this basic question never arises can be explained with reference to
the intrinsic relationship between social structure and subjectivity. To put it another way,
Lukács explains that bourgeois thought exhibits a “double tendency,” which is also
characteristic of bourgeois society, and that it expresses this opposition between an
objective material world and subjective consciousness:
On the one hand, it [bourgeois thought] acquires increasing control over the details of its
social existence, subjecting them to its needs. On the other hand it loses—likewise
progressively—the possibility of gaining intellectual control of society as a whole and
with that it loses its own qualification for leadership. (Lukács, 1971 [1923]: 121)

Lukács (1971 [1923]: 122) believes this problem is ultimately rooted in the
division between theory and practice. Lukács’s theory of praxis seeks to move beyond
traditional subject-object epistemology. He indicates that both subject and object develop
simultaneously through practice—and that this process is thoroughly dialectical. In other
words, through praxis the subject both constitutes and is constituted by social structure.
This practical activity, according to Lukács, is also historically determinate.
It is on this basis that Lukács is able ground his explanation of the antinomies of
bourgeois thought, particularly the opposition between objective matter and subjective
consciousness, in the relationship between social structure and subjectivity, a relationship
reflective of the contradictory nature of modern capitalist society:
[M]an in capitalist society confronts a reality ‘made’ by himself (as a class) which
appears to him to be a natural phenomenon alien to himself; he is wholly at the mercy of
its ‘laws’, his activity is confined to the exploitation of the inexorable fulfillment of
certain individual laws for his own (egoistic) interests. But even while ‘acting’ he
remains, in the nature of the case, the object and not the subject of events. The field of his
activity thus becomes wholly internalized: it consists on the one hand of the awareness of
the laws which he uses and, on the other, of his awareness of his inner reactions to the
course taken by events. (Lukács, 1971 [1923]: 135)
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In capitalist society, “‘nature’ becomes highly ambiguous” (Lukács, 1971 [1923]:
136) since, with the progression of modern capitalist society, “nature” (that which was
not created by man) becomes increasingly socialized while “society” (that which is
artifice; i.e. not “nature”) becomes increasingly naturalized. It is here that the significance
of praxis in Lukács’s critique of reification is perhaps most obvious. Regarding the
contradiction between subject and object, Lukács explains,
[T]he contradiction does not lie in the inability of the philosophers to give a definitive
analysis of the available facts. It is rather the intellectual expression of the objective
situation itself which it is their task to comprehend. That is to say, the contradiction that
appears here between subjectivity and objectivity (…) is nothing but the logical and
systematic formulation of the modern state of society. For, on the one hand, men are
constantly smashing, replacing and leaving behind them the ‘natural’, irrational and
actually existing bonds, while, on the other hand, they erect around themselves in the
reality they have created and ‘made’, a kind of second nature which evolves with exactly
the same inexorable necessity as was the case earlier on with irrational forces of nature
(more exactly: the social relations which appear in this form). (Lukács, 1971 [1923]: 128)

Lukács claims Marx’s method allows us to grasp the mediation of the historical
totality in and through the immediate, fragmented aspects of reified reality. As he
explains,
[T]he essence of history lies precisely in the changes undergone by those structural forms
which are the focal points of man’s interaction with environment at any given moment
and which determine the objective nature of both his inner and his outer life. But this
only becomes objectively possible (and hence can only be adequately comprehended)
when the individuality, the uniqueness of an epoch or an historical figure, etc., is
grounded in the character of these structural forms, when it is discovered and exhibited in
them and through them. (Lukács, 1971 [1923]: 153)

While the significance of Lukács’s categorial appropriation of Marx’s category of
commodity, in addition to his superb critique of reification, should not be downplayed,
Lukács drew some rather faulty conclusions from his analysis.
1.3 History, Labor, Totality
One of Lukács’s most problematic conclusions was that he mistakenly assumed a
logical and historical link between recognizing reification and overcoming it. Jay (1982:
111) describes the implication of this conclusion: “as men adopted a practical attitude
towards the objective world (…) Being would then be understood as Becoming, things
would dissolve into process, and most important of all, the subjective origins of those
processes would become apparent to the identical subject-object of history.” The
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significance of Lukács’s conclusions can be further elaborated along the lines of his
treatment of totality and the concrete.
Although Lukács (1971 [1923]: 140-149) claims a fundamental break with
Hegel’s notion of totality (i.e. the actualization of Geist) as something outside of history,
his critique of capitalism presupposes the proletariat as the historical Subject and assumes
a social totality constituted by the proletariat as the identical subject-object. By affirming
the concrete, useful dimension of labor, Lukács critiques the social totality as veiled by
the abstract value dimension of capitalist social relations. Indeed, it is on this basis that
Lukács analyzes the antagonism between the use-value and value dimensions of capitalist
social relations. Lukács equates the qualitative, use-value dimension with the proletariat
as the identical subject-object of the historical totality. This dimension, which Lukács
affords ontological significance and which he contends represent the creative capacities
of society, is itself outside of history. However, as I later elaborate,91 if the antagonism
between use-value and value is itself constitutive of capital, then affirming one dimension
over the other does not indicate a move beyond capital.
Lukács’s contention that the abstract value dimension veils true social nature
(embodied in the creative capacity of the proletariat) and prevents the realization of the
historical subject-object implies that the creative capacity of the proletariat (their “labor”)
is extrinsic to capitalist social relations (see Postone, 1978, 1993, 2003, 2009). The
ontological status, which Lukács afford to useful labor, involves a number of complex
issues and problems beyond the purview of this dissertation. That said, I would like to
draw attention to the fact that the conclusions Lukács draws from his analysis go against
the critical impetus of his approach outlined in the beginning of his reification essay. By
affording labor an ontological role Lukács elevates, trans-historically, that which is in
fact socially mediated. He therefore misrecognizes the elusive processes of reification
that his critique of reification aimed to grasp.
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The following discussion of Postone elucidates this antagonism not as a static opposition but as
dialectically dynamic, whereby capital is transformed and reconstituted in space and time. In this sense,
championing the use-value dimension of capital’s social forms, popular among romantic critics of
capitalism and other traditional Marxists, is itself an (unrecognized) active participation in the
transformation and reconstitution of capital.
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Nevertheless, Lukács’s concept of reification is significant and, if and when
appropriated critically,92 has the potential to contribute to a critical theory of the
environment. As previously mentioned, the core of Lukács’s reification is an attempt to
critically understand social subjectivity and social objectivity as intrinsically connected in
terms of their relational specificity as structured by the commodity. This categorically
appropriation of Marx’s category of commodity sees the commodity form of social
relations as a model for the structuring principles of a historically-specific form of social
life.
1.4 Lukács and the Environment
Most discussions of the contributing potential of Lukács’s concept of reification
to environmental sociology have focused on a two-page excursus in HCC. In this
excursus Lukács criticizes Engels for his contention in Anti-Dühring that the dialectical
method can (and should) be applied to biophysical nature.93 Unfortunately, the rest of
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Postone (2003) details what such a critical appropriation would entail.
In environmental sociology, this debate has been distorted for a number of reasons, the following four
being some of the more obvious. First, many American Marxist environmental sociologists dismiss out-ofhand any position that does not uphold an unquestioned ontological status—a status “given” by external
biophysical nature (i.e. naïve realism). Hence, questioning of so-called “environmental realism” is
automaticity equated with an extreme form of social constructionism and is then criticized for downplaying
the severity of today’s worldwide ecological crises as though these crises have no bearing in empirical
reality. As mentioned in chapter one, this appears to be an issue specific to American environmental
sociologists who adamantly defend such a strict (un-reflexive) realist position. Second, much of this
discourse has failed to situate the terms of the debate within the context of Lukács’s sociohistorical and
intellectual milieu. Here Lukács’s polemic against Engels must be seen in relation to the debates on
positivism occurring during his own time. Third, not enough attention has been paid to the complexity and
intricacies of what Vogel (1996) calls the “misapplication thesis”—or, in other words, the differences and
similarities between (1) the question of the applicability of the dialectical method to nature and (2) the
question of the applicability of the natural sciences to the social and historical dimensions. Finally, much of
the discussion has suffered from (mis)understandings of Marx’s category of alienation, notion of
commodity fetishism, and theory of practice. This misunderstanding is exemplified in Foster, Clark, and
York (2010: 216-241), who, in their critique of Lukács, propose what they refer to as “natural praxis.”
Although the authors contend that “natural praxis” is synonymous with Marx’s theory of social praxis, their
appropriation of Marx in this regard effectively renders the spirited edge of his critique flat and banal.
Moreover, Lukács himself, following Marx, put forth a much more rigorous and sophisticated analysis of
the relationship between materiality and the senses. Central here is the methodological function of
mediation, which is completely ignored by Foster, Clark, and York (2010).
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Lukács’s superb essay, including the potential contribution of Lukács’s categorial
analysis to a critical theory of the environment, has received almost no attention.94
Although not an environmental sociologist, Steven Vogel95 is among the few
environmentally-focused critical theorists who also uphold the significance of Lukács’s
critique of reification for a critical theory approach to the environment.96 One area where
Lukács’s critique of reification promises to contribute to a critical theory of the
environment can be found in his critical remarks regarding so-called “second nature” that
I mentioned previously. Applying the critique of reification to biophysical nature can, in
this way, highlight the intrinsic connection between the pattern of progress in modern
society and the progressive destruction of nature. Located within this connection is the
concomitant process whereby “nature” has become increasingly socialized while
“society” has become increasingly naturalized. Social practice under capitalism creates a
reified world, but the critique of reification, rather than aimed at uncovering some “real”
essence, should be directed toward the critique of mediation, whereby reified social
practice can know itself as such. Critique of reification could therefore provide a starting
point from which a critical theory of the environment might grasp reification as a key
process of social mediation between the subjective dimension and the objective
dimension of the environment-society problematic.
2. Theodor W. Adorno: Critique of Identity Thinking
Lukács’s critique of reification had a significant impact on members of the
Frankfurt School, not least of which included Adorno. In ways quite different from
Lukács, the Frankfurt School theorists played a significant role in the resuscitation of
Western Marxism during a later period of capitalist development following the Second
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Though not concerned with environmental sociology per se, Vogel (1996) and Feenberg (1999) defend
Lukács’s position in ways that should resonate with a critical theory approach to environmental sociology
as outlined in this dissertation.
95
While I agree with Vogel regarding his position on Lukács (see Vogel, 1996: 13-50), I disagree with his
contention that Adorno’s contribution toward a critical theory of the environment is implausible (see Vogel,
1996: 51-99).
96
See also the work of Andrew Feenberg.
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World War.97 One theoretical connection between Lukács and Adorno is the emphasis on
social contradictions within a historically-specific totality, although Adorno’s emphasis
was far more negative than that of Lukács (see Jay, 1982: 241-275). Adorno was
concerned primarily with the regressive tendencies inherent in the historical
“development” of modern capitalist society. This shift in focus was no doubt the result of
changed historical circumstances, as Adorno, along with other members of the Frankfurt
School, was forced to leave Germany with the Nazi seizure of power, and Adorno
subsequently spent a good portion of his exiled career in America. Adorno’s critical
theory is fundamentally rooted in this historical experience and absence of the historical
Subject. Accusations of Adorno’s overly “pessimistic” approach (see e.g. Habermas and
Levin, 1982) fail to situate his negative dialectics within this “frozen” historical moment.
Only then does it become possible for us to ask what the present means in the face of his
negative dialectics.98
Although Adorno’s oeuvre comprises a vast array of substantive areas, negative
dialectics is a clear thread that runs throughout his works.99 Since any attempt to provide
a general summary or definition of this approach is destined to fail (Adorno tellingly
referred to his approach as an “anti-system”), the following discussion focuses instead on
particular aspects of Adorno’s negative dialectics. I begin by outlining some important
aspects of what Adorno finds compelling in Hegel before discussing Adorno’s critique of
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It was Herbert Marcuse, not Adorno, who would influence the American New Left in the 1960s (see Jay,
1973).
98
In his book on Hegel, Adorno (1993 [1967]: 1) explains that rather than approaching Hegel by asking
whether Hegel has any meaning for the present we should instead ask what the present means in the face of
Hegel.
99
It may come as a surprise to some that, in light of the purpose of this dissertation, the following
discussion will not engage Horkheimer and Adorno’s (1947) Dialectic of Enlightenment (DE). However, I
have chosen not to deal with this work for two reasons. First, a number of scholars have recently begun to
elucidate the connections between DE and today’s current worldwide ecological crisis in new and
interesting ways (see e.g. Görg, 2011; Leiss, 1972; Nelson, 2011). Second, the incorporation of DE would
have compelled me to defend this approach against Habermas, who argued that DE was Adorno and
Horkheimer’s “blackest, most nihilistic book” (Habermas and Levin, 1982: 13). This discussion, in turn,
would have required an extensive analysis of the so-called “pessimistic impasse” reached by Adorno and
his colleagues.
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the Hegelian dialectic.100 The following sub-section discusses the linkage between
Adorno’s break with Hegel and the subsequent shift toward a negative dialectics as well
as how this shift is related to the critique of identity thinking and an unwavering, radical
commitment toward social emancipation. I will then engage Adorno’s (negative)
philosophy of history before discussing his notion of “natural history” as a critical
concept. I conclude by sketching Adorno’s potential contribution to a critical theory of
the environment.
2.1 Dialectics as Critique
Adorno, in his 1965 lecture, “Whether Negative Dialectics is Possible,” explained
to his students that taking the dialectic in Hegel seriously requires moving beyond Hegel
(Adorno, 2008: 28).101 Accordingly, Adorno’s break with Hegel is grounded in what he
considers dialectic in Hegel’s philosophy102 —namely, the core of a dynamic theory of
experience.103 Before discussing Adorno’s break with Hegel, I first provide a brief
account of what Adorno finds compelling in Hegel, as this is the point from which
Adorno launches his critique.
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It should be noted that my discussion here is indebted to Brian O’Connor’s (2004, 2006) rather succinct
explications of Adorno’s ideas in this regard.
101
Adorno’s lectures on negative dialectics, subsequently published in English by Polity Press (2008), are
taken from four courses of lectures on the subject of negative dialectics. Presented while Adorno was
writing the book Negative Dialectics, the lectures address the themes Adorno developed at the beginning of
the book. According to Rolf Tiedemann, who edited and translated the lectures, the Introduction to
Negative Dialectics serve as “a theory of intellectual experience,” which is also what Adorno considered
naming the Introduction.
Compared to the rather abstruse text and notoriously difficult (1973) translation of Negative Dialectics,
these lectures provide a fairly succinct explication of some of Adorno’s guiding theoretical maneuvers in
his own words. As such, I will be making extensive use of these lectures in this section. I have crossreferenced Adorno’s lecture material with Negative Dialectics and have indicated this comparison below
where necessary.
102
This is not to imply that Adorno was an orthodox Hegelian. Indeed, as J.M. Berstein (2004: 20) notes,
the thought of anyone being an orthodox Hegelian is contradictory insofar as philosophy, for Hegel, is
“one’s own time and the history producing one’s own time expressed in thought.”
103
O’Connor (2004, 2013) has argued that the most significant impact of Hegel’s philosophy on Adorno is
his theory of experience. This is substantiated by the following statement from Adorno’s book on Hegel:
“These days it is hardly possible for a theoretical idea of any scope to do justice to the experience of
consciousness, and in fact not only the experience of consciousness but the embodied experience of human
beings, without having incorporated something of Hegel’s philosophy” (Adorno, 1993 [1963]: 2).
According to O’Connor (2004: 29), the introduction to Hegel’s Phenomenology “provides Adorno with a
model of how consciousness is determined through the experience of objects.”
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Experience, according to Hegel, is an active dynamic—a process of recognizing
and moving beyond the insufficient conceptual commitments of unreflected
consciousness (O’Connor, 2013: 61). It should be noted that Hegel’s treatment of
concepts is in accordance with the German idealist tradition (i.e. concepts are both
categories of thought and categories of reality). The dialectical conceptualization of
experience, as Hegel explains below, is also very different from that of contemporary
science, which presupposes the possibility of disembodied analysis from a detached
reference point:
The way in which this movement has been brought about is such that it cannot belong to
the fixed point; yet, after this point has been presupposed, the nature of the movement
cannot really be other than what it is, it can only be external. Hence, the mere anticipation
that the Absolute is Subject is not only not the actuality of this Notion, but it even makes
the actuality impossible; for the anticipation posits the subject as an inert point, whereas
the actuality is self-movement. (Hegel, 1977: 13)

Awareness of the insufficiency of unreflected concepts is, as O’Connor elucidates
(2013: 62), an experience of contradiction. By actively revising its presuppositions about
what the object is, consciousness transcends/transforms itself. For Hegel, reason is what
compels consciousness to respond to, rather than to ignore, a state of contradiction
(O’Connor, 2013: 62). In other words, the actively questioning consciousness is impelled
by reason. The disposition of what Hegel calls determinate negation involves recognizing
the limits as well as the conditions of possibility of our conceptualizations. Determinate
negation, in contradistinction to the abstract negativity of mere skepticism, involves
recognition of the concept “as the result of that from which it emerges” (Hegel, 1977:
51). As Hegel (1977: 51) notes, “when (…) the result is conceived as it is in truth,
namely, as a determinate negation, a new form has thereby immediately arisen, and in the
negation the transition is made through which the progress through the complete series of
forms comes about of itself.” Determinate negation, then, implies self-correction, which
is linked to both the knowing subject and the object of analysis (O’Connor, 2013: 63).
For Hegel, insofar as the subject’s conceptual commitments are challenged and reworked,
the object itself is transformed:
…in the alteration of the knowledge, the object itself alters for it too, for the knowledge
that was present was essentially a knowledge of the object: as the knowledge changes, so
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too does the object, for it essentially belonged to this knowledge (…) Inasmuch as the
new true object issues from it, this dialectical movement which consciousness exercises
on itself and which affects its knowledge and its object, is precisely what is called
experience [Erfahrung]. (Hegel, 1977: 54, 55)

The negativity of Adorno’s negative dialectics is rooted in Hegel’s concept of
determinate negation.104 It is also Adorno’s commitment to determinate negation that
provides the basis for his critique of Hegel. For Adorno, Hegel’s system, which involves
a series of progressive steps as a rational requirement to overcome incompleteness (i.e.
the movement from partial to absolute knowledge), falls short of what is essentially
dialectical in Hegel’s philosophy.105
According to Adorno (2008: 28), it is Hegel’s “assertion that something can
simultaneously be both a synthetic and an analytical proposition (…) that marks the point
at which (…) we have to go beyond Hegel, if we are to take him seriously.” Adorno
breaks with the “positive” nature of dialectics in Hegel—in other words, with the notion
that the whole, as the embodiment of all negations, is the positive. As Adorno (2008: 27)
explains, “the fixed, positive point, just like negation, is an aspect – and not something
that can be anticipated, placed at the beginning of everything.” The fact that this premise
is simultaneously both what fuels the dynamism of the dialectic and what is supposed to
emerge from the dialectic is precisely the point at which Adorno parts company with
Hegel.
According to Huhn (2004: 5), Adorno contends that the progressive arc of the
dialectic and its integrative synthesis is not inevitable and that modern history is the
measure of this failure. Furthermore, as O’Connor (2006, 2013) suggests, the intellectual
cost of Hegel’s commitment to the inevitably forward trajectory of the dialectic is, for
Adorno, the relinquishment of a dynamic theory of experience, a theory Hegel replaced
with his system. As Brian O’Connor notes,
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According to Adorno (2008: 25), “negativity of this kind is made concrete and goes beyond mere
standpoint philosophy by confronting concepts with their objects and, conversely, objects with their
concepts.” See also, Adorno (1973 [1966]: 4-6).
105
I do not engage the question of the degree to which Adorno’s critique of Hegel is justified nor do I
question the degree to which Adorno’s critique rests on possible misunderstandings of Hegel’s philosophy.
On this and related issues, see Bernstein, 2000; Coyle, 2010; and O’Connor, 1999, 2004, 2013.
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The ‘negative’ which is the moment of insight into our failure to encapsulate an object
may be the basis of a more complex knowledge of how we relate to objects. And that
moment may even lead to a new level of sophistication in our ways of relating. What
cannot be assumed, however, is that it will produce a positive outcome – a new
standpoint – and certainly not, as Adorno repeatedly argues, that it can be an element of a
further series of negations ending with a complete system of concepts. This system would
be identical with the object since it would no longer be at odds with it. That is, the full
range of concepts, and their interconnectedness, which would encapsulate an object,
would be established. Experience would therefore cease. Ultimately this Hegelian agenda
is a false one, pursued, according to Adorno, only by distorting experience itself into a
sequence with purely logical values. (O’Connor, 2013: 65)

Such a dynamic theory of experience, according to Adorno, requires an essential
openness that Hegel’s closed system does not allow. For Adorno, this open awareness
must allow the object to show how it is not identical to the concept that seeks to identify
what the object is. As Adorno (1973 [1966]: 28-29). notes, “If the thought really yielded
to the object, if its attention were on the object, not on its category, the very objects
would start talking under the lingering eye.” Consequently, “Reciprocal criticism of the
universal and the particular; identifying acts of judgement whether the concept does
justice to what it covers, and whether the particular fulfills its concept – these constitute
the medium of thinking about the nonidentity of particular and concept” (Adorno, 1973
[1966]: 146).
For Adorno, dialectics as critique is synonymous with the critique of identitythinking and negative dialectics is synonymous with critical theory.106 The push toward a
negative dialectics is impelled by the fact that the dialectic historically has been
suspended.107 This distinction leads to Adorno’s (1973 [1966]: 3) opening statement of
Negative Dialectics that philosophy lives on because the moment to realize it was missed.
According to Adorno,
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Consider, for example, the following statements from Adorno’s (1965) lecture course on negative
dialectics:
“I would suggest that the two terms – critical theory and negative dialectics – have the same meaning.
Perhaps, to be more precise, with the sole difference that critical theory really signifies only the subjective
side of thought, that is to say, theory, while negative dialectics signifies not only that aspect of thought but
also the reality that is affected by it. In other words, it encapsulates not just a process of thought but also,
and this is good Hegel, a process of affecting things” (Adorno, 2008 [2003]: 20).
107
In the words of J.M. Bernstein (2004: 21), the idea of negative dialectics is “a response to the historical
dialectic at a standstill.”
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It is not that there has been an arbitrary change in styles of thought or philosophical
fashions, as aesthetics or psychologists views of the history of philosophy like to portray
it. Instead, idealism has been forgotten, or has at least become a mere cultural
commodity, both out of compulsion and out of necessity; through the compulsion of
critical reflection and out of necessity in the development of a society that has less and
less fulfilled Hegel’s prognosis that it would become absolute spirit, that it would be
rational. (Adorno, 1993 [1963]: 55)

In his lectures on negative dialectics, Adorno (2008: 7) explains that the shift
toward a specifically negative dialectics (as opposed to the systematic integrative
dialectic of Hegel) is necessitated by the relationship between contradiction in the
(dialectical) concept, on the one hand, and the socio-historical content (whose essence is
by virtue of its contradictions) to which the concepts refer, on the other. Indeed, Adorno’s
negative dialectics emphasizes this twofold meaning of the concept of contradiction,
namely, the relationship between “a contradiction in the realm of ideas and concepts” and
the fact that “the world itself is antagonistic in its objective form” (Adorno, 2008: 9).108
As he explains,
The factors that define reality as antagonistic are the same factors as those which
constrain mind, i.e. the concept, and force it into its intrinsic contradictions. To put it in a
nutshell, in both cases we are dealing with the principle of mastery, the mastery of nature,
which spreads its influence, which continues in the mastery of men by other men and
which finds its mental reflex in the principle of identity, by which I mean the intrinsic
aspiration of all mind to turn every alterity that is introduced to it or that it encounters
into something like itself and in this way to draw it into its own sphere of influence.
(Adorno, 2008: 9)

2.1.1 Critique of Identity Thinking
According to Adorno, the relationship between concepts and the historical context
to which they refer has become reified under modernity. “[C]oncepts,” Adorno (2008:
23) explains, “are no longer measured against their contents, but instead are taken in
isolation, so that people take up attitudes toward them without bothering to inquire
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The model for the objective antagonistic world, according to Adorno, is “the fact that we live in an
antagonistic society” (Adorno, 2008: 8; see also Adorno 1973 [1966]). As he explains, “the essence of this
model of an antagonistic society is that it is not a society with contradictions or despite its contradictions,
but by virtue of its contradictions. In other words, a society based on profit necessarily contains this
division in society because of the objective existence of the profit motive. This profit motive which divides
society and potentially treats it apart is also the factor by means of which society reproduces its own
existence” (Adorno, 2008: 8-9).
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further into the truth context of what they refer to.” Such hypostasis, Adorno claims,
comes at a price:
This means that the less the mind possesses predetermined so-called substantial,
unquestioned meanings, the more it tends to compensate for this by literally fetishizing
concepts of its own devising which possess nothing that transcends consciousness. In
short it makes absolutes of things it has created. And it achieves this by tearing them
from their context and then ceasing to think of them further. (Adorno, 2008: 24)

In this passage, Adorno’s critique of meaning as immutably given sheds light on
the significance of one of Adorno’s central theoretical maneuvers: his critique of identity
thinking. According to Adorno, once the identity between concept and object has been
reached, the need for critical self-reflection grows as the capacity for critique becomes
impoverished. (It becomes impoverished because as reified consciousness the subject
reflects upon concept and object as identical; in other words, the subject misapprehends
concepts to be corresponding to the truth of what they identify). Exchange value, which
has come to be the measure of all things (Adorno, 1997: 310), is the social model for
what Adorno calls identity thinking (Adorno, 1973 [1966], 2008; see also Cook, 2011:
19). The genesis of identification parallels Marx’s category of commodity, which renders
both use-value and value identical and thereby concretizes two distinct, yet related,
dimensions into a single form.109
Gillian Rose’s superb (1976) essay, “How is Critical Theory Possible? Theodor
W. Adorno and Concept Formation in Sociology,” is instructive here since she provides a
succinct reconstruction of Adorno’s critique of identity-thinking. Rose explains that
concepts involve defining and, as such, are always contradictory. Concepts identify
properties of an object, but properties do not exhaust what an object is. Identity-thinking,
which in modern capitalist society is our normal mode of cognition, is in this sense
totalizing – it makes unequal things equal. Yet, as Brian O’Connor argues, recognition of
nonidentity is not a matter of logic or epistemology but rather an essentially normative
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According to J.M. Bernstein’s (2004: 32) interpretation of Adorno, “Logic and modern science are the
quintessential expression of conceptual unification theoretically, while practically it is the relegation of use
value to exchange value that performs the task.” On the relationship between Adorno’s theory and Marx’s
materialism, see Cook (2006, 2011), Jarvis (2004), and Stone (2006). On the relationship between Adorno
and Marxism, see Cutrone (2013).
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commitment. Recognition of nonidentity, according to O’Connor (2013: 82 [emphases
added]), “is directed specifically at what ought not to be”, which is why “In the
unreconciled condition, nonidentity is experienced as negativity” (Adorno, 1973 [1966]:
31).
Rose outlines three aspects of identity thinking: (1) pragmatic identity-thinking,
(2) utopian identity-thinking, and (3) rational identity-thinking. Pragmatic identitythinking refers to the “nature-controlling function of thought” (Rose, 1976: 70). The
utopian aspect of identity-thinking refers to the fact that concepts also always relate to
their objects by “the conditions of their ideal existence” (Rose, 1976: 70). Furthermore,
under existing social conditions the utopian aspect of identity-thinking is antagonistic to
itself. As Rose (1976: 71) explains, “For the concept to identify its object in this [utopian]
sense the particular object would have to have all the properties of its ideal state.” This
condition marks the third aspect of identity thinking—rational identity-thinking.
Although rational identity-thinking is constitutive of the utopian moment of identity
thinking, it is problematic precisely because the utopian moment is barred from actuality
due to the inherent violence of rational identity-thinking. In other words, under present
social conditions it is impossible for the concept to identify its true object (Rose, 1976:
71).
Rose suggests that Adorno confronts this problem by way of negative dialectics,
which, as she explains, is a mode of cognition as non-identity thinking. Although nonidentity thinking is different from identity-thinking, it is neither external nor separate
from identity-thinking. If this were the case, then Adorno’s negative dialectics would be
theoretically and logically inconsistent. Adorno’s (1973 [1966]: 146-148) discussion of
the dialectics of identity highlights the importance of immanent critique in his approach
to critical theory as negative dialectics. As a dialectics of non-identity, negative dialectics
approaches a mode of thinking that allows us to recognize the non-conceptual to which
all concepts refer and become aware of the immanently non-identical.
For Adorno (1973 [1966]: 147), the possibility of a different mode of cognition is
intrinsically tied to identity thinking: “Totality is to be opposed by convicting it of
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nonidentity with itself—of the nonidentity it denies, according to its own concept.”
Adorno’s negative dialectics employs concepts (the concept of which Adorno critiques)
to “break out” of the strangle-hold of the concept itself. “The cognitive utopia,”
according to Adorno (1973 [1966]: 10), “would be to use concepts to unseal the
nonconceptual with concepts, without making it their equal.” That the whole is, in
contrast to Hegel, quite literally wrong is what necessitates a specifically negative
dialectics: “In the unreconciled condition, nonidentity is experienced as negativity”
(Adorno, 1973 [1966]: 31). (Negative) dialectics as critique, according to Adorno, is the
“anti-method” most appropriate to a totalizing “administered” world. Not coincidentally,
the aim of Adorno’s (1973 [1966]: 11) theory is characterized by an uncompromising
commitment to social emancipation: “Regarding the concrete utopian possibility,
dialectics is the ontology of the wrong state of things. The right state of things would be
free of it: neither a system nor a contradiction.”
2.2 Negative Philosophy of History
Adorno’s 1964 lecture notes on “Progress or Regression?” bear the historical
specificity of the atomic bomb and the resultant threat of mass planetary destruction.
“Even if the murder of millions could be described as an exception and not the expression
of a trend (the atom bomb),” writes Adorno (2006 [1964]: 4), “any appeal to the idea of
progress would seem absurd given the scale of the catastrophe.” While Adorno echoes
Hegel in asserting that history is meaningful insofar as it is the story of freedom, he
departs from Hegel’s lead when he argues that the theory of historical progress ‘as an
advancement in freedom’ is “highly vulnerable” (Adorno, 2006 [1964]: 5)
Adorno describes the “spell” of capitalist society—the “eternal sameness of the
historical process” (Tiedemann, 2006: xvi)—that is, the objective course of history—in
the following way:
[W]hat Hegel calls the world spirit is the spirit that asserts itself despite people’s wishes,
over their heads, as it were. It is the primacy of the flow of events in which they are
caught up, and it impinges on them no less than do the facts. Only it does so less
painfully, and is therefore the more easily repressed. What is important here is that you
should not regard this idea of the spirit prevailing over people’s heads as a kind of
speculative prejudice and hence dismiss it all too readily. It is important, I say, that you

98

should realize that this is a process in which what prevails always passes not merely over
people’s heads, but through them. (Adorno, 2006 [1964]: 25)

For Adorno (2006 [1964]: 26), “the spirit that prevails over mankind as something
that also prevails in them (…) the objective course of history asserts itself over human
beings (…) And, at the same time, it asserts itself through them.” Given that Adorno is
interested in what the objective historical process that asserts itself means in and through
the individual it ensnares, this clearly has implications for comprehending history.
I refer to Adorno’s philosophy of history as a negative philosophy of history for
two interrelated reasons. First, for Adorno (2006 [1964]: 26), comprehending the
meaning of history involves recognizing the history of the present as “something
meaningless.” Secondly, insofar as Adorno advances a philosophy of history he does so
in and through a social critique of history as such. On this basis, Adorno’s negative
philosophy of history pivots upon the meaning of the objective course of history in and
through the corporeal human being.
Aspects of Adorno’s negative philosophy of history can be seen in his critique of
historicism. Take, for example, Adorno’s (2006 [1964]: 29) contention that, “Facts that
have become a counterweight to mere illusion (…) reinforce the impression of mere
illusion.” The power of facts to penetrate illusion, via disenchantment of the
Enlightenment, became illusory because after the world had been divested of meaning the
“power” of facts were mistakenly taken to be something other—something more—than
what they actually are—the nonidentical is thereby rendered identical. It is through this
process of violent abstraction that positivism gains a momentum of its own as “sociallynecessary semblance.”110 As such, both the defense and critique of the importance of
historical “facts” presupposes that historical processes have some sort of meaning
(Adorno (2006 [1964]: 11). The aim and goal of Adorno’s negative philosophy of history
is critical recognition of the meaninglessness of the history of the present; he contends
110

Adorno’s (1993 [1963]: 137) immanent critique of positivism has its corollary in his aesthetic theory:
“As something set off from empirical reality, art requires for its constitution something indissoluable,
nonidentical; art becomes art only through its relation to something that is itself not art.” This distance is
less harmful in the arts, as Adorno (1993 [1963]: 137) explains, “This semblance is less harmful in art
insofar as art posits itself as semblance and not as actualized reason.”
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this recognition of meaninglessness is the only way the meaning of history becomes
possible. On this basis, Adorno seeks to grasp the damage of the objective course of
history in the particular and, in the process, to illuminate what history is not.
The primacy of the objective course of history takes precedence over particular
individuals who create history as “isolated” particulars. Note that Adorno is not saying
that the objective course of history should be primary; he is, however, saying that the
objective course of history in its actuality is primary and that as social scientists we
should—indeed, must—be able to take this into account if we are to do justice to our
object of study (see Dahms, 2011). Positivism, including the dominant historical methods
that focus on isolated specificity, is false because it does not realize that this mode of
historical analysis is itself determined by history and, as such, says nothing about history.
In other words, our comprehension of historical facts is itself a product of the objective
course of history operating in and through us. History is impossible if we fail to recognize
this condition.
How, then, can we say anything at all about history? Adorno is fully aware of this
dilemma. Indeed, his emphasis on the non-identical might even be seen as a response to
this problematic, one which requires an immanent critique of identity. Adorno (2006
[1964]: 10, 29-38) maintains that history is only objectively possible as philosophy of
history and that in order to do justice to socio-historical reality we must be able to deal
with the complex issues involved in mediating between the universal and the particular.
In his 1964 lecture on the concept of mediation, Adorno explained to his students
what must, at the very least, be included in an adequate explanation of historical factors:
In short you need to grasp the complexity of the pattern, by which I mean the overall
process that asserts itself, the dependence of that global process on the specific situation,
and then again the mediation of the specific situation by the overall process. Furthermore,
in addition to understanding this conceptual pattern, you need to press forward to the
concrete, historical analysis I have hinted at and that goes beyond the categories I have
been discussing. (Adorno, 2006 [1964]: 37)

Adorno’s analysis of historical content employed an interpretive sociology, an
approach he likened to that of physiognomy. From this perspective, the sociologist must
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study surface phenomena as manifestations of social structure.111 As Adorno (1972
[1969]: 32) explains, “In sociology, interpretation acquires its force both from the fact
that without reference to totality—to the real total system, untranslatable into any solid
immediacy—nothing societal can be conceptualized, and from the fact that it can,
however, only be recognized in the extent to which it is apprehended in the factual and
the individual.” As will become apparent below, my (interpretive) approach to analyzing
what I refer to as the cold war regime of critique containment in chapter four is indebted
to Adorno’s approach.
It should be stressed that the concept of totality for Adorno is a critical category
that, by its very nature, has a double meaning—“the concept both applies and does not
apply” (Rose, 1976: 79).112 Rose (1976: 78) explains, “To perceive the mediation of the
individual by the totality and of the appearance by the essence, is to perceive how the
existence of individuals, or the façade of society, does not fulfill its concepts, how
unequal things are made equal by the prevailing form of commodity exchange and by the
corresponding conceptual apparatus of that society.”
Rather than emphasizing a one-sided focus on totality, Adorno’s approach to
engaging the primacy of the objective course of history aims to grasp the mediation of the
totality in the particular. Adorno (1973 [1966]: 303) suggests, “totality over
phenomenality is to be grasped in phenomenality.” The key, then, is to shed light on how
the particular expresses the totality. Gillian Rose’s (1976) description of the
methodological role played by mediation in Adorno’s approach is worth quoting at
length.
A view of the totality, of the mediation of each category, will show how these categories
developed. This is the critical approach: to show how categories have arisen by deriving
them from the historical process. It is to see that these concepts are not fulfilled by the
object they cover, to see the non-identity in the concept. In this case the historical process
is commodity exchange. The commodity falls under the abstract formula of social static
and hence appears to exist in itself. It has not been examined: it has simply arisen from
the process of exchange. (Rose, 1976: 82)
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See, e.g., Adorno,1938.
“The concrete form of the total system requires everyone to respect the law of exchange [value] if he
does not wish to be destroyed, irrespective of whether profit is his subjective motivation or not” (Adorno,
1972 [1969]: 14).
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Adorno’s (1998) contention that in order to speak of progress the social
conditions for progress (i.e. the actuality of freedom) would first have to be established is
informed by his negative philosophy of history. As indicated, Adorno develops his
approach to history via critique of the philosophy of history. From this perspective, the
history of the present is recast in terms of the relation between history and meaning,
between heteronomy and the individual.
2.3 Subject, Object, Nature
Adorno (1998: 246) insists that we cannot “define away” the meaning of the
concepts “subject” and “object.”113 As he explains, “Defining means as much as
subjectively, by means of a rigidly applied concept, capturing something objective, no
matter what it may be in itself. Hence the resistance of subject and object to the act of
defining” (Adorno, 1998: 246). Yet Adorno’s critique is, at its basic level, an
epistemological critique:114
The separation of subject and object is both real and semblance. True, because in the
realm of cognition it lends expression to the real separation, the rivenness of the human
condition, the result of a coercive historical process; untrue, because the historical
separataion must not be hypostatized, not magically transformed into an invariant. This
contradiction in the separation of subject and object is imparted to epistemology.
Although as separated they cannot be thought away, the ψεύδοϛ of the separation is
manifested in their being mutually mediated, object by subject, and even more
differently, subject by object. As soon as it is fixed without mediation, the separation
becomes ideology, its normal form. (Adorno, 1998: 246)

To define what subject or object is is ideology, and to say what the subject is is
both real and semblance. The philosophical problem of the transcendental subject (i.e. the
[transcendental] subject as the condition for the origin of consciousness), in this sense, is
that the separation of subject and object “is both real and semblance” (Adorno, 1998:
246). The idea of the transcendental subject as the condition for the origin of
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According to Vogel (1996), Adorno’s resistance to total concepts and defining is precisely where his
approach to nature falls short. Vogel (1996: 79) explains, “To say, as the theory of nonidentity does, that
‘the object always escapes the concept’s grasp’ requires being able to make sense of an object independent
of the conceptual, which in this sense means independent of the subject’s activity; yet this ‘making sense’
would itself have to be an operation of thought and hence yet another activity of the subject.” Not only does
Vogel’s criticism miss the point entirely – namely, that the conceptual is not something static – he also
overlooks that it is precisely this point where I am suggesting Adorno provides us with a tremendous
amount of insight regarding the environment-society problematic.
114
On Adorno’s (meta)critique of the contemporary discipline of epistemology, see Adorno (1982 [1956]).
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consciousness “presupposes precisely what it promises to establish: actual, living
individuals” (Adorno, 1998: 247).
In relation to the societal realm, the transcendental subject is society: “The living
individual, such as he is constrained to act and for which he was even internally molded,
is as homo oeconomicus incarnate closer to the transcendental subject than the living
individual he must immediately take himself to be” (Adorno, 1998: 248). The idea of
subjectivity as abstracted from the particular “discloses the precedence of the abstract,
rational relations that are abstracted from individuals and their conditions and for which
exchange is the model” (Adorno, 1998: 248). The following passage is key to
understanding the significance of Adorno’s refusal to define the subject from the outset:
If the standard structure of society is the exchange form, its rationality constitutes people:
what they are for themselves, what they think they are, is secondary. They are deformed
at the outset by the mechanism that was then philosophically transfigured into the
transcendental. What is supposedly most obvious, the empirical subject, would actually
have to be considered as something not yet existing. (Adorno, 1998: 248 [emphasis
added])

This obviation is present in Adorno’s resistance to totalizing concepts discussed
above. The unreflected use of total concepts not only cancels the possibility that things
could be otherwise it also, via nominalism, constructs an “ontology of ‘the’ human
being,” thereby “den[ying] society in its concepts by degrading it into an abbreviation for
the individual” (Adorno, 1998: 258). On this basis, Adorno (1998: 252) contends that
identity thinking “no longer poses as the absolutization of the subject,” as it had in
idealism, but is “the characteristic form of reified consciousness.” Writing after the
Second World War, Adorno asserted that identity thinking as reified consciousness is “a
type of seemingly anti-subjective, scientifically objective identity thinking” (Adorno,
1998: 252).
The interaction of subject and object has a determinate affinity with this (modern
capitalist) society that Adorno termed exchange society. “Cognition,” says Adorno (1998:
252), “must be guided by what exchange has not maimed or—since there is nothing left
unmaimed anymore—by what is concealed within the exchange processes.” Adorno
(1998: 253) explains, “If the dialectical primacy of the object is acknowledged, then the
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hypothesis of an unreflected practical science of the object (…) after the subject has been
subtracted away collapses.” Yet without the object dimension the subject dimension is
meaningless, as Adorno explains:
Object is no more a subjectless residuum than it is posited by subject. The two conflicting
determinations fit together: the residue, which science settles for as its truth, is a product
of its manipulative procedures that are subjectively organized. To define what object is
would in turn be itself part of that organization. Objectivity can be made out solely by
reflecting, at every historical and cognitive stage, both upon what at that time is
represented as subject and object as well as upon their mediations. (Adorno, 1998: 253
[emphasis added])

Many have dismissed Adorno because they underappreciate this pivotal moment.
Steven Vogel (1996: 79), for instance, dismisses Adorno because, as he sees it, the basis
for Adorno’s critique of identity thinking is at the same time that which “critique shows
cognition to be incapable of ever knowing.” Vogel overlooks what Adorno is trying to
do: Adorno attempts to elucidate a reciprocity between subject and object whose mutual
mediation is what makes experience possible (see O’Connor, 2006). This mediation is
why Adorno (1998: 256) says, “The difference between subject and object slices through
subject as well as through object. It can no more be absolutized than it can be removed
from thought.”
With regard to the actual damage inflicted by real ecological despoliation, this
damage is not and cannot be identical to our conception of “nature”: “Potentially, though
not actually, objectivity can be conceived without a subject; but not likewise object
without subjectivity” (Adorno, 1998: 249). Based on the very concepts of “subject” and
“object” we could, for example, potentially conceive of the total destruction of mankind
(e.g. nuclear war) wherein humankind is exterminated and the planet earth survives. The
actualization of such a concept (i.e. the rational identity of this concept to its object),
however, is impossible because such actualization implies the destruction of the subject.
To conceive of modern society’s objectification of “nature” without subjectivity is a
performative contradiction. As Adorno (1998: 256) explains, “Subject in its self-positing
is semblance and at the same time something historically exceedingly real. It contains the
potential for the sublation of its own domination.”
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Although Vogel’s (1996) aforementioned impatience with Adorno’s refusal to
define the concepts he nonetheless employs is certainly understandable, Adorno’s
resistance to definition is nonetheless of great theoretical import and is in line with his
negative dialectics. Cook (2011: 12) explains, “It may appear contradictory to refer to the
heterogeneous character of nature in the context of discussing our affinity with the
natural world. But to acknowledge our affinity with nature by no means implies that we
are fully identical with it.” Adorno’s “anti-sytem” resists total concepts (Durkheim’s
notion that society is a reality sui generis, for instance) because in purporting to explain
everything total concepts explain nothing. Sociologies based on total concepts are
“constructed on the basis of a desire for control (Herrschaftsanspruch)” (Rose, 1976: 77).
Theories that take for granted the severance of the objective dimension and the
subjective dimension of the environment society problematic (i.e. theories that root the
critique of actual existing ecological destruction in some preexisting past organic unity
that has been torn apart via “history”) are therefore ideological because the truth content
of such theories rest on an intrinsic affinity with the existing state of affairs.115 For
example, the truth content of traditional Marxist environmental sociology is found in its
emphasis on actual ecological conditions and the objective socio-structural drivers of
environmental destruction. Yet from the perspective of Adorno’s critical theory, this
emphasis is false insofar as it is unable or unwilling to account for the subject as an
essential moment of the objective dimension. Values-based, as opposed to Marxistoriented environmental sociology, which was discussed in chapter one above, relies on a
positivistic misrecognition of the subject and the relationship between social subjectivity
and the material contradictions of social reality.

115

See Nelson, 2011.
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2.4 Natural History as Critique116
Adorno’s (2006 [1932]) published essay, “The Idea of Natural-History,” comes
from a lecture he delivered at the Frankfurt chapter of the Kant society on July 15,
1932.117 The essay is organized in three parts. Part one begins with a critique of the thencurrent formulation of ontology (i.e. fundamental ontology and the work of Heidegger, in
particular), which Adorno (2006 [1932]: 253) indicates in his introduction is analogous to
the term “nature” as he will be using it. Adorno (2006 [1932]: 254) explains that the
ontological question of being can be articulated in two forms. The first, “the question of
being itself,” in Kant is the thing-in-itself, which simultaneously becomes the second, the
question of the meaning of being, or, as Adorno puts it, “the meaningfulness of the
existing or of the meaning of being as, simply, possibility.”
This double form of the question of being is where autonomous reason begins,
according to Adorno’s (2006 [1932]: 254) interpretation of ontology. He explains that
“only when reason perceives the reality that is in opposition to it as something foreign
and lost to it, as a complex of things, that is, only when reality is no longer immediately
accessible and reality and reason have no common meaning, only then can the question
of the meaning of being be asked at all” (Adorno, 2006 [1932]: 254). The insight derived
from this, which led to an initial crisis in phenomenology and which would later impel
the fundamental ontological turn in contemporary phenomenology, is that “the question
of the meaning of being is nothing more than the insertion of subjective meaning into the
existing” (Adorno, 2006 [1932]: 254). Fundamental ontology (e.g. Heidegger, 1926)
seeks to correct the dialectic of history and nature by eliminating the antithesis of being
and history altogether (Adorno, 2006 [1932]: 256).118 According to Adorno (2006 [1932]:
116

In what follows, I analyze Adorno’s treatment of natural history as a critical concept. Instead of focusing
on a single work that employs the concept of natural history, I will identify some defining features of
natural history as a critical concept throughout Adorno’s works. It is also important to be aware that, as
others have argued (for instance, Hullot-Kentor, 2006; Pensky, 2004), Adorno’s concept of natural history
changes from the time of his 1932 lecture to his discussion of natural history in Negative Dialectics (1966).
117
Although Adorno used stopped using “natural-history” as a double entendre (Hullot-Kentor, 2006: 241),
the concept of natural history can be found throughout Adorno’s later works (see Pensky, 2004).
118
According to Hullot-Kentor (2006: 250), the concept of dialectical nature that Adorno develops in this
lecture is “a code word for Marxism,” which is at the same time “a form of interpretation that delineates the
possibility for the comprehension of all signification precisely in its meaninglessness.”
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256), this move has resulted in contemporary ontology’s “turn toward tautology” as
“History itself (…) has become the basic ontological structure. At the same time,
historical thought itself (…) is reduced to a philosophically based structure of historicity
as a fundamental quality of human existence (Dasein).” A related consequence Adorno
identifies is that contemporary ontology is unable to deal adequately with particularity.
“Neo-ontology,” tries to collapse the nature-history dialectic into historicity, but it is
unable to move beyond idealism. Adorno ends the first section of his lecture with the
following corrective:
If the question of the relationship of nature and history is to be seriously posed, then it
only offers any chance of solution of it is possible to comprehend historical being in its
most extreme historical determinacy, where it is most historical, as natural being, or if it
were possible to comprehend nature as a historical being where it seems to rest most
deeply in itself as nature (…) The retransformation of concrete history into dialectical
nature (…) is the task of the ontological reorientation of the philosophy of history: the
idea of natural-history. (Adorno, 2006 [1932]: 260)

In the second part of his lecture Adorno situates the concept of natural-history
within the context of philosophy of history by focusing on the work of Lukács and
Benjamin. In Lukács, the problem of natural history, “as the question of how it is possible
to interpret this alienated, reified, dead world” (Adorno, 2006 [1932]: 2651), produces a
“shock”—in other words, a change in perspective. According to Adorno, Lukács’s
discussion of second nature in the Theory of the Novel (his reference to the charnel house
in particular) effectively grasps the retransformation of the historical into nature. For
Adorno, Lukács leaves “the resurrection of second nature” (Adorno, 2006 [1932]: 262) in
“infinite distance.” Sharing this concern with nature and history, Benjamin, in The Origin
of the German Play of Lamentation, implicates nature itself as history, as transcience.
Commenting on Benjamin’s “resurrection of second nature” into “infinite closeness” and
into “an object of philosophical interpretation,” Adorno (2006 [1932]: 262) asserts, “The
deepest point where history and nature converge lies precisely in this element of
transience. If Lukács demonstrates the transformation of the historical, as that-which-hasbeen into nature, then here is the other side of the phenomenon: nature itself is seen as
transitory nature, as history.” The issue at hand, according to Adorno (2006 [1932]: 263),
“is a historical relationship between what appears—nature—and its meaning, i.e.,
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transience.” The meaning of this historical relationship, Adorno insists (2006 [1932]:
263), “cannot develop these concepts in a traditional fashion.” For this reason, Adorno
indicates constellation as the alternative logical structure for deciphering natural-history.
In the third part of his talk Adorno provides a somewhat cryptic elaboration of the
relationship between immanent criticism and second nature, on the one hand, and the
recuperation of illusion, on the other.119 Adorno concludes his lecture by moving toward
a concept of materialism:120
With this I refer you to the structure of the original-historical in semblance itself, where
semblance in its thusness (Sosein) proves itself to be historically produced or, in
traditional philosophical terms, where semblance is the product of the subject/object
dialectic. Second nature is, in truth, first nature. The historical dialectic is not simply a
renewed interest in reinterpreted historical materials, rather the historical materials
transform themselves into the mythical and natural-historical.
I wanted to speak about the relationship of these matters to historical materialism, but I
only have time to say the following: it is not a question of completing one theory by
another, but of the immanent interpretation of a theory. I submit myself, so to speak, to
the authority of the materialist dialectic. It could be demonstrated that what has been said
here is only an interpretation of certain fundamental elements of the materialist dialectic.
(Adorno, 2006 [1932]: 268-269)

In a 1965 lecture on the history of nature, Adorno explains the idea of second
nature as follows:
The concept of a second nature remains the negation of whatever might be thought of as
first nature (…) it is the totality of whatever has been so completely trapped by social and
rational mechanisms – the two cannot be distinguished – that nothing differing from it
can manifest itself. And because there is nothing else outside it, it acquires the
appearance of the natural, in other words, of what simply exists and is given. There is not
even the possibility of something outside it becoming visible, something that is not
caught up in the general inclusiveness. The exclusion of possibility which converts this
second nature into the only reality is what also turns it into the substitute for possibility,
and it is in this way that the semblance of the natural comes into being. (Adorno, 2005
[1965]: 120-121)

We see that, in the aforementioned passage, Adorno views both “history” and
“nature” as thoroughly dialectical concepts. By juxtaposing these two concepts, Adorno
sheds light on an historical dynamic in order to critique the present. In the “Natural
History” section in Negative Dialectics (Adorno, 1973 [1966]: 354-358), Adorno’s
elaboration of this theme resonates with his negative dialectics:
119
120

See Hullot-Kentor, 2006: 248-251 for an elaboration of Adorno’s somewhat cryptic elaboration.
On Adorno’s “critical materialism,” see Cook, 2006, 2011.
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The objectivity of historic life is that of natural history. Marx, as opposed to Hegel, knew
this and knew it strictly in the context of the universal that is realized over the subjects’
heads (…) Ideology is not superimposed as a detachable layer on the being of society; it
is inherent in that being. It rests upon abstraction, which is the essence of the barter
process. Without disregard for living human beings there could be no swapping. What
this implies in the real progress of life to this day is the necessity of social semblance. Its
core is value as a thing-in-itself, value as “nature.” The natural growth of capitalist
society is real, and at the same time it is that semblance. That the assumption of natural
laws is not to be taken á la letter—that least of all is it to be ontologized in the sense of a
design, whatever its kind, of so-called “man”—this is confirmed by the strongest motive
behind all Marxist theory: that those laws can be abolished. The realm of freedom would
no sooner begin than they could cease to apply. (Adorno, 1973 [1966]: 354-355)

In this passage, it is clear that what Adorno finds compelling in Marx is his notion
of natural history as essentially critical. The question that natural history, as a critical
concept in Marx’s analysis, then begs “is the question of freedom or unfreedom in
history” (Tillack, 2006 [1965]: 116). In this section of Negative Dialectics, Adorno (1973
[1966]: 355; cf. Adorno, 2006 [1965]: 118) notes that it is ironic that Marx was a “Social
Darwinist” before quoting the following passage from Marx’s Foundations of Political
Economy, which according to Adorno, “leaves no doubt that his [Marx’s] view of natural
history was critical in essence” (Adorno, 1973 [1966]: 355).
Much as the whole of this motion appears as a social process, much as the single
moments of this motion take their departure from the conscious will and from particular
purposes of individuals—the totality of the process does appear as an objective context
arising by natural growth. It is indeed due to the interaction of conscious individuals, but
neither seated in their consciousness nor subsumed under them as a whole. (Marx, quoted
in Adorno, 1973 [1966]: 355; see also Marx, 1974 [1857/58]: 196-197)

Such “natural laws of society” are ideology as soon as they are “hypostatized as
immutably given by nature” (Adorno, 1973 [1966]: 355; Adorno, 2006 [1965]: 118).
Adorno goes on to note how Marx, in his chapter on fetishism, “mocks the false
consciousness that acts like a mirror to the parties involved in the process of barter,
reflecting back to them as characteristics of things what in reality is a social relation”
(Tillack, 2006 [1965]: 118). Here ideology speaks the truth about society as
heteronomous (Tillack, 2006 [1965]: 118). These somewhat cryptic insights will be
important to bear in mind in my discussion of Postone below.
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2.5 Adorno and the Environment
Before discussing Adorno’s potential contribution to a critical theory of the
environment, it will be helpful to restate the basic parameters of the environment-society
problematic this dissertation addresses. The environment-society problematic refers to the
seemingly “paradoxical” synchronicity of increased environmental destruction amid
growing environmental attention and concern throughout the latter half of the twentieth
century. We can decipher an objective dimension and a subjective dimension of the
environment-society problematic. Recall that the objective dimension includes actual,
concrete human-ecological transformation, which rose to historically unprecedented
levels following the Second World War and has been increasing exponentially ever since;
whereas the subjective dimension expresses itself via the widespread concern for and
attention to the well-being of the biophysical world, which has also been growing fairly
steadily throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. Another related characteristic
of the environment-society problematic is reflected in the fact that modern society posits
nature as an external “object” which may then be quantified, manipulated, and controlled.
Taking both the subject-object dimensions of the environment-society problematic as
well as modern society’s treatment of nature into consideration, I noted that one of the
most unnerving characteristics of the environment-society problematic is that although
societally-induced environmental degradation is becoming increasingly visible, it is at the
same time becoming less and less understandable (as evidenced by the paradox between
increased ecological destruction amid wide-spread environmental attention and concern
following the Second World War). Finally, I’ve shown that the seemingly “paradoxical”
nature of the environment-society problematic is indicative of this severance of the
subject-object dimensions of the problematic itself.
In the investigation of contemporary American environmentalism in chapter four,
it will be helpful to bear in mind Adorno’s critique of identity thinking, in addition to the
aspects of his concept of mediation discussed above. Because the implications of
Adorno’s critique of identity thinking and his concept of mediation for the investigation
below will only become apparent through the unfolding of that investigation, I will, at
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this point, simply indicate the relation between the significance of Adorno’s critique to
one element of the examination pursued in chapter four by referring to the term
“American society.” As will become clear, “American society” is not a society; rather,
what we refer to as “American society” is, in fact, a historically-specific configuration of
social relations that are problematic and in direct conflict with the promises of an unified
America. The depth of this problem is linked to the problem of reification.
Gillian Rose (1976: 72) suggests that for Adorno the origin of reification is
marked by “the idea that value appears to be the property of a commodity” while in
actuality, Marx has emphasized, “‘exchange value is the only form in which the value of
a commodity can manifest itself or be expressed’” (Marx, quoted in Rose, 1976: 72).
Rose explains,
Thus to say that something is reified is not to emphasize that a relation among men
appears as a relation among things. It is to emphasize that a relation among men appears
in the form of a property of a thing. To be non-reified, then, is really to be a property of a
thing or, by analogy with Marx, to be a use-value. In Marx’s terms, ‘it is through its own
properties, its own qualities that a thing is a use-value’, or, in Adorno’s terms, when the
concept is identical with its object, then something is non-reified. (Rose, 1976: 73)

Recognition of today’s worldwide ecological crises is not real (critical)
recognition if it is confined to the appearance of growing attention and concern for
ecological destruction within existing social conditions (made possible by increasingly
sophisticated measurement technologies) without recognizing itself as such. To claim that
the concept “recognition” correctly describes a state of affairs when it is not, in fact, real
recognition is to make unequal things equal (Rose, 1978: 72; Adorno, 1973 [1966]). As I
explain below in chapter four, contemporary environmentalism (and contemporary
American environmentalism in particular) is a reified manifestation of contemporary
ecological subjectivity—a manifestation that takes shape differently in different societal
contexts. In this sense, real (critical) recognition would involve recognizing itself as a
category of alienation mediated by this reification.
3. Moishe Postone: Critique of Traditional Marxism
In his 1993 book, Time, Labor, and Social Domination, Moishe Postone presents
the most sophisticated reinterpretation of Marx’s critical theory of modern society to
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date. Postone goes well beyond a simple restatement of Marx’s ideas by indicating the
historical specificity and critical core of the Marxian approach through a critique of
traditional Marxism. Although Marx’s work represents a systematic critical theory of
modern society, Postone contends that Marx’s ideas have been appropriated through a
traditional theoretical lens. I shall elaborate throughout my discussion the key aspects of
Postone’s critical Marxian theory and how they differ from traditional Marxism (a brief
summary can be found below in Table 4). While these are by no means the only or most
significant elements of traditional Marxism and critical Marxian theory, Table 4 is
included to assist the reader in situating Postone’s object of critique with regard to his
critique of traditional Marxism.

Table 4. Traditional Marxism and Critical Marxian Theory
Traditional Marxism

Postone’s Critical Marxian Theory

Critique of capitalism rooted in the standpoint
of labor (the proletariat)

Critique of labor rooted in the potential
generated by capital’s accumulated history

Transhistorical conception of labor
-Labor constitutes the social world and is the
source of all wealth in all societies
-Social relations, such as class exploitation and
forms of social domination within capitalism
veil the “true” (transhistorical) nature of labor

Historically specific conception of labor
-Labor constitutes the social world and is the
source of all wealth only in capitalist society
-Capitalism’s historically specific form of
abstract domination and its social relations are
structured by such labor

Categorical appropriation of Marx’s categories
-Interpretation of Marx’s categories, such as
commodity, value and capital, as categories of
the opposition between owners and workers,
proletariat and bourgeoisie

Categorial appropriation of Marx’s categories
-Interpretation of Marx’s categories, such as
commodity, value and capital, as categories of
both the subjective and objective forms of
modern social life
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In contrast to traditional Marxism, which affirms the centrality of labor in
capitalist society, Postone argues that Marx’s focus on the central role played by labor in
capitalist society is fundamental to his critical theory of modern society. Marx’s critical
theory, according to Postone (1993: 307), conceptualizes labor as “a determinate mode of
social mediation” that also structures a form of abstract domination unable to be grasped
adequately when approached in traditional terms. It is important to be aware of the
historical significance of Postone’s critique of traditional Marxism because Postone’s
critique is all the more pertinent today after the historical failures of Marxism as a
political project. One effect of this failure has been an increased skepticism regarding the
applicability of Marx’s theory to the current historical moment, as expressed, for
example, by theories of post-structuralism and deconstructionism, which, as Murthy
(2009: 9-10) explains, “seem to have the advantage of giving up totalizing narratives and
grandiose projects of human emancipation.” These theories are correct to emphasize the
inadequacies of traditional Marxism, particularly the focus on the proletariat as the
historical subject (a narrow, often economistic conceptualization of “class”) and a
similarly narrow concern for concrete forms of capitalist exploitation (Murthy, 2009).
Unfortunately, the inadequacies of this approach are frequently equated with those of
Marx himself. Postone’s engagement with Marx’s critical theory, however, grasps the
historical specificity of capital in history. Postone’s more nuanced reading of Marx
allows for an understanding of larger processes of social domination in light of both statecentric capitalism and “socialism” during the second and third quarter of the twentieth
century as well as the most recent incarnation of capital, which is expressed through the
advent of neoliberalism during the 1970s and accelerated in and through the more recent
processes of globalization.
Postone is significant for both the overall aim of this dissertation and in light of
the preceding discussions of Lukács and Adorno, in particular. With regard to Adorno,
recall that Lukács’s (1971 [1923]) conclusion, which regarded the proletariat as the
identical subject-object, fell victim to the traditional form of theorizing that the critical
impetus of his own theory pointed beyond. Instead of simply discarding Lukács’s
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approach as a failed, outmoded attempt to categorially appropriate the categories Marx
puts forth in his theory of capital, I contend that Postone’s (1993) reinterpretation of
Marx’s critical theory may be seen as the critical appropriation of that which remains
analytically vexing in Lukács’s critique of the commodity form.121 This approach allows
for an analysis more in line with the dynamics of capitalism at the beginning of the
twenty-first century. Whereas both Lukács and Adorno employ Marx’s critique of
capitalism to develop their own systematic critiques of the effects of the capitalist mode
of production on patterns of political, social, and cultural reproduction during the years
following the First World War (Lukács’s critique of reification) and the first two decades
following the Second World War (Adorno’s critique of identity thinking), Postone’s
critical Marxian theory grasps the intrinsic relationship between the changing nature of
the interaction between underlying dynamics of the development of capitalism and its
effects in determining patterns of political, social, and cultural reproduction (Dahms,
2011: 9).122
Postone is significant for the aims of this dissertation in large part because his
critical Marxian theory has an enormous potential contribution to produce an
environmental sociology theoretically informed by a critical theory of the environment.
This contribution becomes clearer in my explication of reification and production of
value below. At the same time, I would suggest that Postone’s potential contribution to an
environmental sociology theoretically informed by critical theory is enhanced if and
when situated in light of the potential contributions of both Lukács and Adorno that I
discussed above.
3.1 Nature of the Contradiction: Value and Material Wealth
Postone’s reinterpretation of Marx’s critical theory of modern society begins with
the Grundrisse rise der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, an unfinished manuscript
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Postone deals explicitly with a critical appropriation of Lukács in his 2003 essay, “Lukács and the
Dialectical Critique of Capitalism,” and in his 2009 essay, “The Subject and Social Theory: Marx and
Lukács on Hegel.” Although I will make references to these essays, my focus will be on Postone’s (1993)
book, Time, Labor, and Social Domination.
122
This point is developed by Dahms (2011: 3-41), who provides a critical analysis of the early Frankfurt
School critique of capitalism and Postone’s related contributions.
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written by Marx in 1857/58 though left unpublished until 1939 (and first published in
English in 1973). Postone contends the Grundrisse indicates the categories of Marx’s
analysis are historically specific: “that his critique of capitalism is directed at both its
mode of producing and its mode of distribution, and that his notion of the basic
contradiction of capitalism cannot be conceived of simply as one between the market and
private property, on the one hand, and industrial production on the other” (Postone, 1993:
21-22). For Postone (1993: 22), Marx’s mature theory is not a critique of capitalism from
the standpoint of labor but rather a critique of labor itself.
Postone focuses his explication on one particular section of the Grundrisse, the
“Contradiction between the foundation of bourgeois production (value as measure) and
its development. Machines, etc.” Marx (1973 [1857/58]: 704) begins this section with the
following statement: “The exchange of living labour for objectified labour time – i.e. the
positing of social labour in the form of the contradiction of capital and wage labour – is
the ultimate development of the value-relation and of production resting on value.”
Postone (1993: 24) argues that the title and first sentence of this section indicate that “for
Marx, the category of value expresses the basic relations of production of capitalism—
those social relations that specifically characterize capitalism as a mode of social life—as
well as that production in capitalism is based on value.” In other words, value is not
simply a market category, not simply a mechanism whereby equilibrium is achieved.123
That value is “both a determine form of social relations and a particular form of
wealth” (Postone, 1993: 24) is the backbone of Postone’s rereading of Marx. “The
exchange of living labour,” Postone stresses, does not refer to circulation but to the
production process itself. Postone (1993: 24) emphasizes that when Marx (1974
[1857/56]: 705-705) states, “the quantity of labour employed, as the determinant factor in
the production of wealth,” he indicates that what characterizes value as a determinate
form of social relations and a particular form of wealth is that it is a social form that
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The traditional Marxist interpretation of the theory of surplus value, codified in introductory texts to
Marx’s theory, interprets the theory of surplus value by emphasizing the source of profit-making in labor
exploitation where the value produced by labor in excess of the value of labor power goes to the capitalist
class as profit (see e.g. Albritton, 2007: 61-82).
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expresses and is based on the expenditure of direct labor time. Marx (1974 [1856/67]:
704) continues, “But to the degree that large industry develops, the creation of real wealth
comes to depend less on labour time and on the amount of labour employed than on the
power of the agencies set in motion during labour time, whose ‘powerful effectiveness’ is
itself in turn out of all proportion to the direct labour time spent on their production, but
depends on the general state of science and on the progress of technology, or the
application of this science to production.”
It is in this passage that the contradiction between value and what Marx calls “real
wealth” is most apparent. The difference between value and “real wealth,” as Postone
(1993: 25) explains, is that value is a form of wealth that depends on labor time and the
amount of labor employed whereas “real wealth” does not. That is to say, value is a
historically-specific form of wealth—it is not a trans-historical form of wealth that could
be distributed differently in different societies (Postone, 1993: 25). Similarly, the labor
that constitutes value is not a property of labor in general but rather a historical
specificity of labor that constitutes value as a form of wealth.124 Postone (1993: 27)
argues that in Marx’s analysis of value “the basic social relations of capitalism, its form
of wealth, and its material form of production” are interrelated.
Postone (1993: 27) points out that in this section of Grundrisse Marx continues to
indicate the increasingly anachronistic character of value as a measure of wealth vis-à-vis
the immense wealth-producing potential of the industrial process of production:
Labour no longer appears so much to be included within the production process; rather,
the human being comes to relate more as watchman and regulator to the production
process itself. (What holds for machinery holds likewise for the combination of human
activities and the development of human intercourse.) No longer does the worker insert a
modified natural thing [Naturgegenstand] as the middle link between the object [Objekt]
and himself; rather, he inserts the process of nature, transformed into an industrial
process, as a means between himself and inorganic nature, mastering it. He steps to the
side of the production process instead of being its chief actor. In this transformation, it is
neither the direct human labour he himself performs, nor the time during which he works,
but rather the appropriation of his own general power, his understanding of nature and his
mastery over it by virtue of his presence as a social body – it is, in a word, the
development of the social individual which appears as the great foundation-stone of
124

By trans-historical labor I am referring to Marx’s notion of labor in general as the basic metabolic
interaction between humanity and nature. Following Postone (1993), the explanatory power of such a
general notion of labor is rather limited.
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production and of wealth. The theft of alien labour time, on which the present wealth is
based, appears a miserable foundation in face of this new one, created by large-scale
industry itself” (Marx, 1973 [1857/56]: 705).

Gleaning insight from this section of the Grundrisse, Postone (1993: 24-25)
argues that, for Marx, as capitalist industrial production develops value becomes an
increasingly less adequate measure of material wealth. Marx (1974 [1857/58]: 705) does,
however, recognize that the persistence of value as a measure of material wealth
produced, despite being increasingly anachronistic, remains a necessary structural
precondition of capitalist society even though the potential embodied in the forces of
production increasingly render production based on value obsolete (Marx, 1974
[1857/58]: 704-711).125 Postone (1993: 27) explains that because production remains tied
to value, where labor time is the sole measure of wealth, the abolition of value would
signify the end of (capitalist) labor.126 The contradiction between wealth and value,
which, following Postone (1993), I shall elucidate below, therefore points toward
capital’s historically-determinate and dynamic socio-ecological domination.
3.2 The Categorial Framework of a Marxian Critical Theory of Modern Society
Postone’s categorial analysis, as opposed to the categorical analysis of traditional
Marxism, is grounded in the historically-specific (“dual”) character of labor in capitalism.
Such labor, according to Postone, constitutes a determinate mode of social mediation in
and through which capital’s basic social relations (and therefore the subjective-objective
forms of modern social life) are both structured and structuring forms of social practice.
On the basis of this categorial appropriation, Postone unfolds the categories of Marx’s
mature theory. Postone’s theoretical analysis shows how the double-sided nature of
125

See also Postone, 1993: 25.
This is substantiated by Marx’s (1974 [1857/58]) statements below:
Its [the value-relation and of production resting on value] presupposition is—and remains—the mass of
direct labour time, and the quantity of labour employed, as the determinant factor in the production of
wealth. But to the degree that large industry develops, the creation of real wealth comes to depend less on
labour time and on the amount of labour employed than on the power of the agencies set in motion during
labour time, whose ‘powerful effectiveness’ is itself in turn out of all proportion to the direct labour time
spent on their production, but depends rather on the general state of science and on the progress of
technology, or the application of this science to production (…) Real wealth manifests itself, rather—and
large industry reveals this—in the monstrous disproportion between the labour time applied, and its
product, as well as in the qualitative imbalance between labour, reduced to a pure abstraction, and the
power of the production process it superintends. (Marx, 1974 [1857/58]: 704-705)
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capital’s basic social forms underlies the fundamental contradiction between value and
wealth (Marx also referred to the latter as “real wealth”). The historically specific
property of labor in modern capitalist society, as Postone explains, is its double character,
which constitutes the basis for a historically-specific, abstract, and impersonal form of
social domination (Postone, 1993: 30). Postone (1993: 30) contends that with his
categories of commodity and capital Marx sought to grasp the historical specificity of this
form of abstract domination. As we shall see, Postone’s approach is both similar to and
different from that of Lukcás, who also appropriated Marx’s category of the commodity
to elucidate the dual character of capital’s basic social forms.127
Because Marx’s discussion of the commodity in the first chapter of Capital
Volume 1 is notoriously difficult and because an adequate understanding of the
structuring principles of the commodity form of social relations is central to
understanding Marx’s critical theory of modern society, I will begin, following Postone,
by engaging Marx’s discussion of the commodity and the double character of
commodity-determined labor before discussing their determinate role in structuring a
form of abstract domination specific to the capitalist social formation. While my aim is to
illuminate the significance of Postone’s categorial framework, the reader should bear in
mind Marx’s unique mode of presentation, which was mentioned above in chapter two.
3.2.1 The Commodity
In the first chapter of Capital, Volume I, Marx (1976 [1867]) distinguishes
between two aspects of the commodity: use-value and exchange-value. Use-value refers
to the “usefulness of a thing”—it is entirely “conditioned by the physical properties of the
commodity, and has no existence apart from the latter” (Marx, 1976 [1867]: 126). Usevalues also “constitute the material content of wealth, whatever its social form may be”
127

The category of capital will be elucidated below, but, to jump ahead for a moment, capital includes a
directional dynamic, which, as Postone convincingly argues, can only be discussed with reference to the
dialectic of labor and time: “The fundamental form of social domination characterizing modern society,
that which Marx analyzed in terms of value and capital, is one that generates a historical dynamic beyond
the control of the individuals constituting it” (Postone, 1993: 31). According to Postone’s reinterpretation
of Marx’s critical theory, the category of capital constitutes the dynamic and contradictory nature of this
totality: “Marx’s critical theory of capital is a theory of the nature of the history of modern society”
(Postone, 1993: 31).
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(Marx, 1976 [1867]: 126). Use-values do not, however, make a thing a commodity: “A
thing can be a use-value without being a value” (Marx, 1976 [1867]: 131). To become a
commodity the product must be transferred to another person through the medium of
exchange.128 Different use-values between commodities refer to qualitative differences
and are therefore incommensurable. In order to be exchanged the incommensurability of
commodities (as use-values) must somehow be rendered commensurable.
Commensurability requires an objective measure of comparison, and the common
property that allows commodities to be compared is what Marx calls value.129 Abstracted
from the utilities (use-value) of commodities, the only common characteristic left,
according to Marx, is labor. As Derek Sayer (1979: 15-16) notes, “What the exchange
value of a commodity expresses is therefore the labour bestowed in, or more accurately
socially necessary to, its production. Value is simply expended labour.”130
But why must value be expressed in the form of exchange value? Value, as
expended labor, is not immediately apparent. Value “is not phenomenally evident”; in
other words, it “has no phenomenal existence” independent of the “‘corporeal reality’, the
natural form of the commodity” (Sayer, 1979: 16).131 Exchange-value expresses value as
that which transcends differences of commodities as use-values. Value necessarily
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Engels added the following note to the fourth German edition of Capital I in order to “avoid the
misconception that Marx regarded every product consumed by someone other than the producer as a
commodity” (Marx, 1976: 131).
129
I will return to the category of value and the problem of the magnitude of value below when I discuss
Postone’s categorial unfolding. At this point it should be noted that while not explicit in Marx’s initial
discussion of the commodity in Capital, Volume 1 value is not simply a market category that makes
“objects” commensurable. Value, which for Marx is a category of mediation, becomes apparent
retrospectively in the course of Marx’s mode of presentation in Capital. It is important to note here that
money, as a universal equivalent, presupposes a world in which everything is up for exchange. The
historical condition for the universality of exchange is wage labor, where a significant proportion of the
population does not consume what they produce but instead use their wages in order to buy objects to
consume. The category of “object,” as well as “labor” (as a general category), is historically constituted.
Both exclusively emerge in capitalism.
130
More accurately, value is objectified time—that is, the objectification of labor time expenditure. As we
shall see, the notion of value as objectified time is central to Postone’s notion that in capitalism people are
dominated by time.
131
According to Marx (1976 [1867]: 138): “Not an atom of matter enters into the objectivity of
commodities as values; in this it is the direct opposite of the coarsely sensuous objectivity of commodities
as physical objects. We may twist and turn a single commodity as we wish; it remains impossible to grasp
it as a thing possessing value.”
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assumes a distinct, two-fold phenomenal form: “the value of any given commodity is
manifested as first, independent of that commodity’s use-value, and second, common to
that commodity and all others” (Marx, 1976 [1867]: 139). Value, for Marx, is a category
of mediation (as understood in terms of the methodological function of mediation in
chapter two above). I shall return to the objectification of abstract labor, the magnitude of
value, and the social necessity of labor time below.
3.2.2 The Double Character of Commodity-Determined Labor
Marx distinguishes two dimensions of labor embodied in the commodity: concrete
labor and abstract labor. These two dimensions of labor parallel and correspond to the
use-value and value dimensions of the commodity. The specific use-values of
commodities differ qualitatively as a result of the different types of laboring activity
required to bring them into existence; as Marx (1976 [1867]: 132) puts it, a “specific kind
of productive activity is required” in order to bring a commodity’s use-value into
existence. Marx (1976 [1867]: 132) refers to this “specific kind of productive activity” as
concrete (useful) labor. As such, concrete labor “is determined by its aim, mode of
operation, object, means and result” (Marx, 1976 [1867]: 132).132 Like the use-value
dimension of the commodity, the category concrete labor implies different types of
laboring activities (e.g. weaving, molding, tailoring, spinning, etc.). The qualitative
heterogeneity of differing types of laboring activities also means that such labor is
inherently incommensurable.
Recall that the common property that allows commodities to become
commensurable is value, which, abstracted from the heterogeneity of use-values, Marx
(1976 [1867]: 136) reduces to “human labour pure and simple.” Value as such cannot
provide the basis for exchange because using labor as the basis for exchange assumes that
the labor embodied in commodities is itself commensurable and thus quantifiable (Sayer,
1979: 18). From the perspective of its use-value dimension (concrete labor), it certainly is
132

The use-values of commodities, as Marx (1976 [1867]: 133) explains, “are combinations of two
elements, the material provided by nature, and labour. If we substract the total amount of useful labour of
different kinds which is contained in the coat, the linen, etc., a material substratum is always left. This
substratum is furnished by nature without human intervention. When man engages in production, he can
only proceed as nature does herself, i.e. he can only change the form of the materials.”
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not. Therefore, in order to establish what is common to all commodity-producing labor,
Marx argues that it is necessary to abstract from the qualitative differences of the
concrete labor embodied in the use-value dimension of the commodity. This dimension
of commodity-producing labor is designated by Marx’s category “abstract labor.” Marx
explicates the necessity of this abstraction as follows:
Just as, in viewing the coat and the linen as values, we abstract from their different usevalues, so, in the case of the labour represented by those values, do we disregard the
difference between its useful forms, tailoring and weaving. The use-values coat and linen
are combinations of, on the one, productive activity with a definite purpose, and, on the
other, cloth and yearn; the values coat and linen, however are merely congealed
quantities of homogeneous labour. In the same way, the labour contained in these values
does not count by virtue of its productive relation to cloth and yarn, but only as being an
expenditure of human labour-power. Tailoring and weaving are the formative elements in
the use-values coat and linen, precisely because these two kinds of labour are of different
qualities; but only in so far as abstraction is made from their particular qualities, only in
so far as both possess the same quality of being human labour, do tailoring and weaving
form the substance of the values of the articles mentioned. (Marx, 1976: 135 [emphasis
added])

Although Marx invokes the category of abstract labor to explain the value-form of
the commodity, the value form and the commodity form are not synonymous. According
to Marx,
Not an atom of matter enters into the objectivity of commodities as values; in this it is the
direct opposite of the coarsely sensuous objectivity of commodities as physical objects.
We may twist and turn a single commodity as we wish; it remains impossible to grasp it
as a thing possessing value. However, let us remember that commodities possess an
objective character as values only in so far as they are all expressions of an identical
social substance, human labour, that their objective character as values is therefore purely
social. (Marx, 1976 [1867]: 138-139)

Value therefore appears as the expenditure of human energy, a category which
would therefore apply to all societies. However, the objective character of commodities
common to all particular forms of productive activity is socially and historically
determinate. A characteristic of value under capitalism—its historical specificity—is its
abstract generality. With use-values (concrete) labor differs qualitatively, yet “with
reference to value, it counts only quantitatively, once it has been reduced to human labour
pure and simple” (Marx, 1976 [1867]: 136).133 The phrase “human labour pure and
133

In this section of Capital, Volume 1 Marx (1976 [1867]) first introduces the contradiction between
wealth and value:
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simple” is therefore far from straight forward and can, in fact, be misleading. Marx
appears to be defining the category of abstract labor with reference to the expenditure of
human energy, which, understood trans-historically, is then quantified under the capitalist
social formation. In other words, abstract labor may appear as a trans-historical category
alongside that of concrete labor. Sayer (1979) indicates some of the problems involved in
Marx’s discussion of value and abstract labor:
It is in this context, that of a definite kind of problem, that Marx introduces the concepts
of value and abstract labour. This problem is defined in such a way that it allows only one
kind of solution. The goal of the analysis must be to elucidate not only those conditions
of existence of the commodity form which coincide with those of products of labour
generally; it must be, quite specifically, to enumerate those conditions which allow the
product to assume the value-form. And if this form is a historical one, then so too must be
its conditions. In so far as the concepts of value and abstract labour purport to articular
these conditions, therefore, they must be historical categories. Conversely, if their
reference is transhistorical, they will be unable to explain the historically specific valueform, and in consequence the commodity form itself will remain a mystery. Prima facie
then, we would expect abstract labour to be a historical category and this no mere ‘mental
generalisation’ but the concept of a definite social form (…) both these conditions are
violated as soon as we equate abstract with physiologically equal labour. (Sayer, 1979:
20)

Postone further explicates the significance of this problematic in terms echoing
Marx’s immanent critique of the commodity form of social relations:134
In itself, an increase in the quantity of use-values constitutes an increase in material wealth. Two coats will
clothe two men, one coat will only clothe one man, etc. Nevertheless, an increase in the amount of material
wealth may correspond to a simultaneous fall in the magnitude of its value. This contradictory movement
arises out of the twofold character of labour. By ‘productivity’ of course, we always mean the productivity
of concrete useful labour; in reality this determines only the degree of effectiveness of productive activity
directed towards a given purpose within a given period of time. Useful labour becomes, therefore, a more
or less abundant source of products in direct proportion as its productivity rises or falls. As against this,
however, variations in productivity have no impact whatever on the labour itself represented in value. As
productivity is an attribute of labour in its concrete useful form, it naturally ceases to have any bearing on
that labour as soon as we abstract from its concrete useful form. The same labour, therefore, performed for
the same length of time, always yields the same amount of value, independently of any variations in
productivity. But it provides different quantities of use-values, during equal periods of time; more, if
productivity rises; fewer, if it falls. For this reason, the same change in productivity which increases the
fruitfulness of labour, and therefore the amount of use-values produced by it, also brings about a reduction
in the value of this increased total amount, if it cuts down the total amount of labour-time necessary to
produce the use-values. The converse also holds. (Marx, 1976 [1867]: 136-137)
I will return to the contradiction between wealth and value on the basis of Postone’s categorial unfolding of
Marx’s categories. As we shall see, this contradiction, which is operative at the level of society as a whole,
gives rise to the socioecological tensions underlying the production of value.
134
The following passage, quoted from Postone (1993: 124), and the previous passage, quoted from Sayer
(1979: 20) should be read in terms of the comparative differences between Sayer’s and Postone’s
interpretation of Marx’s socio-historical theory of knowledge, which I discussed in chapter two. To
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Marx’s analysis of the commodity is not an examination of a product that happens to be
exchanged regardless of the society in which that takes place; it is not an investigation of
the commodity torn from its social context or as it contingently may exist in many
societies. Instead, Marx’s analysis is of the “form of the commodity as the generally
necessary social form of the product,” and as the “general elementary form of wealth.”
According to Marx, though, the commodity is the general form of the product only in
capitalism. (Postone, 1993: 128)

In order to pinpoint value as a determinate form of social mediation, I will next
turn to the historical specificity of commodity-determined labor. My discussion of the
historical specificity of commodity-determined labor—namely, its double character—is
in line with Postone’s (1993: 124) attempt to “reformulate value as a historically specific
form of wealth, different from material wealth.” Marx (1976 [1867]: 132) himself was
quick to point out that the dual character of labor embodied in commodities was “crucial
to an understanding of political economy” when he modestly asserts that “I was the first
to point out and examine critically this twofold nature of the labour contained in
commodities.”
3.2.3 The Historical Specificity of Labor’s Double Character
Following Marx, Postone explains that what distinguishes the capitalist mode of
production is that relative to previous social formations labor is abstract and universal;
that is, it is no longer directly social. Expressed through the exchange of commodities,
the social character of labor, as Sayer (1979: 22) notes, “is accordingly expressed only in
the oblique (and mystifying) form of an apparently objective feature of those products,
their exchange-value.” Discussing abstract labor, Marx (1976 [1867]: 135 [emphases
added]) explains, “The various proportions in which different kinds of labour are reduced
to simple labour as their unit of measurement are established by a social process that goes
on behind the backs of the producers; these proportions therefore appear to the producers
to have been handed down by tradition.” The tendency to treat labor as a trans-historical
category (as traditional Marxism does) is an understandable misrecognition because

reiterate, Sayer (1979) stresses a Kantian impulse in Marx’s theory but one that emphasizes the historical
relativity of the categories of Marx’s critical theory; Postone (1993) argues Marx’s theory of knowledge is
essentially other and more than a relativized Kantian epistemology.
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labor, conceptualized trans-historically, is the form of appearance of what is historically
specific. In other words, labor’s historically-specific character is that it is general.
Inadequate attention to historical specificity is related to the traditional Marxist
interpretation of value as a market-mediated category where the relations of production
are conceptualized in terms of the market and private property:
These relations, so conceived, supposedly are the means by which labor and its products
are socially organized and distributed; they are, in other words extrinsic to labor itself.
Consequently, labor in capitalism can be taken to be labor as it is commonly understood:
a purposive social activity involving the transformation of material in a determinate
fashion which is an indispensable condition for the reproduction of human society. Labor
is thus understood in a transhistorical fashion; what varies historically is the mode of its
social distribution and administration. (Postone, 1993: 124)

As indicated in the above passage, traditional Marxism begins with an
undifferentiated notion of labor imposed on society from the outset. In distinction to this
approach where critique of capitalism assumes the analytic standpoint of labor, Postone’s
critical Marxian theory is rooted in the critique of such labor. This distinction requires
Postone (1993: 124) to examination of the historical specificity of capitalist labor from
within the context of the capitalist social formation in terms of Marx’s distinction
between wealth and value in order to “reformulate value as a historically specific form of
wealth, different from material wealth.” In contrast to traditional Marxism, Postone
(1993) argues that value is not necessarily tied to a historically-specific mode of
distribution. As Postone (1993: 45) explains, “Once fully established socially, it [value]
can be distributed in various ways,” including non-market modes of distribution such as
planning. The implications of Postone’s position are especially pertinent at the beginning
of the twenty-first century, that is, after the official end of the cold war and the collapse
of “actually existing socialism.”
Reworking Marx’s position, Postone identifies value as the central problem of
capitalist production. If value is a historically-specific form of social wealth, then, within
the framework of Marx’s critical theory, the labor that creates value is historically
specific as well. The specificity of this labor, as an expression of alienated social
relations, cannot be adequately grasped in terms of energy expenditure or concrete forms
of exploitation and domination within modern society, and it most certainly cannot be
124

grasped by relying on an undifferentiated notion of labor as the metabolic interaction
between humans and the natural environment (á la Foster, 2000). Following the critical
Marxian approach put forth by Postone, we must instead grasp the specificity of labor in
capitalism, which structures a form of abstract social domination. According to Postone’s
categorial interpretation of Marx, conceptualizing commodity-determined labor as
intrinsically linked to a historically-specific form of abstract domination would also allow
for an analysis of the specific form of modern society itself.135
The double character of labor indicates the historical specificity of commoditydetermined labor and the form of wealth (value) it produces. In order to indicate the
historical specificity of value (and the commodity-determined labor that constitutes it),
Postone returns to Grundrisse, where Marx (1974 [1857/58]: 158) retrospectively
outlines three historically determinate social forms:136
1) Various forms that precede capitalist production: “Relations of personal
dependence (entirely spontaneous at the outset) are the first social forms,
in which human productive capacity develops only to a slight extent and at
isolated points.”
2) The capitalist social formation, which, according to Marx, creates
conditions for
3) Capital’s possible supersession; i.e. a social formation presupposed by
“Free individuality, based on the universal development of individuals and
on their subordination of their communal, social productivity as their
social wealth.”
Recall that, for Marx, the distinguishing feature of the capitalist mode of
production relative to previous social formations is that labor under capitalism is no
longer directly social but rather abstract and universal. In the various pre-capitalist social
formations, labor is social insofar as “various labors are imbued with meaning by the
135

Postone (1993: 123) contends, “Marx’s statement that in capitalism ‘direct labor time [is the] decisive
factor in the production of wealth,’ suggests that his category of value should be examined as a form of
wealth whose specificity is related to its temporal dimension. An adequate reinterpretation of value must
demonstrate the significance of the temporal determination of value for Marx’s critique and for the question
of the historical dynamic of capitalism.”
136
It is important to note the retrospective manner in which Marx outlines these three historicallydeterminate social forms in order to avoid the mistaken assumption that Marx’s theory is one of logical
historical progression.
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social relations that are their context”—in other words, laboring activities are
“determined as overtly social and qualitatively particular” (Postone, 1993: 151). In the
pre-capitalist social formations where labor is communal labor is directly social. In the
middle ages, for example, the expropriation of labor is embedded in particular social
relations of domination and exploitation, which are external to labor as such. In the
capitalist mode of production, “exploitation and domination are integral moments of
commodity-determined labor” (Postone, 1993: 160). If labor is bonded in feudalism, then
in the capitalist mode of production abstract labor is the bond (Stoetzler, 2004: 263).
In the pre-capitalist social formation labor is mediated socially, whereas in the
capitalist social formation, where the commodity is the dominant form, labor itself
constitutes a social mediation. To say that in capitalism labor itself constitutes a social
mediation means that in capitalism “one’s labor has a dual function: On the one hand, it
is a specific sort of labor that produces particular goods for others, yet, on the other hand,
labor, independent of its specific context, serves the producer as the means by which the
products of others are acquired” (Postone, 1993: 149). What is specific about
capitalism—the social formation based on the commodity form—is, as Postone
emphasizes, “Personal independence in the framework of a system of objective
[sachlicher] dependence” (Marx, quoted in Postone, 1993: 125). Citing Marx’s
Grundrisse (see Marx, 1974 [1857/58]: 164), Postone (1993: 125) stresses that the
“‘objective’ dependence is social; it is ‘nothing more than social relations which have
become independent and now enter into opposition to the seemingly independent
individuals; i.e., the reciprocal relations of production separated from and autonomous of
individuals.”137
3.2.4 Abstract Domination
On the basis of the historical specificity of labor’s double character, Marx
recognizes that what distinguishes capital in history is abstract domination. As a
historically-specific form of domination, capital’s abstract domination is tied to the
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Marx (1974 [1857/58: 164 [emphasis in the original]) continues, “individuals are now ruled by
abstractions, whereas earlier they depended on one another.”
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double character of commodity-determined labor: “social labor is not only the object of
domination and exploitation but is itself the essential ground of domination” (Marx,
quoted in Postone, 1993: 125). Commodity-producing labor is both particular (as
concrete labor, a determinate activity that creates specific use-values) and socially
general (as abstract labor, a means of acquiring the goods of others) (Postone, 1993: 151).
Labor is abstracted from its concrete particularity as useful labor, which, as Postone
(1993: 152) stresses, indicates that the category of abstract labor is “a real social process
of abstraction; it is not simply based on a conceptual process of abstraction.”138 What
makes labor general, and thus makes abstract labor the social mediation in capitalist
society, is its social function. Incorporating the socially-mediating function of labor into
his analysis, Postone returns to Marx’s distinction between wealth and value:
Corresponding to the two forms of labor objectified in the commodity are two forms of
social wealth: value and material wealth. Material wealth is a function of the products
produced, of their quantity and quality. As a form of wealth, it expresses the
objectification of various sorts of labor, the active relation of humanity to nature. Taken
by itself, however, it neither constitutes relations among people nor determines its own
distribution (…) Value, on the other hand, is the objectification of abstract labor. It is, in
Marx’s analysis, a self-distributing form of wealth: the distribution of commodities is
effected by what seems to be inherent to them—value. Value is, then, a category of
mediation: it is at once a historically determinate, self-distributing form of wealth and an
objectified, self-mediating form of social relations. (Postone, 1993: 154)

According to Postone (1993), Marx’s mature critical theory indicates that abstract
labor is the primary form of socially-mediating activity specific to capitalism. To
reiterate, it is this so-called “double-character” that, as a defining feature of labor under
capitalism, expresses alienated social relations. As an expression of alienation
(understood as social mediation as discussed in chapter two), commodity-determined
labor consists of isolated individual labor while simultaneously assuming “the form of
abstract generality” (Marx, quoted in Postone 1993: 47). As a particular use-value the
commodity is the product of a particular concrete labor; as a value it is the objectification
of abstract human labor (Postone, 1993: 154). This is the theoretical premise for
Postone’s (1993: 125) contentions that, echoing Marx, labor under capitalism structures a
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form of abstract social domination and that, more generally, “Capitalism is a system of
abstract, impersonal domination.”
3.3 Time, Labor, and Social Necessity
For Marx, the measure of value is very different from the measure of material
wealth. Postone (1993) explains that measurement of material wealth includes
objectifications of its use-value and concrete labor. The mode of measurement of material
wealth “is a function of the qualitative specificity of the product, the activity that
produces it, the needs it may satisfy, as well as custom—in other words, the mode of
measurement of material wealth is particular and not general” (Postone, 1993: 188).
Material wealth, as the dominant measure of wealth in a society, requires a social mode
of mediation that is overtly social, meaning “it is ‘evaluated’ and distributed by overt
social relations—traditional social ties, relations of power, conscious decisions,
considerations of needs, and so forth” (Postone, 1993: 188).
In capitalism, where value is the dominant form of wealth, the measure of value is
not overtly social; rather, value “is itself a mediation” (Postone, 1993: 188). Postone
(1993: 188) explains the difference: “Although value, like material wealth, is an
objectification of labor, it is an objectification of abstract labor.” As such, value acts as
“the self-mediating dimension of commodities”; its measure “is not a direct function of
the amount of good produced” (Postone, 1993: 188). Departing from the traditional
Marxist interpretation of the labor theory of value, Postone (1993: 188-189 [my
emphases] indicates that abstract labor “constitutes a general, ‘objective’ social
mediation” that is “neither expressed in terms of the objectifications of particular
concrete labors nor measured by their quantity. Its objectification is value—a form
separable from that of objectified concrete labor, that is, particular products.”
Against this background, Postone (1993: 189) reworking Marx, returns to the
problem of the magnitude of value (i.e. the “quantitative measure of the objectification of
abstract labor”).139 According to Marx (1976 [1867]: 129), the magnitude of value is to
be measured “By means of the quantity of the ‘value-forming substance’, the labour,
139

See Marx, 1976 [1867]: 129.
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contained in the article. This quantity is measured by its duration, and the labour-time is
itself measured on the particular scale of hours, days, etc.” Yet this measure, Marx (1976
[1867]: 129) indicates, cannot be a function of the quantity of labor expended to the
commodity because if it were then we would run into the same problem that we did when
trying to compare use-values: specifically, we cannot rely on concrete labor time alone as
this is intrinsically heterogeneous.140
Before proceeding to analyze the problem of the magnitude of value, it is first
necessary to discuss Postone’s contribution to understanding the temporal dimensions of
this problematic because the temporal dimension of the magnitude of value, which I
engage in subsequent sections, will become clear only on the basis of this discussion.
3.3.1 The Commodification of Time
Before engaging Postone’s categorial approach to the category of time,141 it will
be helpful to restate the overall significance of this approach. Postone’s categorial
analysis appropriates Marx’s categories as categories of the intrinsic relation between the
subject-object dimensions of modern social life (indicated, for example, by the double
character of commodity-determined labor) as simultaneously abstract and concrete. On
the basis of this approach and in line with the dual character of the commodity form of
social relations, Postone focuses on two different types of time: (1) concrete time (time as
a dependent variable) and (2) abstract time (time as an independent variable).
Concrete time, as Postone (1993: 201) explains, dominated conceptions of time
before the rise of modern capitalist society in Western Europe. The distinguishing feature
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Marx (1976 [1867]: 129) provides the following example to illustrate the inadequacy of quantity of
labor expended to produce a given product as the measure of the magnitude of value: “if the value of a
commodity is determined by the quantity of labour expended to produce it, it would be the more valuable
the more unskillful and lazy the worker who produced it, because he would need more time to complete the
article.”
141
Postone’s (1993: 213) categorial approach to the category of time is one of the places where the
influence of Lukács is most noticeable, particularly because Postone sees an intimate affinity between the
increasing dominance of abstract time as a form of time and the “progress” of capitalism as a form of life.
Lukács (1978: 40), discussing the experiential effects of the abstraction of socially-necessary labor on
behalf of independent artisans in the nineteenth century, says this: “They experienced in practice the
concrete consequences, without having any suspicion that what they were facing was an achieved
abstraction of the social process; this abstraction has the same ontological rigour of facticity as a car that
runs you over.”
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of concrete time is its function as a dependent variable: “The fact that the time unit is not
constant, but itself varies, indicates that this form of time is a dependent variable, a
function of events, occurrences, or actions” (Postone, 1993: 202). Postone (1993: 201)
explains that concrete time as a mode of time reckoning likely “was first developed in
ancient Egypt, spread widely throughout the ancient world, the Far East, the Islamic
world, and was dominant in Europe until the fourteenth century.” Concrete time was
predominant in agrarian forms of social life, where “rhythms of life and work (…)
depend on the cycles of the seasons and of day and night” (Postone, 1993: 202).
Abstract time is quite different than concrete time. Abstract time is not dependent
on events or qualitatively different circumstances; rather, it “‘flows equally without
relation to anything external” (Newton, 1936: 88, quoted in Postone, 1993: 202).
Whereas concrete time functioned as a dependent variable, abstract time “is an
independent variable; it constitutes an independent framework within which motions,
events, and action occur. Such time is divisible into equal, constant, nonqualitative units”
(Postone, 1993: 202). Postone (1993: 202) traces the historical development of abstract
time “with the spread of the commodity-determined form of social relations.” According
to Postone (1993: 214), time itself constitutes a new form of domination that was
controlled socially and politically by the bourgeoisie. Unlike Lukács, Postone (1993:
214) emphasizes that time as a form of domination should not be viewed as a form of
objectivity that veils concrete particularity. Although the development of abstract time is
tied to power, Postone (1993: 214) stresses that temporal social forms “have a life of their
own, and are compelling for all members of capitalist society—even if in a way that
benefits the bourgeois class materially.”142
Postone (1993) argues that the emergence of abstract time must be understood
socially and cannot be understood solely with reference to technological developments.
In other words, the origins of abstract time as a particular mode of time reckoning must
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The notion that abstract time compels all members of capitalist society is significant and will become
clearer when I return below to the category of socially-necessary labor time and the category of value as the
continual necessity of the present. This is also related to the mention of vested “interests” and external
social necessity in chapter one above where I distinguished a critical theory of the environment from a
critical sociology of the environment.
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“be examined in terms of the circumstances under which constant invariable hours
became meaningful forms of the organization of social life” (Postone, 1993: 207
[emphasis added]). Postone (1993: 204) indicates that the development of waterclocks in
ancient China, which functioned on the basis of a more or less uniform process (the flow
of water), indicated variable hours. The function of measuring variable hours as opposed
to constant time, was, as Postone (1993) indicates, not a matter of technical ability. It
was, rather, a matter of sociocultural significance: “although the rate of the water’s flow
remained constant, the indicator varied with the seasons. Less frequently, a complicated
mechanism was devised that allowed the flow of water itself to be varied seasonally”
(Postone, 1993: 204). The development of the mechanical clock in Western Europe
between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, in keeping the Church’s time, shared a
similar variance.
Postone (1993) argues that the transition from variable to constant hours
originated in urban centers of Western Europe in the beginning of the fourteenth century.
Here the development of constant time emerged as a form of work-time discipline
typically monitored by ringing bells in the urban centers in order to signify the opening
and closing of markets and work. Postone (1993: 210) argues the significance of the work
bells as an important organizing principle of the medieval textile industry can be
understood as “an early form of the capital-wage labor relationship.” Since the
merchant’s goal was profit, increased significance was placed on the productivity of the
labor hired, which depended on the “degree to which it could be disciplined and
coordinated in a regularized fashion” (Postone, 1993: 210).
3.3.2 The Magnitude of Value
According to Marx,
the labour that forms the substance of value is equal human labour, the expenditure of
identical human labour-power. The total labour-power of society, which is manifested in
the values of the world commodities, counts here as one homogeneous mass of human
labour-power, although composed of innumerable individual unites of labour-power.
Each of these units is the same as any other, to the extent that it has the character of a
socially average unit of labour-power and acts as such, i.e. only needs, in order to
produce a commodity, the labour time which is necessary on average, or in other words is
socially necessary. (Marx, 1976 [1867]: 129)
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Marx implies that the magnitude of value is the objectification of labor time
expenditure. Because this quantitative measure cannot be based on concrete labor alone,
it must instead be based on abstract (i.e. socially-necessary) labor. To put it another way,
the magnitude of value is the quantitative measure of the objectification of abstract labor
(Postone, 1993: 189). Marx (1976: 129) defines socially-necessary labor time as follows:
“the labour-time required to produce any use-value under the conditions of production
normal for a given society and with the average degree of skill and intensity of labour
prevalent in that society.” Postone (1993: 189) argues that this form of time Marx
identifies is historically specific: it is a determinate abstract time.
Marx’s category of socially-necessary labor time, according to Postone (1993,
1978), refers to an abstract quasi-objective form that confronts individuals as an external
social necessity; that is, socially-necessary labor time is an external social norm that
compels social action accordingly. Socially necessary labor time, as Postone (1993: 191)
explains, “entails the constitution by individual action of a general external norm that acts
reflexively on each individual.” It is part of a social process that, as Marx (1976 [1867]:
135) explains, “goes on behind the backs of the producers,” thereby confronting these
individuals as an external “objective” necessity.143
Postone (1993: 152 [original emphases]) emphasizes that the reference point for
socially-necessary labor time, as the determination of a commodity’s magnitude of value,
is society as a whole: “Viewed from the perspective of society as a whole, the concrete
labor of the individual is particular and is part of a qualitatively heterogeneous whole; as
abstract labor, however, it is an individuated moment of a qualitatively homogenous,
general social mediation constituting a social totality.” This is crucial for understanding
the role time plays in the capitalist mode of production as an external necessity (i.e. in
constituting a form of abstract social domination) as well the linkage between time,
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In the full statement from which I have extracted these phrase, Marx (1976 [1867]: 135) states: “The
various proportions in which different kinds of labour are reduced to simple labour as their unit of
measurement are established by a social process that goes on behind the backs of the producers; these
proportions therefore appear to the producers to have been handed down by tradition.”
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productivity, and the nature of the contradiction between value and material wealth. It is
therefore worth quoting at length one relevant passages from Postone (1993):
The time expended in producing a particular commodity is mediated in a socially general
manner and transformed into an average that determines the magnitude of value of the
product. The category of socially necessary labor time, then, expresses a general temporal
norm resulting from the action of the producers, to which they must conform (…) As a
category of the totality, socially necessary labor time expresses a quasi-objective social
necessity with which the producers are confronted. It is the temporal dimension of the
abstract domination that characterizes the structures of alienated social relations in
capitalism. The social totality constituted by the labor as an objective general mediation
has a temporal character, wherein time becomes necessity (…) Although value is
constituted by the production of particular commodities, the magnitude of value of a
particular commodity is, reflexively, a function of a constituted general social norm. The
value of a commodity, in other words, is an individuated moment of a general social
mediation; its magnitude is a function not of the labor time actually required to produce
that particular commodity but of the general social mediation expressed by the category
of socially necessary labor time. Unlike the measure of material wealth, which is a
function of the quantity and quality of particular goods, then, the measure of value
expresses a determinate relation—namely, a relation between the particular and the
abstract-general that has the form of a relation between moment and totality. Both terms
of this relation are constituted by labor functioning as a productive activity and as a
socially mediating activity. This double character of labor underlies the quasi-objective,
abstract temporal measure of social wealth in capitalism; and it also gives rise to an
opposition between the range of particular products or labors and an abstract general
dimension that constitutes and is constituted by those particular labor. (Postone, 1993:
191-192)

That “the commodity as a dominant social form necessarily implies” (Postone,
1993: 192) that people are dominated by their labor—because the reference point for
socially necessary labor time is society as a whole, this also indicates “a tension and
opposition between individual and society which points to a tendency toward the
subsumption of the former by the latter.” Postone (1993: 192) aptly describes this
domination: “When labor mediates and constitutes social relations, it becomes the central
element in a totality that dominates individuals—who, nevertheless, are free from
relations of personal domination.” As Postone is keen to point out, this antagonism
between individuals (as mere organs) and the whole is an antagonism intrinsic to the
capitalist social formation. The antagonism between these two moments, in other words,
is not an antagonism between non-capitalist and capitalist moments. As Postone (1993)
emphasizes, Marx’s analysis does not champion the organs against the whole; rather it is
a critique of the whole, which includes this antagonism itself.
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3.4 Material Wealth, Value, and Productivity
It should be recalled that the crux of Postone’s categorial reinterpretation can be
found in the fundamental contradiction between value and “real wealth” in modern
capitalist society. As will be elaborated below, the persistence of this contradiction is
linked to the dynamic and contradictory interactions between capital, wealth, and value.
Marx’s concept of capital as self-valorizing value indicates a built-in dynamic to
accumulate, which in developed capitalism (i.e. where relative surplus value is the
dominant form) tends toward accelerating rates of increases in productivity (i.e. not only
a tendency for productivity to increase over time but also a tendency for the rate at which
productivity increases to accelerate over time). The full elaboration of this dynamic will
become apparent only after incorporating Marx’s category of capital.144
If we examine the contradiction between value and wealth, then we can see that
“the magnitude of value is a function of the expenditure of abstract labor time” whereas
“material wealth is measured in terms of the quantity and quality of products created”
(Postone, 1993: 193). Viewed categorially, value is a function of the value dimension of
commodity-determined labor, whereas wealth is a function of the use-value dimension of
commodity-determined labor. If the magnitude of value depends on socially-necessary
labor time, then when average productivity is increased “the average number of
commodities produced per unit time” is increased as well, which thereby decreases “the
amount of socially necessary labor time required for the production of a single
commodity and, hence, the value of each commodity” (Postone, 1993: 193). As Marx
(1976 [1867]: 131) notes, “The value of a commodity (…) varies directly as the quantity,
and inversely as the productivity, of the labour which finds its realization within the
commodity.” The magnitude of total value produced, however, is a function only of the
objectification of abstract labor time expenditure (measured in terms of constant time
units). Postone (1993), commenting on the inverse correlation between average
productivity and the magnitude of value of each commodity, writes,
This indicates that the total value yielded in a particular period of time (for example, an
hour) remains constant. The inversely proportional relationship between average
144
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134

productivity and the magnitude of value of a single commodity is a function of the fact
that the magnitude of total value produced depends only on the amount of abstract human
labor time expended. Changes in average productivity do not change the total value
created in equal periods of time. Thus, if average productivity doubles, twice as many
commodities are produced in a given time period, each with half the previous value,
because the total value in that time period remains the same. The only determinate of
total value is the amount of abstract labor time expended, measured in constant temporal
units. It is, therefore, independent of changes in productivity. (Postone, 1993: 193)

While seemingly redundant, it is important to emphasize (following Marx, 1976
[1867]: 126 as well as Postone, 1993: 194) that value and (material) wealth are two very
different forms of wealth. They differ both qualitatively and quantitatively, and, as
Postone (1993: 194) explains, they can be opposed to one another.
Postone (1993) elaborates the particular qualities of material wealth as follows:
Material wealth is created by concrete labor, but labor is not the sole source of material
wealth (…) Material wealth, then, arises from the interactions of humans and nature, as
mediated by useful labor (…) its measure is a function of the quantity and quality of what
is objectified by concrete labor, rather than of the temporal expenditure of direct human
labor. Consequently, the creation of material wealth is not bound necessarily to such
labor time expenditure. Increased productivity results in increased material wealth,
whether or not the amount of labor time expended is increased. (Postone, 1993: 194)145

The nature of value, however, is quite different. As Postone (1993) explains:
Value is peculiar in that, though a form of wealth, it does not express directly the
relations of humans to nature but the relations among people as mediated by labor.
Hence, according to Marx, nature does not enter directly into value’s constitution at all.
As a social mediation, value is constituted by (abstract) labor alone: it is an
objectification of the historically specific social dimension of labor in capitalism as a
socially mediating activity, as the “substance” of alienated relations. Its magnitude is,
then, not a direct expression of the quantity of products created or of the power of natural
forces harnessed; it is, rather, a function only of abstract labor time. In other words,
although increased productivity does result in more material wealth, it does not result in
more value per unit of time. As a form of wealth that is also a form of social relations,
value does not express directly the acquired productive abilities of humanity (…) If value
is constituted by labor alone, and the only measure of value is direct labor time, it follows
that the production of value, unlike that of material wealth, necessarily is bound to the
expenditure of direct human labor. (Postone, 1993: 195)146

Reworking Marx’s (1976 [1867: 137) position, Postone (1993: 195) stresses that
while the forces of production of labor are analogous to the use-value dimension
productivity, as an expression of “the acquired productive abilities of humanity”
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This is in accordance with Marx’s explanation as well (see Marx, 1976 [1867]: 134, 136-137).
This is in line with Marx’s discussion of value (see Marx, 1976 [1867]: 137).
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(Postone, 1993: 195), is socially constituted in alienated form because value is the
dominant form of social wealth in capitalist society. Instead of being appropriated and
controlled by people, the acquired productive abilities of humanity dominate and control
people as an alienating force.147 Increases in productivity do not correspond to growing
amounts of value per unit time; in capitalism products function simply as material bearers
of objectified time (Postone, 1993). As we shall see in chapter four, advances in
productivity, as exemplified by the post-World War II explosion in science and
technology, “do not increase the amount of value yielded per unit of time, but they do
increase greatly the amount of material wealth produced” (Postone, 1993: 197). It is
important to be aware that the peculiarity of this dynamic, which can only be explained
by the temporal dimension of value, emerges only when relative surplus value becomes
the dominant form of wealth (as it did during the nineteenth century). In other words, the
tendency toward accelerating rates of increases in productivity148 (and therefore
accelerating rates of increases in biophysical throughput) becomes apparent only when
the working day has been limited.149 Before returning to the peculiarity of this dynamic, I
must first provide a brief sketch of Postone’s approach to Marx’s category of capital and
the sphere of production.
3.4.1 Capital
As mentioned in the preceding discussion of the commodity, Marx argues that a
product must be transferred to another person through the medium of exchange in order
for it to become a commodity. Marx also notes that the incommensurability of
commodities (as use-values) must somehow be rendered commensurable in order for an
exchange to happen. This commensurability requires an objective measure of
comparison, which Marx reduces to value. In chapter two I noted that in Marx’s
147

Postone (1993: 195) indicates that these productive abilities also become attributes of capital.
By “accelerating rates of increases in productivity,” I am referring not simply to the tendency for
productivity to increase over time, but rather to the tendency for the rate at which productivity increases to
accelerate over time, which implies a virtually exponential increase in levels of biophysical throughput.
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This is what Marx means by his statement that society can be poor even though it is enormously rich:
more and more “stuff” is being produced, yet poverty still exists. For Marx, this cannot be explained in
distributional terms but only in terms of the form of wealth (i.e. value) itself. The system is not driven by
the “interests” of those at the top of the social pyramid who stand to benefit from its operations, though this
is not to deny that certain individuals do in fact benefit in extreme disproportion to the vast majority.
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discussion of the commodity in the first chapter of Capital, Volume 1, the commodity
appears to be the exchange of external objects mediated by the market. I also noted that
the commodity as something other and more than that indicated by such market exchange
only becomes apparent retrospectively, particularly in the latter half of Capital, Volume
1. On the basis of his initial (categorial) approach to the commodity, Marx begins the
second part of Capital, Volume 1 with an analysis of money before he presents his
category of capital. According to Postone (1993: 265), it is here that “Marx unfolds a
dialectical reversal in his treatment of money: it is a social means that becomes an end.”
Postone’s (1993) gloss on Marx’s analysis of money is instructive and is worth
quoting at length:
In Volume I of Capital Marx develops an analysis of money and then capital on the basis
of his initial determinations of the commodity. He begins by examining the process of
exchange, arguing that the circulation of commodities differs formally and essentially
from the direct exchange of products. The circulation of commodities overcomes the
temporal, spatial, and personal barriers imposed by the direct exchange of products. In
the process, a quasi-natural network of social connections develops; although constituted
by human agents, it lies beyond their control. The commodity form of social mediation
historically gives rise to the independent private producer, on the one hand, and it
constitutes the social process of production and the relations among producers as an
alienated system independent of the producers themselves, a system of all-round
objective dependence, on the other. More generally, it gives rise to a world of subjects
and a world of objects. This sociocultural development proceeds with the development of
the money form. (Postone, 1993: 264)

Postone (1993) further explicates the implications of Marx’s analysis of money by
showing that, according to Marx, value is not a market category and, far from rendering
commodities commensurable, money is “a necessary form of appearance” of their
commensurability:
Marx structures his investigation of money as a dialectical unfolding, in the course of
which he logically derives both the social form of money, leading to his analysis of
capital, as well as the forms of appearance that veil that social form. Proceeding from his
analysis of the commodity as the duality of value and use value, Marx initially
determines money as the externalized manifest expression of the value dimension of the
commodity. He argues that in a society where the commodity is the universal form of the
product, money does not render commodities commensurable; rather, it is an expression,
a necessary form of appearance, of their commensurability, of the fact that labor
functions as a socially mediating activity (…) because the circulation of commodities is
effected by the externalization of their double character—in the form of money and
commodities—they seem to be mere “thingly” objects, goods circulated by money rather
than self-mediating objects, objectified social mediations. Thus, the peculiar nature of
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social mediation in capitalism gives rise to an antinomy—so characteristic of modern
Western worldviews—between a “secularized,” “thingly” concrete dimension and a
purely abstract dimension, whereby the socially constituted character of both dimensions,
as well as their intrinsic relation, is veiled. (Postone, 1993: 264-265)

How is it that in and through the circulation of commodities “a quasi-natural
network of social connections develops” which, “although constituted by human agents,
lies beyond their control” (Postone, 1993: 264)? In his discussion of money, Marx (1976
[1876]: 207-210) outlines how the true nature of money in capitalism may be
concealed.150 Postone’s gloss (1993: 265) on Marx’s discussion of money is in line with
his critique of traditional Marxism: money, as the externalized expression of “abstract
labor objectified as value” is “an externalized expression of the form of social mediation
that constitutes capitalist society.” Consequently, money appears to be natural (i.e. nonsocial). It is important to bear in mind, as Postone (1993) indicates in the passage above,
that the distinction between the use-value dimension (material wealth, concrete labor,
concrete time, productivity) and the value dimension (value, abstract labor, abstract time)
of the commodity form is not evident at the level of immediate experience.151 The
commodity both (1) has a form and (2) is a form. These two elements are intrinsically
related. The content of commodity’s value dimension form is a social relations—the
product (commodity) is brought into being through objectifying activity (labor). Yet, as a
social form, the commodity has another content—namely, abstract labor—and it is this
latter, substantive dimension that underlies the formalism of the capitalist system.
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Cf. Postone, 1993: 265.
The elusively dynamic nature of the commodity form of social relations is evident in the distinction
between values and prices, an issue that has been a source of fundamental confusion among the majority of
Marxist economists. Postone (1993: 196) suggests that in order to flesh this out, one would have to
“elucidate how a categorial distinction—such as that between value and material wealth—is indeed
operative socially, although the actors may be unaware of it. One would need to show how people, acting
on the basis of forms of appearance that disguise the underlying essential structures of capitalism,
reconstitute these underlying structures. Such an exposition would need to show how these structures, as
mediated by their forms of appearance, not only constitute practices that are socially constituting, but do so
in a way that imparts a determinate dynamic and particular constraints to the society as a whole.”
My discussion of the relationship between the development of contemporary ecological subjectivity and
contemporary American environmentalism in chapter four is an attempt to move toward this type of
analysis.
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According to Postone (1993: 268), this abstract, formalistic dimension allows
Marx to put forth his formalistic account of the logic of capital: M-C-M' is not the
formula for a process whereby “wealth in general is increased”; rather, it is the formula
for a process whereby “value is increased.” As Postone (1993) elaborates,
With capital, the transformation of (the commodity) form becomes an end and (…) the
transformation of matter becomes the means to this end. Production, as a social process
of the transformation of matter which mediates humans and nature, becomes subsumed
under the social form constituted by labor’s socially mediating function in capitalism.
(Postone, 1993: 267)

According to Postone’s (1993: 267) interpretation, this immanent dynamic violence is
why the difference between M and M', which Marx calls surplus value, is “necessarily
only quantitative.” The logic of capital, according to Marx (1976 [1867]), is characterized
by an endless dynamic. According to Postone (1993: 268), Marx’s category of capital as
self-valorizing value is an attempt to grasp modernity in a way that is much more
rigorous than the term “modernity” allows for:
Value becomes capital, according to Marx, as a result of a process of the valorization of
value, whereby its magnitude is increased (…) the motivating force of the circuit M-CM', its determining purpose, according to Marx, is value itself, an abstract general form
of wealth in terms of which all forms of material wealth can be quantified. This abstract
quantitative character of value as a form of wealth is related to the circumstance that it
also is a social means, an objectified social relation. With the introduction of the category
of capital, another moment of the determination of value as a means is introduced: value,
as a form of wealth abstracted from the qualitative specificity of all products (hence their
particular uses), and whose magnitude is a function of abstract time alone, receives its
most adequate logical expression by serving as the means for more value, for the further
expansion of value. With the introduction of the category of capital, then, value is
revealed as a means to a goal that is itself a means, rather than an end (…) This social
form is alienated, quasi-independent, exerts a mode of abstract compulsion and constraint
on people, and is in motion. (Postone, 1993: 268-269)

3.4.2 Production
Having introduced Marx’s category of capital as self-valorizing value, we can
now return to the temporal dimensions of the production of value. The contradiction
between wealth and value, including the socio-ecological tensions underlying this
contradiction, is linked intrinsically with the dynamic and contradictory interactions
between capital, wealth, and value. In the Grundrisse, Marx (1974 [1857/58]: 705)
explains how the persistence of value as a measure of material wealth produced remains a
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necessary structural precondition of capitalist society even though the potential embodied
in the forces of production increasingly renders production based on value obsolete
(Marx, 1974 [1857/58]: 704-711).152 Because the labor time that serves as the measure of
value is not individual and contingent but rather social and necessary, labor time forms an
objective totality whose coherence then becomes sensuous reality (Mészáros, 2005
[1970]: 87). According to Postone (1993), this abstract domination is structured by labor
insofar as the double character of labor under fully-developed capitalist society is
understood as structuring forms of social practice, which, embodied in and mediated
through the commodity form, are simultaneously abstract and concrete.153 That is to say,
under fully developed capitalism, where relative surplus value is the dominant form,
labor is both a productive activity and a socially-mediating activity.154
Capital drives the tendency toward accelerating rates of increases in productivity,
which mark the development of relative surplus value, as a self-valorizing value. As
Postone (1993: 283) explains, “With the development of relative surplus value, then, the
directional motion that characterizes capital as self-valorizing value becomes tied to
ongoing changes in productivity. An immanent dynamic of capitalism emerges, a
ceaseless expansion grounded in a determinate relationship between the growth of
productivity and the growth of the value form of the surplus.” The magnitude of total
value produced depends only on the amount of abstract human labor time expended.
Recall that abstract time, by definition, is measured in terms of constant time units,
whereas productivity corresponds to labor’s use-value dimension—value remains a form
of social necessity despite the fact that its determination (abstract labor time expended)
operates independent of changes in productivity. Value becomes increasingly
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See also Postone, 1993: 25.
Regarding the relationship between the double character of labor and the production of value, Postone
(1993: 281) asserts, “Labor, then, as a result of its dual character in capitalism, becomes ‘objective’ in a
double sense: its purpose, because constituted by labor itself, becomes ‘objective,’ separate from the
qualitative specificity of particular labors as well as from the actors’ wills; relatedly, labor in the process of
production, because separated from its purpose, is reduced to the object of that process.”
154
Postone (1993: 282) explains, “the nature of value is such that the process of its creation transforms
labor into the object of production while confronting it with a goal outside of its purpose.”
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anachronistic as a form of social wealth because of the tendency toward accelerating rates
of increases in productivity.
When discussing the category of socially-necessary labor time above, I indicated
that, according to Postone (1993: 191), Marx’s category of socially-necessary labor time
“expresses a general temporal norm resulting from the actions of the producers, to which
they must conform.” In other words, “Socially necessary labor time is the temporal
dimension of the abstract domination that characterizes the structures of alienated social
relations in capitalism” (Postone, 1993: 191). Socially-necessary labor time has an
additional social necessity because, insofar as surplus value is the dominant form in fullydeveloped capitalism, the social whole “is structured by value as the form of wealth and
surplus value as the goal of production” (Postone, 1993: 302). On the basis of Postone’s
categorial reinterpretation of Marx’s critical theory, the opposition of the categories of
value and material wealth illustrates “a form of social life in which humans are
dominated by their own labor and are compelled to maintain this domination” (Postone,
1993: 302).
3.5 Dialectic of Labor and Time
One of the most analytically vexing aspects of Postone’s (1993) reinterpretation
of Marx’s critical theory is his analysis of the dialectic of labor and time. As we shall see,
this is also one of the most potentially useful aspects of Postone’s work for environmental
sociology. Here Postone (1993: 286) incorporates Marx’s unfolding of the category of
capital in light of industrial production and labor’s double character in order to elaborate
the linkage between the temporal dimension of value, on the one hand, and the
interrelationship between productivity and commodity-determined labor, on the other.
Here Postone (1993) illustrates how the distinction between the double character of
capital’s basic social forms is itself an intrinsic dialectical dynamic.155 What is
remarkable about this analysis is that, in contrast to Lukács’s categorial approach,
Postone grasps the interaction between the value dimension and the use-value dimension
155

For the sake of clarity, it should be noted that in his analysis of the dialectic of labor and time Postone
(1993: 287) takes a step back, as it were, when he refers to the two-fold character of these (abstract) social
forms as “the value dimension of the forms” and their (concrete) “use value dimension.”
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(of capital’s basic social forms) as a dynamic in motion in and through time-space: under
Postone this interaction becomes a movement in accordance with the directional dynamic
of Marx’s category of capital.
Postone (1993) explains that in Marx’s discussion of the inverse relationship
between productivity and value (increased productivity yields an increase in material
wealth while the magnitude of total value yielded remains static within a given unit of
time) labor’s value dimension (i.e. the objectification of abstract labor time expenditure
as the magnitude of value) and labor’s use-value dimension appear to be nonaligned. In
other words, at first sight the inverse relationship between productivity and value (these
two processes (use-value and value) appear to operate independent of one another)
appears to indicate a static opposition between the use-value and value dimensions of the
commodity form of social relations.156 However, Postone (1993: 287) points out that
behind the opposition between these two (apparently static) dimensions “is a dynamic
interaction.”
Postone (1993) elaborates this thesis by examining the following passage, taken
from Marx’s discussion of the magnitude of value in the first chapter of Capital, Volume
1:
The introduction of power-looms into England, for example, probably reduced by one
half the labour required to convert a given quantity of yarn into woven fabric. In order to
do this, the English hand-loom weavers in fact needed the same amount of labour-time as
before; but the product of his individual hour of labour now only represented half an hour
of social labour, and consequently fell to one half its former value. (Marx, 1976 [1867]:
129)

According to Postone (1993: 287-288), because the magnitude of value is
determined by socially-necessary labor time as the objectification of abstract labor
expenditure at the level of society as a whole,157 once an increase in productivity
becomes generalized the magnitude of value falls back to its previous level. Postone
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The appearance of this static opposition is what Lukács, for example, mistakes for underlying essence.
In contrast to Lukács’s position, Postone contends that within the framework of Marx’s mature critique the
opposition between value and use-value does not indicate an opposition between capitalist and noncapitalist moments but is, in fact, a critique of that opposition itself.
157
Here it worth emphasizing that, as Postone (1993: 287-288) explains, Marx’s example of the power
loom “indicates that when the commodity is the general form of the product, the actions of individuals
constitute an alienated totality that constrains and subsumes them.”
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(1993: 288) refers to Marx’s example of the power loom in Capital, Volume 1 as
indicative of the fact that “the initial determination of the magnitude of value also implies
a dynamic.” In a similar gesture, Postone (1993) uses the passage from Marx quoted
above to extract what he contends is a peculiar dialectic of labor and time:
[N]ot only does increased productivity yield a greater amount of material wealth, but it
effects a reduction of socially necessary labor time. Given the abstract temporal measure
of value, this redetermination of socially necessary labor time changes the magnitude of
value of the individual commodities produced rather than the total value produced per
unit time. That total value remains constant and is simply distributed among a greater
mass of products when productivity increases. What has changed is not the amount of
time which yields a value of x but, rather, the standard of what constitutes that amount of
time (…) The amount of value yielded per unit of abstract time by the new level of
productivity is equal to that yielded by the older general level of productivity. In this
sense, the level of productivity, the use value dimension, is also determined by the value
dimension (as the new base level). (Postone, 1993: 288-289)

Postone (1993: 289) contends that the insidiousness of this dynamic is
continuously enacted by way of its peculiar “treadmill effect.” According to Postone
(1993: 289-290), the interaction of the linkage between concrete labor and abstract labor,
on the one hand, and the linkage between productivity and the abstract temporal measure
of wealth, on the other, gives rise to a dialectic of transformation and reconstitution
whereby “the socially general levels of productivity and the quantitative determinations
of socially necessary labor time” change in and through time-space. Here Postone
emphasizes that the dialectic of transformation and reconstitution operates at the level of
society as a whole.
In ways strikingly similar to Adorno’s (1973 [1966]: 354-356) appraisal of
Marx’s notion of natural history in Negative Dialectics, Postone (1993) asserts,
The reciprocal redetermination of increased productivity and the social labor hour has an
objective, lawlike quality that is by no means a mere illusion or mystification. Although
social, it is independent of human will. To the extent that one can speak of a Marxian
“law of value,” this treadmill dynamic is its initial determination (…) it describes a
pattern of ongoing social transformation and reconstitution as characteristic of capitalist
society. The law of value, then, is a dynamic and cannot be understood adequately in
terms of an equilibrium of the market. Once one considers the temporal dimension of
value—understood as a specific form of wealth that differs from material wealth—it
becomes evident that the form of value implies the above dynamic from the outset.
(Postone, 1993: 290)
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Postone (1993: 290) incorporates his analysis of the commodification of time in
order to further examine the “treadmill dynamic,” whose initial determination “delineates
the form growth must take in the context of labor-mediated social relations.” In doing so,
Postone (1993) unfolds the category of time as a commodity whose abstract and concrete
dimensions are synchronous with the intrinsic interaction between the abstract and
concrete dimensions of the aforementioned dialectic of labor and time. Only after
incorporating the category of time as a commodity whose dimensions parallel the
dialectic of labor and time is Postone able to indicate how these dynamics interact to
transform and reconstitute capital’s social totality.
3.5.1 Value as the Continual Necessity of the Present
Postone distinguishes between abstract and historical time and indicates a
dialectic between the two. Historical time is analogous to the use-value dimension and
may be considered a form of concrete time as constituted in capitalism. Historical time,
according to Postone (1993: 294), “is the movement of time, as opposed to the movement
in time.” As Postone (1993: 294) explains, “The social totality’s dynamic expressed by
historical time is a constituted and constituting process of social development and
transformation that is directional and whose flow, ultimately rooted in the duality of the
social relations mediated by labor, is a function of social practice.” Abstract time, on the
other hand, is a function of the measure of value. In contrast to historical time, Postone
(1993: 293) points out that “Although the measure of value is time, the totalizing
mediation expressed by ‘socially necessary labor time’ is not a movement of time but a
metamorphosis of substantial time into abstract time in space, as it were, from the
particular to the general and back.”
With regard to the temporal dimension of the production of value, Postone (1993:
293) indicates that although the abstract temporal measure of value remains constant, it
has a changing constant whereby “both the social labor hour and the base level of
productivity are moved ‘forward in time.’” This “substantive redetermination of the
abstract temporal constant” involves an exponential increase in the rate at which
productivity increases (Postone, 1993: 292). As Postone (1993: 292) explains, in this
144

sense the constant hour becomes “denser” as the amount of products produced increases.
This “substantive redetermination” is not immediate, however, and is therefore not
apparent at the level of appearances despite the fact that a substantive redetermination (as
indicated in increases in productivity) has actually occurred (Postone, 1993: 292). The
process through which the hour becomes “denser” cannot be expressed in abstract time
because, as Postone (1993: 292) explains, the social labor hour (abstract time), although
redetermined, is the “form against which change is measured.” According to Postone
(1993: 292-293), “The entire abstract temporal axis, or frame of reference, is moved with
each socially general increase in productivity; both the social labor hour and the base
level of productivity are moved ‘forward in time.’”
Because productivity is rooted in the use-value dimension of labor, it is possible
to conceive of the “forward” movement of the abstract temporal frame of reference “as a
mode of concrete time” (Postone, 1993: 293). That the interaction between capital’s usevalue and value dimensions can be conceived in this way is itself indicative of capitalism.
As Postone (1993: 293 [original emphasis]) explicates, the interplay of abstract labor and
concrete labor sheds light on the foundation of Marx’s analysis of capital, especially the
fact that “a feature of capitalism is a mode of (concrete) time that expresses the motion of
(abstract) time.” Historical time within capitalist society, then, is socially constituted (via
praxis) insofar as it is mediated by value.158
As mentioned previously, Postone analyzes the dialectic interplay between
capital’s dual forms as giving rise to an immanent dynamic—a dialectic of transformation
and reconstitution between the abstract and concrete dimensions. This dialectic of
transformation and reconstitution, according to Postone (1993: 294), is also operative
between two forms of social necessity: 1) ongoing surface-level transformations and 2)
the continuing reconstitution of the underlying conditions necessary for the production of
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In contrast to the concept of “agency” in structuralism, post-structuralism, and many of the recent
developments in contemporary sociological theory (e.g. Giddens, etc.), “agency” within a critical Marxian
framework is always constrained, which is to say that “structure” is not the opposite of agency but is rather
constitutive of agency.
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value.159 The dialectic of transformation and reconstitution implies that, as Postone
(1993: 295) explains, “the Marxian analysis elucidates and grounds socially the
historically dynamic character of capitalist society in terms of a dialectic of abstract and
historical time.”
While both forms of time are intrinsically related, the abstract temporal unit is
distinct in that “it does not manifest its historical redetermination—it retains its constant
form as present time” (Postone, 1993: 295). Like the commodity form, the “social
‘content’ of the abstract temporal unit remains hidden” (Postone, 1993: 295). Moreover,
value, as an expression of time as the present, represents an external social norm
(Postone, 1993: 295).
Postone (1993) applies this insight to Marx’s example of the power loom as
follows:
The social labor hour in which the production of 20 yards of cloth yields a total value of x
is the abstract temporal equivalent of the social labor hour in which the production of 40
yards of cloth yields a total value of x: they are equal units of abstract time and, as
normative, determine a constant magnitude of value. Assuredly, there is a concrete
difference between the two, which results from the historical development of
productivity; such a historical development, however, redetermines the criteria of what
constitutes a social labor hour, and is not reflected in the hour itself. In this sense, then,
value is an expression of time as the present. It is a measure of, and compelling norm for,
the expenditure of immediate labor time regardless of the historical level of productivity.
(Postone, 1993: 296 [original emphasis])

Insofar as substantive changes effected by the use-value dimension, including, for
example, societally-induced environmental degradation, remain nonmanifest in terms of
the abstract temporal frame of value, these changes cannot be recognized within the
framework of the present.160 The unfolding of capital’s historical dynamic implies that as
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Postone (1993: 294) indicates some of the basic determinations of the historical process specific to
capital’s dynamic totality (as analyzed by Marx). These include but are certainly not limited to: 1) the
continual development of productivity, which entails 2) “massive transformations in the mode of social life
of the majority of the population” and 3) “the constitution, spread, and ongoing transformation of
historically determinate forms of subjectivity, interactions, and social values.”
160
This obviously raises the question of the possibility of critique. Here it is important to note that, as
Postone (1993: 295) emphasizes, both abstract time and historical time are expressions of alienated social
relations, which is the reason the opposition between these two moments is not an opposition between
capitalist and noncapitalist moments. Postone’s position here is consonant with that elaborated in chapter
two. Postone (1993: 17-18) notes that Marx’s position “neither affirms the existence of a transhistorical
logic of history nor denies the existence of any sort of historical logic. Instead, it treats such a logic as
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productivity increases value as a form of social wealth becomes increasingly
anachronistic. The dynamic of capital gives rise to an ever-increasing disparity between
the accumulated historical potential of scientific knowledge and the production of value.
As Postone (1993) explains,
The dynamic of capitalism, as grasped by Marx’s categories, is such that with this
accumulation of historical time, a growing disparity separates the conditions for the
production of material wealth from those for the generation of value. Considered in terms
of the use value dimension of labor (that is, in terms of the creation of material wealth),
production becomes ever less a process of materially objectifying the skills and
knowledge of the individual producers or even the class immediately involves; instead, it
becomes ever more an objectification of the accumulated collective knowledge of the
species, of humanity—which, as a general category, is itself constituted with the
accumulation of historical time. In terms of the use value dimension, then, as capitalism
develops fully, production increasingly becomes a process of the objectification of
historical time rather than of immediate labor time. According to Marx, though, value,
necessarily remains an expression of the latter objectification. (Postone, 1993: 298)

The growing disparity between the accumulated historical potential of humanity
and the production of value, however, does not automatically undermine the necessity
represented by value; that is, the necessity of the present (Postone, 1993: 299), but rather
changes the “concrete presuppositions of that present, thereby constituting its necessity
anew” (Postone, 1993: 299). Value, as an expression of time, indicates that capitalism’s
historical dynamic is simultaneously dynamic and static: “It entails ever-rising levels of
productivity, yet the value frame of reference is perpetually reconstituted anew”
(Postone, 1993: 299). Historical time, as constituted by capital’s dynamic totality, is
invariably naturalized “into the framework of the present, thereby reinforcing that
present” (Postone, 1993: 300).
The dialectic of transformation and reconstitution is simultaneously static and
dynamic. This dialectic, as Postone (1993: 300) indicates, gives rise to, and is operative
on, two different, yet synchronous, levels of social necessity: 1) the ongoing
transformation of social life (e.g. “of the nature, structure and interrelations of social
classes and other groupings,” the nature of production, transportation, circulation, etc.);
characteristic of capitalist society which can be, and has been, projected onto all of human history.”
Postone (1993: 18) continues this discussion by explaining that it is in this way that—and this is important
for the critical theoretical approach advanced in this dissertation—Marx’s theory “reflexively attempts to
render plausible its own categories”: “Theory, then, is treated as part of the social reality in which it exists.”
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and 2) the ongoing reconstitution of “its own fundamental condition as an unchanging
feature of social life” (Postone, 1993: 300).
3.6 Postone and the Environment
The critical Marxian approach put forth by Postone (1993) demands that we
reexamine the socio-ecological tensions underlying the fundamental contradiction
between value and “real wealth” in capitalist society. In Grundrisse, Marx (1974
[1857/58]: 705) explains how the persistence of value as a measure of material wealth
produced remains a necessary structural precondition of capitalist society even though the
potential embodied in the forces of production increasingly renders production based on
value obsolete (Marx, 1974 [1857/58]: 704-711).161 Postone (1993: 27) explains that the
abolition of value would signify the end of (capitalist) labor because production remains
tied to value where labor time is the sole measure of wealth.162 The contradiction between
wealth and value therefore points toward capital’s historically-determinate and dynamic
socio-ecological domination. However, because the labor time serves as the measure of
value and is not individual and contingent but rather social and necessary, time as such
forms an objective totality whose coherence then becomes sensuous reality (Mészáros
2005 [1970]: 87). For Postone (1993), this abstract social domination is structured by
labor insofar as the double-character of labor under fully-developed capitalist society is
understood as structuring forms of social practice, which, embodied in and mediated
through the commodity form are simultaneously abstract and concrete. That is to say,
under fully-developed capitalism, where surplus value is the dominant form, labor is both
a productive activity and a socially-mediating activity (Postone, 1993).
As a primary form of social mediation and abstract socio-ecological domination,
the objectification of abstract labor is a necessary structural precondition for the capitalist
production of value. As reification á la mode, this abstract social domination is not
experienced as such in everyday life. It is therefore important that we analytically
distinguish between the transformation of the objective dimension of the environment-
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162

See also Postone, 1993: 25.
See also Marx, 1974 [1857/58]: 704.
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society problematic (i.e. actual human ecological transformation of the biophysical via
labor), on the one hand, and the subjective dimension of the environment-society
problematic (i.e. the social conception and understanding of this transformation), on the
other. As Postone (1993) notes:
In capitalism, both moments of people’s relation to nature are a function of labor: the
transformation of nature by concrete social labor can, therefore, seem to condition the
notions people have of reality, as though the source of meaning is the labor-mediated
interaction with nature alone. Consequently, the undifferentiated notion of “labor” can be
taken to be the principle of constitution, and knowledge of natural reality can be
presumed to develop as a direct function of the degree to which humans dominate nature.
(1993: 222)

As discussed above, Adorno’s critical theory exemplifies a level of sociohistorical reflexivity capable of acknowledging the necessary reciprocity between the
subjective and objective dimensions of the environment-society problematic while at the
same time recognizing their distinction. Engaging this dialectic is necessary in order to
pinpoint alienation and reification as key mediating processes between the subject-object
dimensions. If environmental sociology fails to grasp alienation and reification, then the
distinction between the subjective and the objective becomes unrecognized and conflated
in the commodity form, thereby becoming subsumed under the identity principle of
exchange society. In this sense, the notion of an unmediated relationship between
people’s transformation of the biophysical world and our conception and understanding
of this transformation fails to recognize these two moments as non-identical as it also
perpetuates the contradictory dynamic of capital insofar as it fails to recognize alienation
and reification as structuring concrete social practices that produce and reproduce the
subjective/objective severance in space-time.
According to Postone (1993: 191), Marx’s category of socially-necessary labor
time “expresses a general temporal norm resulting from the action of the producers, to
which they must conform.” Or, to put it differently, “Socially necessary labor time is the
temporal dimension of the abstract domination that characterizes the structures of
alienated social relations in capitalism” (Postone, 1993: 191). Socially-necessary labor
time has an additional social necessity because, insofar as surplus value is the dominant
form in fully-developed capitalism, the social whole “is structured by value as the form
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of wealth and surplus value as the goal of production” (Postone, 1993: 302). Hence, the
opposition of the category of value and material wealth illustrates “a form of social life in
which humans are dominated by their own labor and are compelled to maintain this
domination” (Postone, 1993. 302). The possibility and ground for Postone’s (1993)
critique of alienated labor is located in these double-sided social forms rather than
between these social forms and “labor.”
One of the most provocative and potentially useful aspects of Postone’s (1993)
approach for environmental sociology is his explication of how the interrelations between
the subjective/objective and abstract/concrete aspects of capitalist social forms produce
“an immanent dialectical dynamic” between productivity and value, a dynamic he
contends is at the heart of Marx’s analysis of the dynamic of capital. Here the temporal
aspect of productivity and value is conceptualized alongside the two dimensions of the
commodity form. The magnitude of value—that is, the quantitative measure of the
objectification of abstract labor (i.e. socially-necessary labor time) operates at the level of
society as a whole, as mentioned above (Marx, 1976 [1867]: 135; Postone, 1993: 289).
The use-value and value dimensions do not simply form a static opposition.163 Rather,
both dimensions interact through an ongoing ‘process of reciprocal determination,’
effecting “a directional dynamic in which (…) concrete labor and abstract labor,
productivity and the abstract temporal measure of wealth, constantly redetermine one
another” (Postone, 1993: 290). This ‘ongoing pattern of social transformation and
reconstitution,’ according to Postone (1993: 290), is perhaps the best estimate of a socalled Marxian “law of value.”
Although in fully-developed capitalism relative surplus value is acquired by way
of increasing levels of productivity, and although increases in productivity outturn greater
quantities of material wealth and reduce socially-necessary labor time, these
developments do not change the total-value-produced per abstract-time-unit (i.e. labor
expenditure as measured by the independent variable, abstract time) because the
“constant” time unit itself is a dependent variable whose determination is dictated by the
163

Cf., Lukács, 1971 [1923].
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concrete use-value dimension of labor. Postone (1993) analyzes the category of time
itself as a commodity whose abstract and concrete dimensions interact with the abstract
and concrete dimensions of labor to transform and reconstitute capital’s social totality.
The insidiousness of this process, as Postone (1993) explains, is continuously enacted by
way of a particular “treadmill effect”:
Increased productivity increases the amount of value produced per unit of time—until
this productivity becomes generalized; at that point the magnitude of value yielded in that
time period, because of its abstract and general temporal determination, falls back to its
previous level. This results in a new determination of the social labor hour and a new
base level of productivity. (Postone, 1993: 289)

Postone (1993: 308) extends his elaboration of the dialectic of transformation and
reconstitution to capital (which, as self-valorizing value is “the drive toward increasing
levels of productivity and the necessary retention of direct human labor in production”) to
an analysis of the self-valorization of value.164 Recalling Postone’s “treadmill effect”
discussed above, which necessitates accelerating rates of increases in productivity (and
therefore a virtually exponential increase in the level of biophysical throughout), the
expansion of relative surplus value furnished can never approximate the amount of the
total-value-produced per unit-time. According to Postone (1993), Marx’s analysis
indicates that
The more closely the amount of surplus value yielded approaches the limit of the total
value produced per unit time, the more difficult it becomes to further decrease necessary
labor time by means of increased productivity and, thereby, to increase surplus value.
This, however, means that the higher the general level of surplus labor time and,
relatedly, of productivity, the more productivity must be further increased in order to
achieve a determinate increase in the mass of surplus value per determinate portion of
capital. (Postone, 1993: 310-311)

Thus, while accelerating rates of increases in productivity simultaneously yields
increased quantities of material wealth, surplus value (the goal of capitalist production) is
increased only indirectly: “in the society in which the commodity form is totalized, there
is an underlying tension between ecological considerations and the imperatives of value
as the form of wealth and social mediation” (Postone 1993: 313 [emphasis added]).
Moreover, as the passage above indicates, the expansion of surplus value necessitated by
164
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capital illustrates a specific proneness toward the acceleration of increases in productivity
(Postone, 1993: 311), which necessitates a virtually exponential increase in the quantity
of biophysical throughput.
4. Critique of (Modernist) Sociobiophysicality
Lukács (1885-1971), Adorno (1903-1969), and Postone (1942 - ) each wrote
successively. In this sense, I would like to suggest, with regard to the potential
contribution these theorists might make toward a critical theory of the environment, that
we view the core critique of each theorist, as outlined above (i.e. critique of reification,
critique of identity thinking, critique of traditional Marxism), as an attempt to “name”
central aspects of the nature-society relationship at different, successive stages of the
development of modern capitalist society. In order to further a critical theory of the
environment in line with this critical theory tradition, I advance the concept of
sociobiophysicality (SBPh). SBPh is an attempt to “name” central aspects of the naturesociety relationship, including its elusively dynamic nature, particularly with regard to
the fact that the nature-society relationship is fundamentally other and more than our
conceptualization of it. In other words, SBPh is less a category or concept to be applied
than it is an attempt to “name” an inherently dynamic process intrinsic to its “object” of
study as an historical experience whose contradictions and tensions are entwined with
those of the thought attempting to comprehend it.
Situated within the critical theoretical scaffolding provided by the three critical
theorists outlined above, SBPh is rooted in alienation and reification, which, constituted
by the capitalist mode of production, are understood as key mediating processes between
the subject-object dimensions of the environment-society problematic. Drawing on
Marx—an insight furthered by Lukács, Postone, and Adorno, albeit in different ways—
this theoretical understanding of mediation is also a theory of praxis whereby (á la
alienation) people create structures through social practice that in turn dominate them165
while processes of reification (á la alienation as “second nature”) simultaneously rewrite
reality so as to inhibit these very same humans from “consciously” recognizing that this
165
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is indeed the case.166 Understood dialectically, this implies that people are both producer
and product of alienated socio-ecological relations of domination.
The concept of SBPh combines Lukács’s focus on the subjective dimensions of
the commodity form with Postone’s categorial appropriation of Marx’s categories, which
allows us to capture both objective socio-“structural” drivers of human-ecological
transformation as synchronous with the historical development of the commodity form of
social relations. Gleaning insight from Adorno, SBPh underscores the reciprocal need of
both the subjective and objective dimensions of the environment-society problematic
while emphasizing the disproportionate priority of the objective dimension, which, under
existing social conditions, operates in and through individuals as isolated particulars via
the unfolding of “the inner composition of elements of nature and elements of history
within history itself” (Adorno, 2006 [1964/65]: 116). Such an approach therefore
illuminates the constellation of social forces which make up a form of abstract
(sociobiophysical) domination that effectively operates in and through actual social and
ecological destruction while recognizing these processes as non-identical to, yet
simultaneously shaping the possibilities of subjective experience.
Drawing on Postone’s critique of the double character of commodity-determined
labor, the concept of SBPh allows for a dynamic reconceptualization of reification in
terms of the sociobiophysical tensions underlying the production of value; i.e., the
necessary social-ecological destruction underlying value as the continual necessity of the
present, where the continual necessity of the present is recognized as immanently
dynamic. That is to say, capital, as self-valorizing value, tends toward accelerating rates
of increases in productivity, which in turn necessitates virtually exponential levels of
biophysical “throughput,” thereby effecting quantitative increases in “material wealth”
output, even though the resultant increases in value are effected only indirectly. The
increasingly anachronistic character of value as a measure of material wealth and as a
structural precondition of capitalist mode of production is precisely the point at which
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On alienation as “second nature”, see Dahms (2011).
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value (as the necessity of the present) points beyond itself: the social necessity of this
present is the historically-determinate nature of modernist sociobiophysicality.
In this sense, the necessity of virtually exponential levels of biophysical
throughout—the form so-called “economic growth” must take—is a form of social
necessity within and through which sociobiophysicality is to the extent that both the
social and the biophysical are material bearers of objectified time. In other words, the
ontology of the material realm—a realm so defended by environmental “realists”—is,
quite literally, the ontology of the social mediation of time, labor, and social domination,
or, to use Adorno’s words, “the ontology of the wrong state of things.” On this basis, the
concept of SBPh redirects our attention to the “social mediatedness” of materiality,
which, as stated above, is rooted in an understanding of the reciprocal dynamism of the
subject-object dimensions of the environment-society problematic whereby the
(heteronomous) objective dimension takes priority insofar as this heteronomy is always
already defined (and being defined) as such. SBPh makes recognition of this priority
explicit because without such explicit recognition, research efforts are unfortunately at
the inherent risk of becoming ideology.167 Research rooted in an understanding of SBPh,
on the other hand, scrutinizes the present via critique of this continuous heteronomy,
which is in line with critical theory’s attempt to explode the analytic/political boundary.
Critique of (modernist) SBPh is simultaneously analytic, normative, and political.
On this basis, we can rethink the paradox of increased environmental degradation
amid wide-spread attention and concern during the latter half of the twentieth century by
analyzing the social constitution of subjectivity and objectivity—that is, by examining the
synergy of structure and practice in terms of the dynamic and contradictory nature of
capital (see Postone, 1993: 224). We can then explain the synchronous development of
objective human-ecological transformation and contemporary ecological subjectivity
after the Second World War as an expression of “the social constitution and historical
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This is because, insofar as the priority of the objective dimension is always already defined as
heteronomous, failure to recognize this priority as such, and/or failure to make such recognition an explicit
and integral part of the activity of social research, de facto risks becoming a reflection of the present in
reified, alienated form.
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development of needs and perceptions—both those that tend to perpetuate the system and
those that call it into question” Postone (1993: 224). On this basis, both the post-World
War II American model of economic “growth,” as well as recent discussions of so-called
“de-growth,” are elucidated as a projection of historically specific circumstances.
Specifically, the post-World War II configuration of economy, society, and state that
impelled an unprecedented global flow of capital and an exponential level of resource
extraction during the second half of the twentieth century, which in turn necessitated new
efforts to control human and non-human natures.
The post-World War II configuration of business, labor, and government, which is
deeply engrained at the beginning of the twenty-first century (Chomsky, 2003; Dahms,
2006b), can therefore be grasped as “the constitution of historically specific deep social
structures by forms of social practice that, in turn, are guided by beliefs and motivations
grounded in the forms of appearance engendered by these structures” (Postone, 1993:
224)—namely, global expansion and the growth of ecological knowledge required to
control an unprecedented level of resource extraction amid an anxiety-ridden global
arena. Assuming there is something to the concept of SBPh, which underscores the
reciprocal need of both the objective and subjective dimensions of the environmentsociety problematic, the interaction of structure and practice in terms of the post-World
War II configuration not only led to historically unprecedented levels of global ecological
despoliation—it simultaneously facilitated the contemporary conception and
understanding of the natural environment as well, including the development of
contemporary environmentalism and the more general growth in concern for the wellbeing of the biophysical world in recent decades. This provides us with a much more
sober perspective—one which relativizes the recent antagonism between “growth” and
“degrowth” by locating this opposition in ‘a form of social life dominated by the
historical necessity of capital’ (Postone, 1993: 314).
Consequently, it is not possible to conceive of the relationship between society
and the biophysical independent of alienation and reification, regardless of the fact that,
empirically speaking, this has eluded the attempts of most environmental sociologists.
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The fact that today we are able to perceive the potentially catastrophic effects of humaninduced environmental degradation more precisely than at any other point in human
history, yet remain incapable of reducing the rate at which this destruction continues to
increase, is the most important case in point. The concept of SBPh requires directing our
efforts toward the constellation of social forces that operate in and through not only the
biophysical, or so-called “external nature,” but the human body/consciousness, or socalled “internal nature,” as well. This is significant for sociology because it allows us to
identify the social mediations that structure concrete human-ecological transformations
and our conception and understanding of the natural environment so as to acquire insight
into how current environment-society interactions might become less destructive. The
scope of related research ranges from the development of a critical theory of the
environment to the social-psychologically embodied consequences of the environmentsociety problematic for individuals and the moral and ethical implications involved.
Interdisciplinary work in these and related areas remains important and salient as global
environmental problems continue to advance at an increasingly rapid pace—often more
rapidly than societal, institutional, and/or individual responses to them can be formed.
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PART II. CONTEMPORARY ECOLOGICAL SUBJECTIVITY:
CONTEXTUALIZING SOCIOBIOPHYSICALITY
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CHAPTER 4: COLD WAR ORIGINS OF CONTEMPORARY ECOLOGICAL
SUBJECTIVTY
Against the background of chapter three, which situated the environment-society
problematic in theoretical context, this chapter employs a theoretical understanding of
sociobiophysicality with systematic and interpretive intent in order to contextualize
further the environment-society problematic in historical and societal context. The
purpose of the chapter is to elucidate aspects of the environment-society problematic as
manifested in American society throughout the latter half of the twentieth century.
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Introduction
Instead of suggesting that the rise of contemporary American environmentalism is
directly linked to “conscious” concern for the environment at home, the following
chapter investigates the linkages between the emergence of contemporary American
environmentalism and American’s unprecedented global economic, political, and
ideological role following the Second World War. The full scale development of big
business-state symbiosis throughout the twentieth century (McQuaid, 1994), the strategic
political economic importance of oil during war, and the shift from a productive to a
consumptive based economy are inextricably connected to the development of a
specifically contemporary social conception of nature. These developments, which
required an exponential increase in America’s fossil fuel emissions, more resource
extraction, and an unprecedented flow of global capital, in turn necessitated new forms of
scientific management and technological control over human and non-human natures. For
example, the development of systems analysis, originally for war (Amadae, 2003) as well
as the scientific field of ecology parallels the rise of an interconnected, “ecological”
worldview (Luke, 1997). Such knowledge production involves breaking the earth into
systems and subsystems, creating the possibility for orderly scientific inquiry and control
(Luke 1997). At the same time, these new forms of control may actually produce a social
conception of nature, which in turn gives rise to new environmental needs and desires. In
this sense, the contemporary social conception of nature and the recent growth of
widespread concern for the well-being of the biophysical environment is a product of
ideology and violence and should therefore not be interpreted as somehow akin to an
altruistic concern for the biophysical world.
Research Aims
By situating the environment-society problematic historically with reference to
large scale structural transformations since the end of the Second World War, we can
divide the latter half of the twentieth century into two halves: 1) the decades after the
Second World War (1950-1973); and 2) the remaining final quarter of the twentieth
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century.168 These two periods also comprise the expanse of the cold war. With this in
mind, and from within the categorial framework of critical theory, the environmentsociety problematic can be contextualized historically and restated in terms of the
following two interrelated questions:
How do we explain the fact that contemporary environmentalism—which
emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a response to the historically unprecedented
spike in societally-induced environmental degradation during the third quarter of the
twentieth century—failed to engender changes in social structure conducive to its
expressed need and desire to move beyond the societally-induced environmental
degradation which characterized this period?; and relatedly, how do we explain the fact
that, from the perspective of the beginning of the twenty-first century, the exact opposite
occurred, as evidenced by the onset of neoliberalism in the 1970s and its continuation,
which defines our current moment in the face of persisting increases in environmental
attention and concern?
This chapter attempts to move toward addressing these (historical) questions by
situating them within the (societal) context of American society. More specifically, the
following investigation aims to elucidate the conditions of possibility of a contemporary
(i.e. post-World War II) social conception of nature through an immanent critique of
contemporary American environmentalism’s misrecognition of its own sociohistorical
context. As I will return to note again below, it is important to be aware that this
misrecognition is not the result of American environmentalism’s inherent fallibility, quite
the contrary. Rather, I shall argue that such misrecognition is the result of the objective
context within which contemporary American environmentalism emerged, as this
sociohistorical context is defined by an apparent decontextualization.
Chapter Organization
The first section of the chapter distinguishes the contours of contemporary
American environmentalism’s objective sociohistorical context by focusing on the
emergence of I refer to as the post-World War II configuration—a particular
168

This periodization is adapted from Hobsbawm’s Age of Extremes (see Hobsbawm, 1994: 226).
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configuration of business-labor-government relations that took hold following the end of
the Second World War. Section two pinpoints the development of what I call the cold
war regime of critique containment, which emerged in and through the post-World War II
configuration. Section three examines the linkage between patterns of change and
patterns of continuity from 1) the first half of the cold war characterized by state centric
capitalism to 2) the last quarter of the twentieth century characterized by neoliberalism. I
argue that, despite the official end of the cold war in 1991, the cold war regime of
critique containment persisted throughout these two periods and that its continuation—far
from being static—is perhaps best grasped as a process of “sedimentation,” whereby the
containment of social critique has effectively penetrated the very fabric of American
society and is therefore unrecognized as such. On this basis, the fourth and final section
of the chapter engages an immanent critique of contemporary American
environmentalism’s misrecognition of its own sociohistorical context. I do so by situating
the development of contemporary American environmentalism within the context of
critique containment, focusing on the conditions of possibility of a contemporary (i.e.
post-World War II) social conception of nature, which today remains central to
contemporary environmentalism.
Delimitations
The following investigation relies solely on secondary literature, much of which is
rooted in various theoretical and methodological assumptions. In attempting to apprehend
the post-World War II, cold war era, I was confronted with an endless list of literature.
The primary delimitation of the chapter has less to do with the use of secondary literature
and more with the fact that this literature comes from different methodological and
theoretical backgrounds. Although it would have been impossible to read all the relevant
literature, I did work my way through a sizable portion. In wading through this material
(much of which was superfluous), I found myself struggling to keep sight of the
significance of historical pattern amid tremendous historical detail. While this is perhaps
the crux of historical sociology, I was unable to scrutinize the compatibility of the various
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literatures in terms of their various theoretical and methodological assumptions.169
Instead, this chapter treats the results of different studies and historical analyses as
“data,” which I interpret from within the methodological and theoretical framework
advanced in the previous two chapters. I therefore ask the reader to bear this in mind.
The chapter’s focus on American society throughout the latter half of the
twentieth century is delimited in terms of scale and scope. Although the following
investigation does on occasion refer to the global context, my aim is to situate the
environment-society problematic in historical and societal context and, delimited as such,
does not focus on the intricate nuances of the various interconnections frequently
subsumed under the heading “globalization.” One must therefore be aware that that the
post-World War II, cold war world was characterized by a historically unprecedented
level of international interconnectedness, at least in terms of the speed with and through
which these interconnections were made. At the same time, a focus on the American
societal context during the post-World War II, cold war period is appropriate for at least
two fundamental reasons. First, as Westad (2000, 2006) has shown, America’s
unprecedented global role, both politically, economically, and ideologically during this
time turned out to be of extreme significance in the shaping the world, economically and
ideologically. Second, American society during this time is a thoroughly modern society,
as defined by the saliency of the commodity form. My discussion of Lukács, Adorno, and
Postone is therefore pertinent in dealing with this societal context and I would ask that
the reader be cognizant of this theoretical discussion while working through the following
investigation.
Lastly, it should be noted that the chapter is not a history of the cold war, nor is it
a history of twentieth century American society. While I incorporate elements from the
“real course of history,” I also ignore much historical detail, highlighting only those
patterns I consider crucial to my aim of deciphering the conditions of possibility of a
contemporary (i.e. post-World War II) social conception of nature through an immanent
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This is perhaps most obvious in the first sections of the chapter where I discussion the configuration of
business, labor, and government relations in American society.
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critique of contemporary American environmentalism’s misrecognition of its own
sociohistorical context. Against the claim that I am reducing complex and unrelated
phenomena to a narrow area of historical development, the chapter’s focus is an attempt
to elucidate the historical conditions that may have paved the necessary ground for
contemporary environmentalism and contemporary American environmentalism in
particular.
Assumptions
While the following investigation shifts from the abstract theoretical discussion of
chapter three toward a more empirical examination, the shift toward the empirical is
informed by and must be understood from within the framework of critical theory
discussed in chapters two and three. Specifically, as will become clear in my discussion
of contemporary ecological subjectivity and American environmentalism, I engage the
categorial framework, which aims to grasp the intrinsic relationship between social
subjectivity and social objectivity as structured by the commodity form of social
relations. Although my discussion refers to decisions made by particular individuals
within specific social organizations and social institutions, I have sought to describe these
decisions as either necessary; as decisions of practical necessity; or decisions which were
perceived as necessary – where such necessity is understood along the lines of the
necessity of reconstituting the present (e.g. the necessity of capital and its relation to
value as the continual necessity of the present). This is important to bear in mind because
I do not, for the most part, reiterate the theoretical complexity of this assumption when
discussing the more empirical processes below. Agency, from within the critical
theoretical framework of this dissertation does in fact exist. However, agency is also
always already constrained. Therefore, agency must be understood in its historical
determinateness. As I see it, this assumption is in line with the theoretical perspectives of
both Adorno and Postone, although in different ways.
1. The Post-World War II Configuration
We can locate the antecedent to the configuration of business-labor-government
relations that took hold in American society following the Second World War (referred to
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as “post-World War II configuration” hereafter) in a qualitative transformation that
occurred throughout the 1930s, when business-labor-government relations were
strategically reconfigured for the first time.170 This reconfiguration was the response to
structural transformations brought about by the rise of finance capitalism.171 The first two
decades of the twentieth century saw the modern business enterprise transform from the
entrepreneurial form to the large-scale industrial corporation. Scientific and technological
management and administration became a prime organization and control ingredient in
factory production and mass distribution. Far from being a passive observer, the US
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It should be noted that the U.S. government first attempted to control the economy with the onset of
WWI when it shifted more than twenty percent of national production to wartime needs (Peterson and
Gray, 1969: 357). According to Rockoff (2005), the rapid conversion of the U.S. economy from neutrality
to war was made easier by the fact that the additional infrastructure needed for war was added in those
sectors that had already been prepared to respond to the production demands from other countries already
in the war. During the war, the War Industries Board determined industrial priorities, fixed prices, and
converted plants to meet Federal Government needs (Vangiezen and Schwenk, 2003). Many government
functions that would tacitly be accepted fifty years later originated during at this time (Reich, 1992: 39).
The objective economic necessities of war that spurred these organizational shifts also impelled the
government to embark on its first extensive propaganda effort. President Wilson created the Committee on
Public Information (CPI), also known as the Creel Committee, whose members included Edward Bernays
and Walter Lipmann. The committee was tasked with getting a largely pacifist American public to support
the entry of the U.S. into WWI. To this end, the CPI embarked on the first nation-wide propaganda effort,
including propaganda coordinated by foreign consultants abroad, visual material (drawings, moving
pictures, stereopticon slides, and photographs), printed material, public advertising and speakers estimated
to have cost taxpayers 4,912,553 U.S. dollars. Walter Lippmann later sought to apply the ICP’s propaganda
effort to democracy with his notion of the “manufacture of consent” (a phrase Noam Chomsky and Edward
Hermann [1988] later borrowed in their well-known book on the political economy of media). At the start
of WWI, the U.S. was in a recession, in part due to the state’s failure to regulate the money supply. In 1914,
the Europeans began purchasing U.S. goods for the war, which brought the economy out of recession and
sparked an economic boom from 1914-1918. The American Federation of Labor (AFL), established in
1886, saw its unions’ members increase tenfold by the end of WWI. The federal government granted mild
concessions to labor during the beginnings of the twentieth century, including the Clayton Antitrust Act in
1914. At the state level, worker’s compensation, the first major social insurance program in the U.S., was
undertaken in Ohio and Washington first in 1911.
171
According to Veblen (1923), finance and industry initially operated according to two different logics:
industrial logic was driven by a concern for the extraction and supply of natural resources whereas finance
logic was geared toward profit-making above all else. These logics had merged by the beginning of the
twentieth century. Although this merging was anything but smooth, the profit-making logic of finance
displaced the logic of industry, which was exemplified by the first merger wave in American society during
the 1890s. According to Veblen (2000 [1923]: 57), this shift in logic was a result of absentee ownership in
“key industries” that were “progressively taken over into the absentee ownership of the country’s credit
institutions” and thereby “consolidated and arranged in manageable shape.” Additionally, the scientific and
technological frontier of finance capitalism was accompanied by the growth of large-scale investment
banks, which moved to the center of economic activity to play the dominant role in the economy.
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government actively celebrated the success of the modern corporation in all its regality,
as indicated by President Coolidge’s statement quoted above.
Although finance capitalism generated levels of productivity and manufacturing
output never before seen, the side effects of unrestricted prosperity culminated in the
1929 stock market crash, which reverberated throughout American society and other
industrialized nations around the world. The subsequent decade was scarred by the most
severe worldwide economic depression of the twentieth century. During this time, the
U.S. unemployment rate rose from an estimated annual rate of 3.3 percent during 19231929 to a peak of 25 percent in 1933 (VanGierzen and Schwenk, 2003). Prime interest
rates fell to one-tenth of their 1920s peak; 40 percent of U.S. banks went bankrupt in only
four years; 30 percent of savings deposits were lost (McQauid, 1994: 4). The American
stock market declined by an estimated 90 percent from 1929 to 1932, forcing a slew of
banks and businesses into insolvency (VanGierzen and Schwenk, 2003). Levels of
spending and production as well as the gross national product (GNP) were greatly
reduced as capital investment and consumer demand declined at an astonishing rate
(VanGierzen and Schwenk, 2003).
The Great Depression all but guaranteed the failure of the Republican incumbent
(Herbert Hoover) in the 1932 election. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, inaugurated in
1933, soon embarked on a series of relief measures in response to the Depression. These
initiatives, collectively known as the New Deal, effected historically-unprecedented
federal government involvement in the economy. Although the New Deal administration
put an end to the U.S. tradition of federal minimalism and (implicitly) questioned laissezfaire economic doctrine, it did so out of necessity in order to save “corporate America,”
which greatly influences American society, from the destructive effects of finance
capitalism. It is often said that Roosevelt saved capitalism, and this is true.
Two days after his inauguration, Roosevelt temporarily closed all the banks,
suspending the transactions of all federally-chartered banks and loan associations
(Arrington, 1983: 3). After four days, about five thousand banks were reopened and
pronounced healthy for business (Arrington, 1983: 3). Although these banks resumed
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business, about 25 percent of members of the Federal Reserve System remained closed.
FDR called upon Congress, along with these member banks and loan associations, to
embark on an immediate emergency economic recovery designed to stop financial panic
and save capital markets and private investment (McQuaid, 1994: 7). The federal
government oriented their actions toward various institutions, such as The Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which was created in 1933 as part of the GlassSteagall Act and acted to guarantee the debts of owners of firms in the commercial
banking industry in the case of bankruptcy (McQuaid, 1994: 7). In turn, commercial
bankers (reluctantly) accepted federal regulations. For example, investments banks were
prohibited from engaging in commercial banking (McQuaid, 1994: 7). Under the New
Deal administration, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), which had been
created under Hoover in 1931 as an investor of last resort, was expanded. Through the
RFC, the federal government invested in financial markets, stepping in to help states with
their relief efforts. The RFC rescued companies in high-fixed-cost industries, such as
banking, railroading, and energy production (McQuaid, 1994: 7). The administration also
invested heavily in public works, including massive public projects, such as the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA); New Deal agriculture and energy programs; and
Social Security, which was established in 1935.
Part of Washington’s new regulatory function was its role as middleman between
business and labor. In 1935 labor union organization transformed172 when the Congress
of Industrial Organizations (CIO) began organizing workers in traditionally nonunion
industries.173 That same year the National Labor Relations (or Wagner) Act was passed,
which guaranteed workers’ rights to organize and bargain collectively. The federal
government established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to guarantee labor
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The American Federation of Labor (AFL), whose members had increased tenfold by the end of World
War I (McQuaid, 1994), started to decline in membership throughout the 1920s. According to McQuaid
(1994) only seven of every hundred workers were union members at the beginning of the 1930s. Part of the
reason for the AFL’s stasis was due to its skilled-only approach to labor organizing. This approach was
relatively unsuccessful in the mass production industries that dominated the economy (McQuaid, 1994).
173
The CIO received harsh opposition from the American Federation of Labor (AFL) whose membership
had remained static since about 1914, primarily because of their crafts-based union organization had
become anachronistic in an economy dominated by large-scale industrial production and deskilled labor.
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standards and to conduct representation elections. Through the Davis-Bacon Act of 1931
and the Walsh-Healy Act of 1936, the federal government established wage standards.
While some, namely big business and the Republican Party, felt that the nation’s
core values, such as free enterprise and political liberty, were under attack amid such
change, increased government involvement during this time, objectively speaking, was
brought about insofar as it was a perceived necessity. Prior to 1929, it was generally
accepted that the “market” corrected deviations from full employment. The Great
Depression was a clear sign that a capitalism dominated by large-scale corporations
operated quite differently than the capitalism espoused by Smith’s Wealth of Nations
(Dahms, 2000: 12). Moreover, the so-called “self-regulating” market proved incapable of
healing the wounds inflicted on an economy dominated by such organizations.174 In
summary, the federal government took on the role it did during the Great Depression to
manage the destructive effects of finance capitalism and not to solve the problems that
had effected this destruction (Dahms, 2000, 2006).
1.1 World War II as Big Business
It was not the New Deal but rather America’s war effort during the Second World
War that brought the U.S. economy out of depression. More specifically, the heightened
need for rapid and large-scale armament production, accelerated the growth of large-scale
economic organizations. The organizational foundations for the business-government
symbiosis175 that had been geared toward the New Deal welfare state was expanded,
refined, and redirected toward military production.176 Such action was, once again,
perceived as one of practical necessity because it was far easier and more efficient for
Washington to deal with large corporations with whom they had already established lines
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See, e.g., Polanyi 1947, referenced in Dahms, 2000: 12.
Business-government “symbiosis” is a technical term put forth by McQuaid (1994) to denote the
necessary entwinement of big business and government in American politics throughout the twentieth
century.
176
McLauchlan (1992: 102) notes that “It was during the war that the processes of constructing the New
Deal welfare state were eclipsed by the emerging national security state. The institutions of the latter were
oriented to provision of the scientific research, military technology and social organization necessary for
the requirements of a new, expansive concept of ‘national security.’”
175
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of credit with banks and were therefore able to obtain large amounts of money quickly
and cheaply (McQuaid, 1994: 15).177
State development and war-making grow in and through one another; indeed, this
is among the few hypotheses that have been confirmed consistently by sociologists from
a variety of empirical and theoretical backgrounds.178 America’s war effort during the
Second World War facilitated such state-war mediated evolution as both war and state
developed through a complex web of institutions and scientific expansion. In fact, the socalled “golden age” of capitalism (i.e. the post-WWII economic boom), which I discuss
below, was less spectacular in America (relative to other comparable modern societies)
because this growth was essentially a continuation of the economic expansion of the war
years (Hobsbawm, 1996). The war effort intensified big business-government symbiosis,
which would later become refined and further ingrained in the fabric of American society
during the latter half of the twentieth century. I shall return to further elaborate the
entwinement of state, military, industry, and science in my upcoming discussion of the
cold war regime of critique containment.
Two business organizations—the Business Committee (BC) and the Committee
on Economic Development (CED)—recognized that the post-World War II businessgovernment symbiosis was a necessary symbiosis and, because of this, were able to take
control of the postwar situation to a significant extent. The BC originated within the
institutional transformations enacted through the New Deal administration. It was created
as an agency affiliated with the Commerce Department in 1933 in order to maintain
advisory contacts with the new institutions tasked with implementing New Deal
economic reforms. The CED had no formal connection with the state, although, as
McQuaid (1994: 19-20) explains, its “informal relations with federal power barons” was
quite extensive. It is difficult to exaggerate the significant role played by these two
business organizations in shaping the post-war situation at home and abroad. The BC and
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According to McQuaid (1994: 14), “The federal government eventually spent $245 billion in five years:
more than it spent between 1789 and 1940. By the end of the war, 60 percent of all manufacturing output
went to the military.”
178
See, e.g., Bella, 1992; Hooks, 1992; Mann, 1988; McLauchlan, 1992; Mills, 2000 [1956]; Rosa, 2013;
Shaw, 1988; Wolfe, 1982.
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the CED, like most business organizations, did not like Washington’s involvement in the
economy, but, unlike their fellow businessmen who voiced reactionary, anti-government
responses, the BC and CED recognized that state involvement had become a reality—a
“necessary evil,” as it were.179
The BC and the CED used this knowledge to their strategic advantage. According
to McQuaid (1994: 23), “By 1944, economists rich with federal experience had
completed or gotten underway a dozen CED-sponsored ‘Transition from War to Peace’
studies on subjects like the removal of wartime economic controls, manpower
demobilization and reemployment, postwar international economic relations, and the sale
of ‘government surplus’ war goods and government-owned defense plants.” Such efforts
paid off, as the BC and CED’s proposals for postwar reconversion were, for the most
part, a success. McQuaid (1994) describes the payoff as follows:
Two-thirds of the total value of all federal plant and equipment was eventually sold to
only eighty-seven large firms. One company, US Steel, got 71 percent (by value) of all
government-built integrated steel plants. High-technology synthetic rubber (polymers)
facilities mostly went to the four largest rubber companies. Chemical plants were
purchased by leading oil companies. Sale prices were minimal, often pennies on the
dollar. Competitive bids from firms other than those that had run the plants in wartime
were rarely allowed. Reconversion was therefore fine for big business—an almost
unnoticed American version of Japan, Inc., that is, state-sponsored oligopoly. (McQuaid,
1994: 24)

The CED also worked with local and state business organizations to ensure
peacetime economic reconversion. The organization’s strategy was to limit the threat of
new labor unions and the New Deal administration. As McQuaid (1994: 24) explains,
“Businesses’ interests in such uncustomary collective work was fundamental: if private
companies failed to provide full-employment economic growth after largely risk-free war
capitalism ended, social and political upheaval might revive the New Deal.” As inflation
rose, the memory of the Great Depression and war remained fresh in the minds of many
Americans, leading business to respond to a wave of labor strikes in 1946 with a massive
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This reality was most obvious in the interrelationships established through the entwinement of warmaking and state development mentioned above. McQuaid (1994: 23) cites one such example:
“Washington had paid for one-third of all plants and equipment built in the United Sates during wartime;
one-third of all war workers labored in these plants. Washington owned 10 percent of America’s postwar
industrial capacity, dominating major trades like aircraft, machine tools, synthetic rubber, shipbuilding, and
nonferrous metals.”
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public relations campaign that described an overly-militarized and communist labor
force. Meanwhile, Truman’s indecisiveness on postwar reconversion issues, such as price
controls and the appropriate role of government in labor relations, effectively made him
an enemy in the eyes of many working-class voters who had supported him previously
(Freeman, 2012: 45).
In this context, conservatives saw the potential to seize control of the situation and
reign in labor. In 1946, the GOP took control of both House and Senate for the first time
since 1930 (McQuaid, 1994: 27). Passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 was the nail in
organized labor’s coffin. The Act effectively “moved the balance of power away from
unions toward employers” by rolling back many of labor’s formal gains achieved through
the Wagner Act just twelve years prior (Freeman, 2012: 47).
Organized labor effectively imploded during this time, in large part because of
Taft-Hartley. The act made labor organizing by alleged communists illegal, and the longstanding in-fighting between AFL and CIO members was reignited as the AFL raided
radical CIO unions to ensure anticommunism. McQuaid (1994) explains the deterioration
of organized labor during this time:
What was branded as anti-Americanism in the house of Labor clearly weakened unions’
ability to collect on political debts. Democrats whom labor had helped elect wanted to
avoid being branded radical or their party being branded as a class party, and they
therefore made no strong effort to either repeal or revise Taft-Hartley. Truman-era
Democrats became bastards, with a southern and western antiunion wing they wouldn’t
purge. But union leaders realized that Truman Democrats were their bastards, and that
their own political position would weaken even further without them. (McQuaid, 1994:
33)

Having reeled in labor, the next obstacle confronting corporate expansionist
efforts abroad was business itself. Although smaller businesses did not favor the Marshall
Plan, the CED worked to encourage an economic-oriented approach to foreign policy. In
fact, it was in both government and corporate interests (the dividing line between the two
had by this time become quite unclear) to engage economic expansion internationally.
There was still the problem of overproduction from the war: America is estimated to have
been producing as much as two-thirds of the total manufacturing output of the world
during this time. Economic expansion overseas would provide international outlets for
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such historically-unprecedented levels of U.S. industrial output, and Washington would
benefit from favorable U.S. balance of payments. In comparison to war-torn Europe,
America was incredibly affluent. America’s post-World War II affluence and assurance,
as McQuaid (1994: 35) explains, was “combined with foreign fears and global military
power to shift political energy and attention away from struggles over redistributing
income, wealth, and power at home and toward the new frontiers of defending America
and the world against the spread of communism abroad.”180
1.2 Cold War
The triumphalism following the Second World War was expressed explicitly in
the Allied Force’s victory over fascism. However, both Western and Eastern Europe,
whose territories housed the two Allied superpowers (England and Russia), were in ruins.
America was the only superpower to have escaped the war virtually unscathed. One key
economic and geopolitical strategic concern for the United States was the establishment a
new international economic order favorable to its domestic market, which is estimated to
have been producing anywhere from about half (McQuaid, 1994) to three-quarters
(Hobsbawm, 1994) of the world’s total manufacturing output by the war’s end. As
mentioned previously, it was also within this context that the CED worked to encourage
foreign intervention,181 because business, along with U.S. balance of payments, would
benefit from an economic approach implemented and made legitimate through U.S.
foreign policy. There were no competitors abroad since the international economic
infrastructure had been destroyed and the previously powerful trading nations were now
in ruins. In 1944, forty-four nations met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to negotiate
international economic relations. The result was the founding of a set of three
interconnected banking and trade institutions: (1) the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
180

For a recent assessment of the Marshall Plan, see Hitchcock (2012).
In terms of U.S. foreign policy, the design for post-war intervention was greatly shaped by America’s
colonization of the Philippines in the 1920s and 1930s and the restructuring of Japan during U.S.
occupation from 1945-1952 (Westad, 2006). In both cases, the idea was that “good,” successful
development required these countries to become more like the United States. In this sense, the “other” was
capable of good or bad. It was therefore America’s responsibility to ensure that “good,” successful
development be channeled in the appropriate direction. Obviously this ideology also functioned to quell the
alternative, communist development path. See Westad (2006) for a comprehensive discussion of America’s
Third World intervention during the cold war.
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(2) the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and (3)
the International Trade Organization (ITO). The ITO’s influence was negligible, mainly
because American business objected to tariff reductions, full employment policies, and
improved labor standards (Freeman, 2010: 57). The ITO was replaced with the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
The Bretton Woods system was strategically designed to favor rich member
nations. Because the veto power of member nations was proportional to their monetary
contributions, the United States (the only nation whose infrastructure had not been
damaged by the war) became de facto the key player. The aim of the IMF was to advance
currency exchange, promote trade, and assist countries with balance of payments
problems. To this end, member nations fixed the value of their currency in relation to
gold, which was set at a fixed-dollar price (Freeman, 2010: 57). The aim of the World
Bank was to facilitate post-war reconstruction through private bank loans for investment
in productive and infrastructural development.
Although the Bretton Woods system that tied the value of currency to a fixeddollar rate remained the international standard system until the early 1970s, the IMF and
World Bank – at least in the initial postwar years – were less active in their said
institutional aims of facilitating trade and advancing international economic relations.
Western Europe sought to rebuild its war-torn economies through the continuation of
colonial trade agreements that included barriers to cheap American exports; the United
States wanted open markets for the free flow of its own goods (Freeman, 2010: 56).
Freeman (2010) describes how, during the post-war years, America used its strategic
position to oppose the imposition of European trade barriers:
[T]he United States did not send the bulk of its reconstruction aid to Europe through the
World Bank, and until the late 1950s the IMF remained relatively inactive. Instead,
American officials used their country’s overwhelming wealth to try to directly counter
the postwar retreat from free-trade principles. In 1945, Britain, desperate for cash
reserves to fund imports, borrowed $3.75 billion from the United States, agreeing in
return to allow the free convertibility of its currency, sterling, into dollars, to facilitate
trade between its huge colonial empire and the United States. (Assistant Secretary of
State for Economic Affairs William Clayton, who had cofounded the world’s largest
cotton trading firm, told financier Bernard Baruch, “We loaded the British loan
negotiations with all the conditions that the traffic would bear.”) Similarly, the United
States conditioned a large loan to France on that country’s agreement to reduce subsidies
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and currency arrangements that favored its exports in the world market. (Freeman, 2010:
56)

At the same time, as Westad (2006) has shown, America’s postwar intervention
abroad cannot be reduced to economic considerations alone. The establishment of an
international system geared toward the “American way of life” was just as important. Of
course, overproduction at home and the much-needed outlet for capital were key
concerns for the BC and CED at home, but the push to expand the “free market” globally
is also a reflection of America’s unique history and ideology.
Central to the unique ideational context of American society is the idea of liberty.
But, like the other core ideas of what Lipset (1997) refers to as the “American Creed,” the
power of the idea of liberty in American society is that its bearing on historical reality is
entirely ideological. Throughout its history the American concept of liberty was “not for
everyone, but for those who, through property and education, possessed the necessary
independence to be citizens of a republic” (Westad, 2006: 10). This belief in liberty has
impacted the American view of the world outside of itself, often by instilling a deep sense
of responsibility to create that world in its own image. America’s approach to so-called
“free trade” is also an expression of this unique ideology. As Westad (2006: 30) explains,
“in American history (…) the concept of free trade has been a domesticated term: it was
good for trade within the United States and for American access to foreign markets. But it
was not, overall, admissible for foreign exports to the United States.”
During the years immediately following the end of the Second World War, the
issue of reparations among the Allied powers was another crucial issue, one that is
typically cited as one of the key factors leading up to the so-called “cold war.”182 The
Soviet Union, which had lost an estimated 26.6 million men in the Second World War,
was chiefly concerned about Germany. The Soviets felt they deserved something in light
of the suffering they underwent during the war. At the famous Yalta meeting in February,
1945, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt tacitly agreed to a mutually-recognized sphere of
influence in which Britain and the U.S. yielded the Soviets control over Eastern Europe
182

George Orwell was the first to use the term “Cold War” in 1945 to criticize both the Soviet Union and
the United States.
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on the condition that Stalin allow free elections in the region (Freeman, 2010: 58).
Roosevelt, whose aim was, above all, the establishment of an “American-led liberal
world” (Freeman, 2010: 58), was uneasy about accepting Soviet control of Eastern
Europe.
Following the election of Truman, the tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union became more pronounced; these tensions were, undoubtedly, exacerbated by his
inept approach to foreign affairs (Freeman, 2010: 60). News of the first successful test of
the atomic bomb in 1945 reinforced Truman’s standoffish approach to Soviet
involvement in Eastern Europe, Iran, and Turkey. In 1946, tensions mounted over Soviet
demands that Turkey cede its bases on the Dardanelles strait (Freeman, 2010: 61). The
Soviets rejected Truman’s proposed internationalization of the waterway and proposed
instead a joint Turkish-Soviet responsibility for defending the strait, which was rejected
in turn by the U.S., Britain, and Turkey.
Truman, however, stood strong and began sending naval task forces to the region.
The Soviet Union eventually withdrew its forces from Bulgaria but kept insisting on
defending the strait. It soon became clear that the world was dividing into two blocs—the
capitalist West, headed by the U.S., and the communist East, headed by the Soviet Union.
In 1946, Churchill, speaking in Missouri, announced that an “iron curtain” had descended
across Europe. Churchill explained that the U.S., Britain, and Canada had knowledge of
atomic armament production and insisted on the importance of such knowledge for
national self-preservation, calling for “an Anglo-American alliance to prevent war”
(Freeman, 2010: 63).
Soviet Communism did represent a threat—not militarily, to be sure, but
ideologically—because communism represented an alternative form of social
organization. Indeed, the U.S. had been fighting an ideological battle against the
alternative, socialist form of modernity since 1917 (Westad, 2006). No doubt the memory
of the Russian Revolution just twelve years prior to the 1929 stock market crash figured
on the minds of American elites’ decision to implement state involvement in order to
save finance capitalism. Ironically, it was largely the East/West division itself that
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allowed the Soviet and other Eastern bloc economies to survive by insulating themselves
from international pressure (Hobsbawm, 1994). For it was only during détente and the
increase of East-West trade that the Soviet economy began to falter. Moreover, the cold
war sustained a certain level of international conflict control. This is not to say that the
decades of the cold war were marked by peace—far from it. Rather, as Hobsbawm (1994:
253) notes, “conflicts were controlled, or stifled, by the fear that they might provoke an
open – i.e. a nuclear – war between the superpowers.” The result was a frozen
international situation that “stabilized what was an essentially unfixed and provisional
state of affairs” (Hobsbawm, 1994: 252).
America’s “deification of the market” in U.S. foreign policy was primarily a
result of the right wing’s opposition to the New Deal’s extension of the government as
well as of the threat posed by the alternative, collectivist development path expressed by
the Third World and the Soviet Union (Westad, 2006: 31). As Westad (2006: 31)
explains, “Both the domestic campaign and the international challenges led to a
reaffirmation of the market in US foreign policy, but more as ideology than as
exploitative practice” (see also Amadae, 2003). After the fall of French, Dutch, and
British colonial rule, rival resistance groups represented a threat to the American way of
life insofar as these newly decolonized nation-states were perceived as having the
potential to embark on an alternative (i.e. non-capitalist) development path. Since wartorn Europe was lacked a position of strength, it was up to America to ensure the future
direction of newly-decolonized nations—the so-called “third world”—or so thought
America’s elite decision-makers.
Within this context the scaffolding for a robust ideological apparatus, which,
grounded in an already entrenched belief in the actuality of “America” (i.e. the actuality
of liberty and free enterprise), meant that at home the contours of “legitimation” was
always already de facto determined (cf. Habermas, 1973) while the solidification of this
apparatus also justified America’s intervention abroad.183
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See Boltanski and Chiapello (2005: 26) for more on the justification of capitalism via reference to a
common good and their derivations of the term “legitimate” (legitimation and legitimacy). Boltanski and
Chiapello (2005: 26-27) explain how these two derivations express an opposition between (a) legitimation
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1.3 The “Golden Age”
The so-called “golden age” of capitalism comprises the two decades following the
end of the Second World War, which were characterized by historically-unprecedented
levels of economic growth, productivity, and affluence.184 According to Glyn et al. (1990:
47-48), the “macroeconomic pattern” during the golden age was marked by “(i) rapid and
parallel growth of productivity and capital stock per worker, and (ii) parallel growth of
real wages and productivity.” Together, these two dynamics yielded a more or less steady
profit rate and synchronous growth rates of consumption and production, thereby
perpetuating the initial rate of accumulation (Glyn et al., 1990: 48). In order to illustrate
the historically-unprecedented growth rate of labor productivity, consider the following:
Simple economic estimates based on the experience of capitalist countries over the last
100 years suggest that for every 1 per cent growth of capital stock per worker employed,
hourly labour productivity increases by 0.75 per cent. Given that on average capital per
worker grew around 2.5 per cent p.a. faster over the period 1950-73 than during 18701913, this would account for about two-thirds of the 3 percentage points increase (from
about 1.5 per cent p.a. to almost 4.5 per cent p.a.) in productivity growth actually
observed. (Glyn et al, 1990: 48)185

During the first half of the cold war, unemployment in most parts of the
industrialized West went down, although this reduction was less dramatic in American
society (Hobsbawm, 1994: 266-267). In fact, only North America had failed to all but
eliminate mass unemployment (Hobsbawm, 1994: 267). However, America’s
disproportionate welfare state (relative to its European counterparts) was counterbalanced
by corporate-heavy welfare benefits that simulated the appearance of a society willing to
take care of the poor.186

as concealment that must be unmasked and (b) legitimacy as expressive of communicative argumentation,
which has marked the sociological and philosophical literature for the past thirty years.
184
For a more nuanced analysis of the golden age, see Webber and Rigby (1995), who question the
conventional assumption that this period was one of exuberant prosperity.
185
This data is based the largest six advanced capitalist countries during this period (the US, the UK, Japan,
Germany, Italy, and France). It is important to note that such growth took place at different rates in
different countries (Glyn et al., 1990: 48).
186
This is not to deny the fact that real gains were effected during this period, but that this effort was
essentially ideological as an effort to secure social stability, particularly in light of what was perceived as
an impending communist threat. For a critical assessment of “economic growth” during this time, see
Hodgson (1974).
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During the years immediately following the Second World War, inflation was a
major concern for both liberals and conservatives. For conservatives and business groups
unemployment was the preferred method of inflation control, whereas Democrats, who
were allied with powerful unions, “preferred the longer economic risks of inflation to the
shorter-term political risks of unemployment” (McQuaid, 1994: 64). For nearly two
decades after the end of the Second World War, Keynesian-esque demand management
guided policy that, in economic terms, delivered real gains in distributional equity and
stability. According to Godfrey Hodgson (1974),
The essential promise of the Keynesian system was that it would allow government to
guarantee low and diminishing unemployment without inflation. It could thus banish at a
stroke the worst terrors of both liberals and conservatives. At the same time, thus
managed, the economy would also be able to deliver growth. (Hodgson, 1974: 79)

Even during its high time prior to the 1930s, the American labor movement, in
contrast to labor movements in other Western industrialized nation-states, was
overwhelmingly anti-statist; yet labor’s support for the New Deal administration’s social
democratic affinities was gradually increased from 1945 to 1980 (Lipset, 1997). This
change was primarily a result of long-term prosperity and of considerable economic
growth during this time; this prosperity and growth also led to a refurbishing of the
classical liberal ideology characteristic of American conservatism (Lipset, 1997).187 For
the most part, qualitative distinctions between the political left and the political right in
American politics were smoothed over. The political left – to the extent the Left existed
in American society – was effectively eclipsed by liberalism by the late 1950s (Hodgson,
1974: 89). Hobsbawm (1994) describes the reactions of socialist parties and labor
movements in the industrialized West during this period:
They fitted readily with the new reformed capitalism (…) the Left concentrated on
improving conditions of their working-class constituencies (…) Since they had no
alternative solutions except to call for the abolition of capitalism, which no socialdemocratic government knew how to, or tried to, abolish, they had to rely on a strong
wealth-creating capitalist economy to finance their aims. In effect, a reformed capitalism
which recognized the importance of labour and social-democratic aspirations suited them
well enough. (Hobsbawm, 1994: 272)
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During this period class tensions produced by the Depression lessened, as reflected in the decline of the
labor movement and lower expected correlations between class position and voting choices (Lipset, 1997).
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Keynesianism, tax cuts, and economic growth were all encouraged by cold war
tensions. As historian Kim McQuaid (1994: 125) recalls, “Krushchev regularly boasted
that the USSR would ‘bury’ the United States economically by 1970.” The so-called
“golden age” of capitalism (i.e. the postwar economic boom) was a truly worldwide
phenomenon. World manufacturing output quadrupled between the 1950s and early
1970s (Hobsbawm, 1994: 262). Total energy consumption in the U.S. alone tripled
between 1950 and 1973 (Rostow, 1978: 256, in Hobsbawm, 1994: 262). The alliance
between government and corporations, which had emerged before and during WWII and
which was refined in the years immediately following the end of the war in 1945,
culminated and became ingrained in the fabric of American society throughout the four
decades of the cold war.
Once firmly rooted, the new organizational forms that laid the foundations for the
emergence of the regulatory state established the limits of (what was perceived as) the
possible. Indeed, these transformations were a result and expression of what I analyze
below as the cold war regime of critique containment. It is telling, for example, how
during this time, John Kenneth Galbraith, whose name is synonymous with American
liberalism, railed against the popular notion that American politics involved a clear
dividing line between government and private business. Galbraith (1967) urged American
citizens to hone in on the reality of “the political,” advice which was perhaps especially
well-warranted given the impending Communist threat:
The position of this line – what is given to the state and what is accorded to private
enterprise – tells whether the society is socialist or non-socialist. Nothing is so important.
Any union between public and private organization is held, by liberal and conservative
alike, to be deviant sin. To the liberal it means that public power has been captured for
private advantage and profit. To the conservative it means that high private prerogative
has been lost to the state. In fact, the line between public and private authority in the
industrial system is indistinct and in large measure imaginary, and the abhorrent
association of public and private organizations is normal. When this is perceived, the
central trends in American life become clear. On few matters is an effort to free the mind
more rewarding. (Galbraith, 2000 [1967]: 168)

Whereas Lukács (1923) had stressed recognizing the reified social mediation
between social structure and subjectivity after the First World War, Galbraith espoused
freeing one’s mind via recognition of the imaginary line between public (socialist) and
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private (non-socialist). The difference between these two critiques and what is at stake is
indicative of the distinct socio-historical contexts within which each was penned.
The 1950s was marked by a renaissance of American welfare capitalism. By
1959, fringe benefits accounted for 21.5 percent of the total payroll costs of
manufacturing (McQuaid, 1994: 83). In 1949 Washington ruled to back labor in the
collective bargaining of fringe benefits. In exchange, companies that provided benefits to
their employees, such as health benefits, would receive tax exemption benefits in
return.188 The story of fringe benefits is an instance of a more general pattern of businesslabor-government compromise integral to the corporate order referred to as “managerial
capitalism.”189
McQuaid (1994) explains America’s corporate reorganization during this time:
Corporate reorganizations came in waves, particularly as technologically advanced
companies became progressively multiindustrial. International Harvester, Allied
Chemical, GE, Ford, and Chrysler, for instance, all changed to decentralized management
between 1945 and 1950. Other companies swiftly followed. The fashion was for firms to
undertake four or five major product lines, coordinated by as many as a dozen functional
specialists in the head office of the corporation and responsible to the CEO. A signature
of the managerial capitalist’s new industrial state was investment plans reaching as much
as four years into the future. In the late 1940s, only 20 percent of large U.S. corporations
had such plants, but by the early 1960s, 90 percent did. Such dry administrative changes
were important. They brought new corporate leaders to the forefront of both business and
political life. (McQuaid, 1994: 92)

Managerial science became an integral part of business-labor-government
relations throughout the 1950s. In 1943, University of Chicago Booth School of Business
established the first executive MBA program, which has since become an established
degree program in nearly every business school in the United States. Although industrialorganizational (IO) psychology had been around since the first merger wave during the
turn of the twentieth century,190 new IO psychology doctrines took off in the post-World
War II years in accordance with the changing context.191 The existence of big unions and
188

On the development of the Social Security and its significance to American welfare capitalism, see
McQuaid (1994: 84-90).
189
See, e.g., Mizruchi and Bey, 2005.
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See, e.g., Scott, 1911.
191
One of the chief differences between IO psychology before the Second World War and post-WWII IO
psychology is that before the war IO psychology was simply discourse on the social whereas in the postWorld War II context this distance was effaced as IO psychology became the social discourse (Lefort,
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federal agencies, such as the NLRB, during the postwar period meant that “unilateral
force had to be replaced with multilateral negotiation and consent” (McQuaid, 1994: 95).
IO psychology, according to McQuaid (1994), served as an effective counterweight to
union power and federal regulation both in the 1950s and in subsequent decades. As
McQuaid (1994: 95) explains, “Knowing what workers thought and why they thought it
paid dividends. It allowed management to identify and solve labor problems before
unions or federal regulators did.”
The overall mood of the 1950s was against the Left (see Hobsbawm, 1994: 283).
The affluence produced by the war and the postwar boom hit labor unions the hardest
(McQuaid, 1994: 96) because rising wages during the 1950s and the movement of
workers into the “middle class” segregated them from unorganized and unskilled
workers. McQuaid (1994: 96) notes, “High-tech workers labored at GE or IBM, bought
houses, and hoped to send the kids to college one day, while their low-tech counterparts
worked in laundries, rented apartments, and often lacked even savings accounts.” During
the 1950s job security, as opposed to working conditions or wages, increasingly became
the key issue in collective bargaining (McQuaid, 1994: 96-97). Indeed, organized labor
never recovered from the reorganization of productive labor associated with the shift
from a manufacturing to a service economy. As international trade expanded rapidly
during the 1960s, production firms went abroad in search of lower labor costs. In
America the percentage of people employed in manufacturing began to decline in 1965, a
decline that increased at a more rapid pace after 1970 (Hobsbawm, 1994: 302). The
nature of work in American society also changed during this period as the number of
people working part-time increased dramatically.192 By the end of the 1980s even service
workers were vulnerable to automation.193

1986). I will discuss some of the implications of this shift in my discussion of the cold war regime of
critique containment. For a recent discussion of managerial domination, see Boltanski (2011) and Boltanski
and Chiapello (2005).
192
On the reorganization of labor and the related ideological function of “middle class,” see Kolko (1988
[2000]). According to Kolko (1988 [2000]: 276), “More income for workers does not change their relations
of exploitation or their vulnerability as a commodity.” Kolko’s claim here is instructive. A more adequate
analysis of class would also need to incorporate the needs and perceptions of workers as a category of
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Since the decline of the golden age in the mid-1970s, business-government
symbiosis developed in and through the acceleration of these trends,194 especially during
the 1980s when capitalist democracies, one after the other, began to restructure their
economies in neoliberal mold. The irony, in light of the achievements of state-centric
capitalism, is that free market triumphalism “is today the single greatest legacy of the end
of the Cold War” (Lichtenstein, 2004: 103). Section three below reexamines the issue of
neoliberalism in light of the nature of the linkage between patterns of change and patterns
of continuity from the state-centric capitalism of the third quarter of the twentieth century
to the neoliberal model of the last quarter of the twentieth century. My argument, to jump
ahead for a moment, is that the nature of the linkage between patterns of change and
continuity from the first of these periods to the next is mediated by the cold war regime
of critique containment. It is to this phenomenon that I now turn.
2. The Cold War Regime of Critique Containment: Cold War Infrastructure and
Capitalist Democracy in Social Structure and Social Subjectivity
The discussion of post-World War II American society thus far has pinpointed the
emergence and highlighted the contours of the post-World War II configuration as a
particular configuration of business-labor-government relations that took hold following
the Second World War. I have argued that labor organization was stifled as the postWorld War II configuration become solidified within and through the context of
“American society.” I also suggested that business-government symbiosis was
simultaneously restructured in accordance with the needs of an economy geared toward
perpetual war.
The second section of this chapter distinguishes the formation and development of
what I call “the cold war regime of critique containment,” which, on the basis of the
alienation and relate them to changes in social structure as these two (subject-object) dimensions transform
and reconstitute one another in and through space-time.
193
Although it is not the aim of this dissertation to engage an analysis of these changing dynamics, such an
analysis could be greatly enhanced from within the framework of Postone’s categorial approach to critical
Marxian theory discussed in chapter three. This approach could, by focusing on the temporal dimension of
value, labor, and productivity, explain the persistent structural necessity of value-producing labor despite
its increasingly anachronistic character in light of emerging historical contradictions.
194
One such example: the establishment of a global capitalist network in which the transnational
corporation has become the key economic organizational form.
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foregoing discussion, must be understood as having emerged in and through the postWorld War II configuration. I delineate the cold war regime of critique containment as
inherently connected yet fundamentally distinct from the objective business-laborgovernment social relations, which served as the referent for distinguishing the postWorld War II regime in the previous section. I do so by analyzing key passages of the
NSC 68 report, published by the U.S. National Security Council on April 14, 1950.195
The report is in many ways the quintessential cold war document because it outlines the
strategy of containment that would define U.S. foreign policy for the next twenty
years.196 My analysis of this 58-page top secret paper demonstrates that the NSC 68
report is also indicative of a cold war regime of critique containment—in other words,
something fundamentally other and more than the containment traditionally understood
as the U.S. foreign policy strategic objective.197
More specifically, I shed light on key passages of the NSC 68 that clearly
rationalize two key developments during the post-WWII, cold war era, which I interpret
as indicative of critique containment: 1) the development of the infrastructure commonly
referred to as the military-industrial complex and 2) the so-called “American Century.”198
While others have written on the rationalization provided by the NSC 68 for these two
key developments, no one (to my knowledge) has examined the relationship between the
report’s rationalization of these two developments and the strategy of containment
outlined in the report as indicative of the phenomenon I refer to as critique containment.
The most proximate analysis that I am aware of is Amadae’s (2003) Rationalizing
195

References to (NSC 68, 1950 [1778]) refer to Etzold and Gaddis (eds) Containment: Documents on
American Policy/Strategy, 1945-1950 (Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 385-442, where the NSC 68
is reprinted in toto. The full text of NSC 68 was first made available to the public in 1975, where it was
published in the Naval War College Review, XXVII 6(25): 51-108.
196
According to the report’s authors, the policy of containment is one which seeks by all means short of
war to (1) block further expansion of Soviet power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions, (3) induce
a retraction of the Kremlin’s control and influence, and (4) in general to foster the seeds of destruction with
the Soviet system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to
generally accepted international standards (NSC, 1950 [1978]: 401).
197
For a comprehensive critical assessment of the six main perspectives on early cold war U.S. foreign
policy, including the traditionalist perspective, see Hurst (2005).
198
The term “American century” was coined in 1941 by Henry Luce, publisher of Time magazine, who
used the term to advocate America as the world proselytizer of democracy in lieu of America’s previous
isolationism.
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Capitalist Democracy, which I shall draw on extensively in my discussion of the
American Century. I suggest the American Century, when understood as mediated by
critique containment, provides a clear rationalization of capitalist democracy.
Against this background, the purpose of my analysis of the NSC 68 strategy of
containment as critique containment is to show both the infrastructural regime associated
with a permanent war economy and the rationalization of post-World War II capitalist
democracy as it developed in and through a cold war regime of critique containment.
Therefore, both 1) an infrastructure conducive to and in-line with an economy geared
toward perpetual war and 2) the rationalization of capitalist democracy, as they have
developed throughout the latter half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first
century, must be understood as mediated in and through a cold war regime of critique
containment.
Although the significance of this implication will become clear only as the
investigation proceeds (in sections three and four below), for the sake of clarity I would
like at this point to provide a preliminary indication of why understanding the
continuation of the military-industrial complex and the rationalization of capitalist
democracy as mediated by critique containment is crucial to the argument that will be
developed throughout this chapter. First, if we are able to grasp the nature of the linkage
between the third and fourth quarters of the twentieth century as they were mediated in
and through the Cold war regime of critique containment, then it becomes possible to
recognize the persistence of this regime despite the fact that the cold war officially ended
in 1991. In section three I argue that the persistence of the linkage between these two
periods, when grasped in its critique containment mediation, is perhaps best understood
as a process of sedimentation wherein the cold war regime of critique containment has
become ingrained in the very fabric of “American society” to an increasing extent
throughout the latter half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century and is
therefore unrecognized as such.199 I will return to the issue of the sedimentation of
199

Here I put “American society” in quotes to indicate that American society, as the sedimentation of the
cold war regime of critique containment, is something fundamentally other than what we mean by the term.
Viewed from within the framework of Adorno’s critique of identity thinking, the sedimentation of critique

183

critique containment in my discussion of the specific contemporary social conception of
nature produced by cold war science and technology without which contemporary
environmentalism would arguably not have been possible. I shall then explicate the
related theoretical and empirical issues through an immanent critique of contemporary
American environmentalism. The overall significance of my argument for understanding
the environment-society problematic will become apparent only at the end of the chapter.
2.1 Cold War Infrastructure
The 1950 National Security Council report “United States Objectives and
Programs for National Security”—commonly referred to as NSC 68—outlines the
American strategy of containment and is credited for having provided the rationale for
both the dramatic and historically-unprecedented increase in defense spending.200 The
study was initiated in the wake of the Soviet Union’s successful deployment of an atomic
weapon and the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War.201 The Second World War
had undermined the prospect that either Western Europe or Japan would regain power, at
least in the immediate term. The post-World War II world had two superpowers: the
United States and the Soviet Union.202
With this context in mind, Nitze and his team argue that
[T]he Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic
faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of
the world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the
Soviet Union, by violent or non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of
expediency. With the development of increasingly terrifying weapons of mass
containment in terms of its increasing penetration into the very fabric of American social relations implies
that the domination of human and non-human nature and the result of this domination for how we live our
lives is proportional to the degree to which we refer to what is mediated by critique containment as
“American society.”
200
On defense spending see, e.g., Leffler, 2010; Gaddis, 2005, 2010; on the so-called “American Century”
see, e.g., Slater, 1999.
201
Secretary of State Dean Acheson oversaw the production of the NSC 68 report, which was led by Paul
Nitze, head of the Policy Planning Staff. Acheson had been Secretary of the Treasury under the FDR
administration and became Assistant Secretary of the State for Economic Affairs in 1941, where he later
oversaw the U.S. oil embargo of Japan. He played a key role in the negotiations that precipitated the
creation of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the Food and Drug Organization, and
the International Monetary Fund. He became Secretary of State under Truman in 1949.
202
This was explicitly recognized by the report’s authors. See, for example, the NSC 68 statement that “the
defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline of the British and French Empires have interacted with the
development of the United States and the Soviet Union in such a way that power has increasingly
gravitated to these two centers” (NSC 68, 1950 [1978]: 385).
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destruction, every individual faces the ever-present possibility of annihilation should the
conflict enter the phase of total war. (NSC 68 1950 [1978]: 385)

Although the authors of the NSC 68 stress the pressing need for America to lead
the world, they conclude that the only way to securely control the Communist threat was
for President Truman to support a massive effort aimed toward the continual
preparedness for war. Nitze and his team stress that a massive military build-up was, in
fact, economically feasible. As the authors of the report state,
[T]he United States could achieve a substantial absolute increase in output and could
thereby increase the allocation of resources to a build-up of the economic and military
strength of itself and its allies without suffering a decline in its real standard of living (…)
With a high level of economic activity (…) Progress in this direction would permit, and
might itself be aided by, a build-up of the economic and military strength of the United
States and the free world; furthermore, if a dynamic expansion of the economy were
achieved, the necessary build-up could be accomplished without a decrease in the
national standard of living because the required resources could be obtained by siphoning
off a part of the annual increment in gross national product. These are facts of
fundamental importance in considering the courses of action open to the United States.
(NSC 68, 1950 [1978]: 406, 407-408)

The report’s authors detail how the Soviet’s allocation of resources to bolster its
economic and military strength has become an increasingly-pressing threat to the United
States (and therefore the world).203 The authors stress the United States’ military strength,
relative to that of the Soviet Union, was “becoming dangerously inadequate” (NSC, 1950
[1978]: 411) and that the fate of the free world was in jeopardy “unless more positive
government programs” were enacted (NSC, 1950 [1978]: 410). The recommendations of
NSC 68, which were implemented over the course of the so-called “American Century,”
were rooted in a religious commitment to the “maintenance of a strong military posture”
(NSC, 1950 [1978]: 401), which required enhancing U.S. military bases around the
world, creating an infrastructure to enhance global military lines of communication, and
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Consider, for example, the following statements by the authors of the NSC 68: “[T]he Soviet Union is
widening the gap between its preparedness for war and the unpreparedness of the free world for war. It is
devoting a far greater proportion of its resources to military purposes than are the free nations and, in
significant components of military power, a greater absolute quantity of resources” (NSC, 1950 [1978]:
409).
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enhancing the technical superiority of the United States through “an accelerated
exploitation of [its] scientific potential” (U.S. Department of State).204
During the latter half of the twentieth century, cold war tensions led societies
around the world to “maintain and refine a perpetual state of readiness for war” (McNeill,
2010: 443). Within the socioeconomic and political context of America’s technoscientific
war economy, new systems of knowledge production and administrative-management
emerged. New systems of knowledge production were effected through the successful
deployment of rational choice decision-theoretical technologies (Amadae, 2003) through
which new expert knowledge (“technopolitics”) displaced old-style military decisiontheoretical technologies (“geopolitics”) (Hooks and McLauchlan, 1992).205
Recall that it was America’s war effort during the Second World War and not the
New Deal that brought the U.S. economy out of depression and that the organizational
foundations for the business-government symbiosis that had been geared toward the New
Deal welfare state were expanded, refined, and redirected toward military production. I
also noted that America’s war effort during the Second World War facilitated state-war
mediated evolution wherein both war and state developed through a complex web of
institutions and scientific expansion. More specifically, the Manhattan Project laid the
administration-management foundation for an infrastructural regime that would continue
well into the post-WWII period. The formation of a specifically scientific militaryindustrial-complex, as McLauchlan (1992) notes, originated with the advent of nuclear
weapons during the Second World War. The Manhattan project and the advent of nuclear
weapons ushered in a new era of mass destruction and a new kind of science-intensive,
national security state (McLauchlan, 1992). According to Hooks and Smith (2005: 20),
weapons of mass destruction are “qualitatively more dangerous” than convention
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“MILESTONES: 1945-1952, NSC-68, 1950” available at: http://history.state.gov/milestones/19451952/NSC68 (accessed 1 July, 2013).
205
There is no shortage of literature on the so-called “military-industrial-(academic) complex,” it is
important to be aware of the debate regarding the direction of influence between scientists/individual
personnel and the larger social institutions within which the activity of science is carried out. Robin (2003),
for example, does not paint this knowledge production as a “one-way street” but rather shows how social
scientists actively participated in the military-industrial-complex. See also Herman (1996), who focuses on
psychology as a new discipline and important source of ideology in post-WWII American society.
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weapons because (1) “input materials (nuclear, chemical, and biological) are selected for
their potential to create toxic materials” and (2) “these materials are processed until they
can be deployed to make an enemy’s environment inhospitable.”206
According to McLauchlan (1992: 103), the Manhattan Project was a “learning
experience for state managers” since it acted as a model of state expansion in terms of
providing a model at both the material level (i.e. the constructed part of the infrastructure
of the scientific-intensive state) and the organizational level (i.e. it offered a prototype for
the scientific-intensive state). At the organization level, state managers saw science and
technology as the means for continual preparedness for war during the post-WWII
period. This shift in perception is marked by a shift from “geopolitics” to “technopolitics”
(McLauchlan, 1992), meaning control of technology becomes the primary means for
expanding power and thereby rendering technology control crucial for the post-WWII
development of the science-intensive state (McLauchlan, 1992). According to
McLauchlan (1992), at the material level the shift from geopolitics to technopolitics
helped create an infrastructure in which the dividing line between science and the
military was increasingly blurred. The core social institutions comprising this
infrastructure are science, industry, and the military. These instituions were integrated
through a system of national laboratories (e.g. Oak Ridge and Los Alamos) that
originated during the Manhattan Project. McLauchlan (1992) explains the formation and
continuation of the institutional base of this post-WWII big science “military-industrialcomplex” infrastructure:
The national laboratories spawned by the Manhattan Project were themselves managed
by new administrative structures consisting of multi-university corporations, or
consortiums, formed by major universities in each geographic region. These were part of
a ‘coordinated national program’ by the Manhattan Project leadership to continue and
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Taking a lead from Schnaiberg’s treadmill of production theory (see chapter one above) while also
drawing on C. Wright Mills’s concept of “power elite,” Gregory Hooks and his colleagues have recently
put forth the concept of the “treadmill of destruction.” According to Hooks and Smith (2005), the treadmill
of destruction operates through the logic of militarism, which is seen as connected to yet distinct from the
treadmill of production, which operates under the logic of “capitalism.” The concept of the treadmill of
destruction has been used in a number of empirical studies documenting the environmental effects of
militarism (see, for example, Clark and Jorgensen, 2009; Jorgensen and Clark, 2009; and Jorgensen, Clark,
and Kentor, 2010). In chapter five below I return to discuss treadmill of destruction and how my
dissertation relates to and potentially furthers such research endeavors.

187

expand the institutions and relations constructed during the Manhattan Project into the
postwar. (McLauchlan, 1992: 108)

Those occupying top positions in the management-administration network that
linked the university with the scientific nuclear state were among an elite group of
political-scientific state managers. The cold war regime of critique containment would
continue through the interrelationships between institutions of state, university, and
business well after the official end of the cold war. The new organizational structure
formed during the Manhattan Project involved a new method of administration that
linked science and government. Research and development in universities were supported
on a contract basis that ensured a certain social space between universities and national
laboratories. The contract system allowed scientists to work in their own laboratories at
major universities. Instead of creating new facilities or expanding those in existence, the
science-intensive state was able to make use of existing facilities. This system was not
only cost effective but also beneficial in that it constructed a reality in which the state was
not seen as an intrusive threat, which was especially important given the American value
system. The integration of the university and the industrial plant was thus developed in
and through the advent of nuclear weapons (McLauchlan, 1992: 114).
Technopolitics also involved a compression of time and space. Time was a crucial
factor in the Manhattan Project and in the arms race. Time itself – not the Germans or
Russians – was the opponent the speed of production was fighting against. The enemy
was unknown; therefore, developing nuclear weapons as fast as possible was the most
important thing to do. This ethos of rapid production also meant that the effects
(social/environmental/etc.) of such production were always recognized in hindsight,, after
the goal had been met. This emphasis also marked a strategic shift from “the strategy of
mobilization to the policy of deterrence”; this shift required (and necessitated) “a greatly
expanded military and scientific effort in peacetime” (McLauchlan, 1992: 115). The shift
to technopolitics also necessitated continual preparedness during times of so-called
“peace.” The worldview associated with technopolitics can be termed “remote control”
(McLauchlan, 1992: 118).
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In other words, the military-industrial-academic complex increasingly penetrates
society while becoming less and less visible in terms of the social space it occupies. This
is consonant with Hooks and Smith’s (2005: 31) contention that the environmental effects
of militarism are becoming increasingly expansive amid a decreasing social space within
which the cause of such destruction might be located. As McLauchlan (1992) notes,
With the advent of nuclear weapons it is no longer geography that separates the United
States from potential attack, it is time: the hours (and later minutes) it would take
bombers (later missiles) with nuclear weapons to reach the United States. Time, as it
relates to security, is no longer a function of geography, but of technology. In these trends
we see a breakdown in the distinction between war and peace, between wartime and
peacetime. (McLauchlan, 1992: 116)

Here it is important to recall that this acceleration of objectified time is a process
whereby time literally becomes denser at an accelerating rate, as a virtually exponential
acceleration in the rate at which biophysical throughput increases is necessitated by the
production of value. In other words, the production of more and more “stuff” is required
to effect less and less (indirect) increases in value. Although beyond the scope of this
dissertation, research on militarism and the environment could be furthered by
investigating the interaction between Postone’s (1993) analysis value in terms of the
dialectic of labor, time, and its treadmill effect, on the one hand, and the increasingly
expansive destruction of militarism amid its diminishing social space, on the other.207
2.2 Capitalist Democracy
Thus far my discussion has indicated how the external threat of communism
produced the need for American society to remain in a state of perpetual preparedness for
war, as rationalized in the NSC 68 report. This need was facilitated and reinforced
through the continuation and development of the military-industrial-academic complex.
The communist threat also sustained America’s commitment to economic growth and
“social security.” The affluence of the “golden age” saw the reorganization of productive
labor and the emergence of a “new class” of technicians responsible for strategically
managing the new work regime with sophisticated administration technologies.
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I will return again to elaborate this connection and area for future research in chapter five.
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Another key development rationalized in the NSC 68 is the so-called “American
Century.” The report explicitly affirms the need for American world leadership in order
to stave off the communist threat. Implicit in this responsibility is a belief in America’s
intrinsic superiority and the desire to create the world in the image of American society.
Many have detailed the “American Century” in terms of America’s expansionist efforts
abroad.208 I analyze an equally important yet often overlooked aspect of the “American
Century”: the problem of American democracy at home.209 The need to create a rational
capitalist democracy in American society is historically specific. Retrospectively, we can
see that this need was necessitated by the cold war international context and the apparent
impending threat of communism.
It does not take an effort of great abstraction or keen interpretive skill to recognize
the NSC 68 report as an official battle cry for the so-called “American Century.” The
report represents an explicit break from America’s “isolationism” during the 1920s and
1930s. The belief that NSC 68 served to rationalize the “American Century” is
substantiated by numerous statements in the report that articulate the beliefs that the
future of the world community depended on the triumph of American liberal capitalist
democracy and that it was up to the United States to pave the road for such victory.
The report’s authors explain,
Our overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world
environment in which the American system can survive and flourish. It therefore rejects
the concept of isolation and affirms the necessity of our positive participation in the
world community.
This broad intention embraces two subsidiary policies. One is a policy which we would
probably pursue even if there were no Soviet threat. It is a policy of attempting to
develop a healthy international community. The other is the policy of “containing” the
Soviet system. These two policies are closely interrelated and interact on one another.
(NSC, 1950 [1978]: 401)
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See e.g. Kolko, 1969, 1976, 1988; Kolko and Kolko, 1972; McCormick, 1995; Slater et al., 1999.
My discussion here is influenced by Amadae’s (2003) superb analysis of the origins of rational choice
theory.
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The authors of NSC 68 describe the inherent superiority of America’s capitalist
democracy and suggest that this superiority could be, at least in principle, capable of
deterring the Soviet threat:
[O]ur democracy (…) possesses a unique degree of unity. Our society is fundamentally
more cohesive than the Soviet system, the solidarity of which is artificially created
through force, fear and favor. This means that expressions of national consensus in our
society are soundly and solidly based. It means that the possibility of revolution in this
country is fundamentally less than that in the Soviet system (…) The essential tolerance
of our world outlook, our generous and constructive impulses, and the absence of
covetousness in our international relations are assets of potentially enormous influence
(…) The full power which resides within the American people will be evoked only
through the traditional democratic process: This process requires, firstly, that sufficient
information regarding the basic political, economic and military elements of the present
situation be made publicly available so that an intelligent popular opinion may be formed.
Having achieved a comprehension of the issues now confronting this Republic, it will
then be possible for the American people and the American Government to arrive at a
consensus. Out of this common view will develop a determination of the national will
and a solid resolute expression of that will. The initiative in this process lies with the
Government. (NSC, 1950 [1978]: 402-403)

But what is the nature of the connection between the policy of containment, which
the report’s authors later described as “a policy of calculated and gradual coercion”
(NSC, 1950 [1978]: 402), and the American system (i.e. capitalist democracy)? For
calculated and gradual coercion would seem to be at odds with the central message of the
American system, whose “revolutionary message” since its inception was “free men and
free enterprise” (Westad, 2006: 9-10). Of course, the policy of advancing a healthy
international community made in the image of American democracy presupposes that
American society is a healthy, functioning democracy. The fact that the authors of NSC
68 express what might be described as anxious skepticism regarding Americans’
psychological capacity to support a protracted war against communism lends credence to
the contention that American democracy, as it is understood today, is a specifically
contemporary production that developed in and through the post-WWII, cold war regime
of critique containment.
According to the report’s authors,
The democratic way is harder than the authoritarian way because, in seeking to protect
the individual, it demands of him understanding, judgment and positive participation in
the increasingly complex and exacting problems of the modern world (…) A free society
is vulnerable in that it is easy for people to lapse into excesses—the excesses of a
permanently open mind wishfully waiting for evidence that evil design may become
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noble purpose, the excess of faith becoming prejudice, the excess of tolerance
degenerating into indulgence of conspiracy and the excess of resorting to suppression
when more moderate measures are not only more appropriate but more effective. (NSC,
1950 [1978]: 403)

The type of ideology and its tensions, which the authors of NSC 68 describe
above and which I have been referring to as critique containment, can also be elaborated
in terms of what political theorist Claude Lefort (1986) calls “invisible” ideology. In
order to provide a better grasp of the elusive nature of critique containment, I will outline
the general contours of Lefort’s (1986) analysis of ideology.210 I will then situate the
“invisible” ideology of critique containment in the American societal context by focusing
on the specific forms of decision-making technologies through which this type of
ideology is diffused.
2.2.1 “Invisible” Ideology
In his work on ideology Lefort aims to provide an outline of the genesis of
ideology in modern society.211 Lefort is concerned with modern ideology, which is
indicated by a specific type of discourse on politics and society that emerged during the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. What is unique about modern ideology, according to
Lefort, is that, in contrast to the ideational context(s) of previous periods whose validity
was rooted in an extra-social reference point, modern ideology legitimates itself within
the social domain. At the same time, modern ideology obscures its origins (modern
society) and, in this sense, functions to conceal the inherent contingency of modern social
life. Lefort (1986: 201) explains, “[modern] ideology is the sequence of representations
which have the function of re-establishing the dimension of society ‘without history’ at
the very heart of historical society.”
Lefort (1986) outlines three forms of modern ideology: 1) bourgeois ideology, 2)
totalitarian ideology, and 3) “invisible” ideology. Bourgeois ideological discourse, which
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Lefort (1986: 219) insists that his outline of an analysis of ideology is necessary before the examination
of particular ideologies in historically determinate conditions: “Any attempt to analyse them [concrete
forms of ideology] as empirical, socio-historical formations will be limited, however rich the
documentation may be, for such an attempt will fail to see that it is the question of the existence of the
social, of the historical as such which is brought into play in particular forms of modern ideology.”
211
My discussion of Lefort’s work on ideology is drawn primarily from his essay, “Outline of the Genesis
of Ideology in Modern Societies” (Lefort, 1986).
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peaked in the nineteenth century, is distinct from the discourse of previous periods
because it relies on the ideal of positive knowledge and “thrives on challenging, explicitly
or implicitly, any reference to an ‘elsewhere’ from which knowledge about the social
order and the order of the world might be gathered” (Lefort, 1986: 205). What is unique
about the discourse of bourgeois ideology, according to Lefort (1986: 205), is the
mechanism by means of which it attempts to fulfill its function. This mechanism is
ordered “in terms of a split between ideas and the supposed real” (Lefort, 1986: 205). So,
the discourse of bourgeois ideology debunks the “external character” of mythical ideas,
for example, “but the discourse refers back to itself only via the detour of the
transcendence of ideas” by opening up the possibility of “an objectification of the social,
no matter what point of view is adopted” (Lefort, 1986: 205). Accordingly, the text of
bourgeois ideology, Lefort (1986) tells us, is written in capital letters (e.g. Humanity,
Progress, Nature, Life, Science, Art, the Republic, Property, Order, Society, Nation, and
so on). Lefort (1986: 205) stresses that “The double nature of the idea as both
representation and norm cannot be over-emphasized; nor can the double character of the
argumentation, which attests to a truth inscribed in the real and to the conditions of acting
in accordance with the nature of things.” This twofold element implies appropriate
actions in accordance with the idea, thus giving rise to the opposition between the subject
whose actions conform to the rule and the Other, who, “not having access to the rule,
does not have the status of subject” (Lefort, 1986: 206). Lefort (1986) explains this aspect
of bourgeois ideology:
In so far as it is presented as a discourse on the social, extricating itself from the social,
ideological discourse develops in an impersonal way; it conveys a knowledge which is
supposed to arise from the order of things. But it is essential for it to bring out the
distinction, at every level, between the subject, who establishes himself by his
articulation with the rule and expresses himself in expressing the rule, and the other (…)
Thus there emerges (…) the artifice by means of which social division is dissimulated:
the positing of reference points which enable a difference to be established between the
social and the sub-social, order and disorder, the world and the underworld (…) in such a
way that what reality conceals from discourse can be identified and mastered. Thus
discourse can cover up the question of its genesis. (Lefort, 1986: 206, 207)

The discourse of bourgeois ideology is therefore an impossible project because it
“claims to represent the transparency of the social and to be, qua social discourse,
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discourse on the social” (Lefort, 1986: 209). On the one hand, the divisions expressed by
the subject in relation to the rule and to the Other allow bourgeois ideology to conceal
any divisions within society. On the other hand, the discourse of bourgeois ideology is
vulnerable because insofar as it seeks “to extract itself from the social and to affirm itself
as discourse” its intrinsic contingency is exposed (Lefort, 1986: 213). Bourgeois
ideological discourse, according to Lefort (1986), has no “safety catch,” no recourse,
from this intrinsic contingency.
Totalitarian ideology develops out of bourgeois ideology and, Lefort (1986)
argues, must be seen as a response to bourgeois ideology’s intrinsic contingency. In its
response totalitarian discourse “denies all the oppositions that bourgeois ideology dealt
with in a representation which was constructed in each case in order to defuse their
effects and which threatened the foundations of each term by exposing it to the necessity
of account for itself” (Lefort, 1986: 215). The most significant opposition totalitarianism
erases is the opposition between state and civil society, yet totalitarian ideology remains
dependent on bourgeois ideology. Lefort (1986) illustrates how this dependence is
exemplified in the concept of the total state:
The discourse of the organization, arranged in such a way that anonymous knowledge
governs the thought and practice of its agents, is thus only supported by constant
reference to the authority in which the decision is concentrated. It is on this double
condition that the contradiction of bourgeois ideology is “overcome” by the concept of
the total state. (Lefort, 1986: 219)

Yet totalitarian ideology too suffers from its own internal contradiction. The
contradiction of totalitarianism, according to Lefort (1986: 221), emerges from “the fact
that, on the one hand, power is doubly masked therein, as representative of the society
without division and as agent of the rationality of the organization, whereas, on the other
hand, power appears there, as in no other society, as an apparatus of coercion, the bearer
of naked violence.” Because totalitarian ideology is “engendered in ‘historical society’”
(Lefort, 1986: 222), the effacement of the oppositions of bourgeois ideology is bound to
fail. Totalitarian discourse, Lefort (1986: 224) explains, “runs the risk of appearing as a
generalized lie, as discourse in the service of power, the mere mask of oppression.”
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“Invisible” ideology, according to Lefort (1986), is the new form of ideology in
Western democratic societies. Like totalitarian discourse, this new ideological discourse
seeks to secure the homogenization of the social domain: it aims to eliminate “the
distance between the discourse on the social and social discourse” (Lefort, 1986: 225).
Unlike totalitarianism, invisible ideology achieves this unification of the social by
severing itself from the affirmation of totality and thereby rendering itself “invisible”
(Thompson, 1986: 19).212 For Lefort (1986), this invisibility is the defining aspect of this
new ideological discourse: invisible ideology seeks to merge itself, as discourse on the
social, with the social discourse of everyday life. In doing so, “invisible” ideology
provides constant assurance of the social bond and thereby hides temporal and social
divisions.
Western democracies in which “invisible” ideology is infused develop a “new
strategy”213 to “represent society” from the danger of totalitarianism, from the danger of
eschewing the image of a diffusion of power (Lefort, 1986: 224, 225). This new
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“Invisible” ideology must be situated within the socio-historical context of critique containment. It is in
relation to this problematic and in light of the foregoing discussion that the following passage from
Adorno’s (1951) Minima Moralia, written during his time in exile in the U.S., is strikingly pertinent:
Fascism is itself less ‘ideological’, in so far as it openly proclaims the principle of
domination that is elsewhere concealed. Whatever humane values the democracies can
oppose it with, it can effortlessly refute by pointing out that they represent not the whole
of humanity but a mere illusory image that Fascism has had the courage to discard. So
desperate have people become in civilization, however, that they are forever ready to
abandon their frail better qualities as soon as the world does their worse ones the
obligation of confessing how evil it is. The political forces of opposition, however, are
compelled to make constant use of lies if they are not themselves to be completely wiped
out as destructive (…) Only the absolute lie now has nay freedom to speak the truth (…)
The conversion of all questions of truth into questions of power, a process that truth itself
cannot escape if it is not to be annihilated by power, not only suppresses truth as in earlier
despotic orders, but has attacked the very heart of the distinction between true and false,
which the hirelings of logic were in any case diligently working to abolish. (Adorno,
1951 [2005]: 108-109)
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Although Lefort sometimes uses language that may imply the “conscious” use of ideological discourse,
he stresses that this is not the case. He explains, “I do not mean to say that the discourse emanates from a
particular agent, or from a series of agents who would simply be representative of the dominant class. In so
far as it is presented as a discourse on the social, ideological discourse develops in an impersonal way; it
conveys a knowledge which is supposed to arise from the order of things” (Lefort, 1986: 206). This applies
to Lefort’s use of the term “strategy” as well.
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“strategy,” according to Lefort (1986: 225), is a new social significance attached to the
“group.”214
[T]he ‘group’, set up as a positive entity and treated as both the expression and the
objective of social communication, becomes a screen which obscures the separation of
the apparatus of domination from the mass of those without power. The representation of
a structure of the group, indifferent to the conditions which dictate the status of its
members, tends to exclude from its domain the question of the origin, the legitimacy and
rationality of the oppositions and hierarchies instituted in each sector. A new faith is
invested in this representation: the faith in a ‘mastery’ of the social in the very experience
of socialization here and now, that is, within the perceptible boundaries of each
institution, in each situation where the individual finds himself situated by virtue of the
‘natural’ necessity of production or of economic activity more generally, but also of
education or leisure, of political, trade union or religious practice. (Lefort, 1986: 225226)

Lefort (1986) explains that the various instruments (e.g. television, radio, etc.)
through which the representation of the group (and the faith in the present) is dispersed
make the new ideology so practicable:
With the constant staging of public discussions turned into spectacles, encompassing all
aspects of economic, political and cultural life, ridiculing everything from the most trivial
to the most revered, an image of reciprocity is imposed as the very image of social
relations (…) The effectiveness of discourse such as that transmitted by radio and
television lies in the fact that it is only partially manifested as political discourse – and it
is precisely because of this that it acquires a general political significance. It is the things
of everyday life, questions of science and culture, which support the representation of a
realized democracy where speech seems to circulate without obstruction (…) In this way,
the subject finds himself (almost) lodged in the system of representation, in an altogether
different way than in totalitarian ideology, since he is now invited to incorporate the
terms of every opposition. And at the same time, he is lodged in the group – an imaginary
group in the sense that individuals are deprived the power to grasp the actual movement
of the institution by taking part in it, by confronting the fact of their differentiated relation
to one another (…) It is in this light that one may assess, for example, the efficacy of a
mechanism which, from commercials to programmes on politics or culture, provides the
constant illusion of a between-us, an entre-nous. (Lefort, 1986: 226-227)

According to Lefort (1986), the discipline of psychology and the fascination with
the present are at the center of this ideology. Another feature of this ideology that Lefort
(1986) points out is the fusion of scientific discourse and social discourse. This fusion
combines with the spell of the entre-nous (referred to above) and “renders everything
sayable” (Lefort, 1986: 233). Lefort (1986) explains,

214

Cf. Reisman, 1950.

196

Just as social communication is content to be realized here and now, knowledge is
exhibited here and now, bearing the solution to the secret of nature and the secret of man,
giving rise to the fascination with the present. Thus, not knowing means not coinciding
with the time, not coinciding with the being of the social as it manifests itself. Not
knowing means incurring the tacit sanction of society, excluding oneself from the
legitimate social bond. The ‘new’, then, is nothing more than the materialized proof of
temporal difference, of the historical, and hence of its concealment beneath the illusion of
a difference in time, of a controllable relation to present as such. Invisible once again is
the operation which defuses the effects of the institution of the social, which attempts to
prohibit the question of the sense of the established order, the question of the possible.
(Lefort, 1986: 233-234)

This “thrusting forth of the new” (Lefort, 1986: 235) is precisely what represents
the historical, which is why an understanding of the empirical manifestations of this
“invisible” ideology is significant. The concrete forms through which this ideology
became infused into American society proliferated during the interwar and postwar
period. The superior “unity possessed by American society” and the “expressions of
national consensus” that the authors of the NSC 68 so fondly exalted emerged in a sociohistorical context where they were mediated by critique containment, which is illustrated
in the decision-making and scientific technologies through which they were diffused.
Mediated in and through the cold war regime of critique containment, this sociohistorical context is simultaneously defined by an apparent decontextualization expressed
by the ahistorical statements regarding “American society” and “national consensus” of
the NSC 68 report. The persistence of the cold war regime of critique containment
throughout the latter half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century is
perhaps more accurately described as a process of sedimentation wherein critique
containment becomes ingrained into the very fabric of American society and is therefore
unrecognized as such. The corresponding reified worldview, as facilitated through cold
war warriors and Industrial psychologists and made manifest in sustained militaryindustrial-academic efforts to control the external world, ultimately comes at a price,
specifically the restriction of reflexivity, which is both real and semblance, whereby that
which is needed most—namely, a critique of the present—becomes that which is most
difficult to obtain.
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In the next section I elaborate critique containment as a category of mediation by
focusing on how post-World War II democracy in American society based on a system of
legitimate governance is mediated in and through the cold war regime of critique
containment. I argue that the origins of “legitimate governance” are intimately connected
to the (perceived) threat posed by the Communist alternative.
2.3.1 Critique Containment in Legitimation
The system of knowledge production and decision-making technology through
which a new “invisible” ideology is dispersed emerged as a result of fear of the
Communist alternative. This knowledge and decision-making production is defined by its
goal of control. Although I will discuss this subject in connection with contemporary
environmentalism in more detail below, at this point it is important to recognize
retrospectively that it is clear that the recent increase in attention and concern for the
well-being of biophysical nature would not have been possible without the cold war
communications and technological explosion and cold war science, which effected a
specifically contemporary social conception of nature. That the contemporary social
conception of nature is a product of cold war science and technology implies that
contemporary environmentalism developed in and through the postwar, cold war regime
of critique containment. (Note that when I speak of contemporary environmental
consciousness as being reified, I am referring to the fact that the meaning of
environmentalism is not measured in relation to this context.)
The reification of contemporary environmental consciousness is in line with
Adorno’s discussion of reified consciousness. For example, Adorno’s (2008 [1965]: 24)
critique of so-called “first philosophy”—specifically, Heidegger’s fundamental
ontology—is a critique of the hypostasis of mind: “The mind literally fetishizes concepts
of its own devising which possess nothing that transcends consciousness. And it achieves
this by tearing them from their context and ceasing to think them further.” The following
passage from Adorno’s (1965) lectures on negative dialectics speaks to the post-war, cold
war regime of critique containment, namely, that “American society” exists by virtue
of—not despite—critique containment:
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[I]t is probably true that today almost the entire economy can be sustained only because a
very large part of the social product is devoted to the production of weapons of mass
destruction, in particular, nuclear weapons and everything connected with them. This
holds good in every country, in both he capitalist nations and the countries belonging to
the Russian and Chinese power blocs. This means that the ability of our society to
withstand crises, an ability that is generally held to be one of its finest achievements, is
directly linked to the growth in its potential for technological self-destruction. (Adorno,
2008 [1965]: 9)

In retrospect, it is clear that America’s twin commitment to economic
management and social stability, particularly during the first two decades of the cold war,
was a significant—yet unintended—consequence of the internal Communist threat.
Although the conventional understanding of the cold war era in the United States tends to
paint a picture of the struggle against an external enemy (the Soviet Union), the external
threat of Marxism was inverted throughout the twentieth century. The fact that today
Marxism does not is not represented a serious internal threat to the socioeconomic or
political order of American society (Amadae, 2003) is an indication that the
sedimentation of critique containment has become ingrained within the social fabric of
American society during the latter half of the twentieth century. While today the failure
of political Marxism may seem quite obvious, it is important to bear in mind that the
triumph of capitalist democracy was not always so apparent.
Throughout the twentieth century, many Western leaders worried about the
possibility that, in the wake of the 1917 Revolution in Russia and in light of the threat of
global extermination brought about through the cold war, alternatives to capitalist
democracy would become increasingly enticing to the American population, particularly
to those already disenfranchised. Even Joseph Schumpeter (1943)—a political
conservative—predicted that capitalism would not survive in the postwar world and that
socialism was inevitable.215 Yet this supposedly inevitable rise of socialism never
occurred. According to Amadae (2003: 3), Marxism was defeated by “a new approach to
democracy [that] emerged in cold war America, one based on the notion of the ‘rational
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actor,’ which was quickly assimilated into the traditions of political and economic
liberalism that underlie the modern experiment with democracy and capitalism.”
Amadae (2003: 41) traces the conceptual scaffolding of rational choice theory to
the systems analysis developed by the RAND Corporation in the 1940s and 1950s:
“Systems analysis studies originated as tools used by the aircraft trade to prepare contract
bids for the Air Force” and soon became a mainstay at the RAND corporation, where it
was promoted and utilized as “a comprehensive and rigorous science of war” (Amadae,
2003: 43). The infamous “missile gap” between the Soviet Union and the United States
during the beginning of the cold war and America’s strategy of containment (outlined in
the NSC 68) were both based on prescriptions derived from systems analysis. Robert
McNamara would later use these techniques in the implementation of rational defense
management, which allowed him to establish complete control over the Pentagon during
the 1960s (Amadae, 2003). As Amadae (2003: 30) explains, “RAND’s decision
theoretical tools first in the department of defense, and then later throughout the federal
government via President Johnson’s Great Society programs” led to the effective
installment of “a knowledge production regime that would revolutionize government
policymaking in the United States.”
Like other systems of knowledge (and technology) during the cold war,
management techniques that had originally been produced as decision theoretical
technologies for a global nuclear standoff were transferred to the civil sphere. Think
tanks and consulting agencies proliferated while “Public Policy” programs and curricula
were implemented at top universities (Amadae, 2003). The new field of policy analysis,
according to Amadae (2003: 71-72), was rooted in distinct ideas about legitimation and
fairness standards:
The key to success of the dual conceptual and institutional revolution was that the new
methods gained a de facto legitimacy before they had been tried and debated in public
forum. The decision technologies did not filter into mainstream practice from the world
of academia, but were designed in a hands-on manner to revolutionize national security
decisionmaking and to integrate budgeting with strategic planning in order to centralize
control (…) The de facto legitimacy acquired by systems analysis and RAND’s program
budgeting is contrary to the common understanding that acceptance presupposes that
legitimacy has already been established. With “scientific knowledge,” or at the
intersection of politics and processes of knowledge production, it is often believed that
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superior explanatory power is the criterion for successful promulgation (…) A concept of
legitimate governance served as the rationale anchoring the evolving practice of public
sphere democracy. (Amadae, 2003: 72)

The ungovernability and legitimation crisis debates during the 1970s and 1980s,
while seemingly critical of the postwar regime, are themselves products of cold war
dualisms.216 John Kenneth Galbraith (as I mentioned previously) sought to expose as
illusory the conventional public/private distinction, which by 1960 had taken the form of
a clear dividing line between government and private business. That Galbraith saw
recognizing the illusory nature of the public/private distinction as an activity of freeing
one’s mind is itself a reflection of the degree to which critique containment had become
sedimented in “American society.” As a reference point, we might compare Galbraith’s
critique of the public/private distinction to Lukács’s critique of reification, which also
aimed at the emancipation of mind, but for Lukács this required overcoming capital.
Arguing against Galbraith’s assertion that the public/private distinction was
illusory, Habermas (1973) asserts that the public/private line was the consequence of a
class structure he saw as being kept latent. Offe (1981) argues that the creation of the
modern welfare state functioned as a “peace formula” in advanced capitalist democracies
and that by the mid-1970s the welfare state was established and had reconfigured society
according. The irony, as Offe (1981) points out, is that both the political left and right
leveled their critiques of the welfare state for different reasons and yet both failed to
acknowledge the empirical fact that the welfare state had become an integral aspect of
contemporary democratic societies, including the very process of making claims for or
against its worth.
Although these scholars engaged sophisticated critiques of “the political” in late
capitalism, the critiques themselves typically presupposed “free” normative action by
misrecognizing the category of legitimacy itself as produced by and mediated through the
cold war regime of critique containment. Their analyses are therefore unable to grasp the
fact that legitimacy is always already determined. Moreover, these theorists assumed a
rational connection between social democracy and efforts aimed toward ameliorating
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structural problems at the expense of recognizing social democracy as an attempt to
ameliorate structural problems within a framework that is itself generative of these
problems (cf. Postone, 2006: 95). Amadae (2003: 4) perceptively notes that “It is not
without historical irony that the ideological front of American society’s hard fought war
against communism and the Soviet Union may, inadvertently, have eroded the
meaningfulness of the term ‘American society.’”
3. Critique Containment Penetration as Sedimentation: “American Society” after
the “Golden Age”
This section examines the nature of the linkage between patterns of continuity and
change from 1) the first half of the cold war, which was characterized by state centric
capitalism, and 2) the last quarter of the twentieth century, which was characterized by
neoliberalism. I argue that the cold war regime of critique containment persists
throughout these two periods even though the cold war officially ended in 1991.
Moreover, I suggest that the continuation of critique containment, far from being static, is
perhaps best understood as a process of sedimentation whereby critique containment
becomes engrained in the very fabric of American society and, therefore, becomes
increasingly difficult to recognize.
Our discussion has shown that the political, economic, and ideational elements
that facilitated and sustained the golden age in the West, and in American society, in
particular, would not have been possible without America’s commitment to containing
the communist threat, which, as discussed above, required ensuring a certain degree of
social stability for at least a portion of the population. Yet by the early 1970s the golden
age was showing signs of failure. The oil shocks of 1973, an initial slowdown in
productivity growth, underutilized productive capacity, and higher levels of
unemployment all pointed toward a change in nearly two decades of capitalist success.
During the 1960s the U.S. dollar went from being an internationally undervalued to an
internationally overvalued currency (Marglin, 1990: 21). Simultaneous with the war in
Vietnam, America’s period of sustained growth began to decline during the late 1960s,
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and the U.S. finally abandoned the Bretton Woods system in 1971. Marglin (1990)
explains,
The consequences were momentous, if somewhat delayed: faced with an external
constraint for the first time since the war, the United States could no longer play a
leadership role in the management of aggregate demand internationally. In the late 1970s
when the United States attempted to induce a global expansion by stimulating aggregate
demand, the rest of the world was no longer willing to accept a flood of US dollars,
except at a price which sent shudders through the financial community from New York to
Zurich and from London to Tokyo. (Marglin, 1990: 21)

As with the stock market crash of 1929 and the subsequent institutional
reconfiguration, the crisis in the 1970s is an example of how the success of a historicallyspecific configuration eventually leads to the different elements of the configuration
undermining the configuration itself (Marglin, 1990). The early 1970s economic
downturn was the first since the Second World War and was followed by a shift away
from Keynesian demand management toward supply-side economics. This shift was
signaled by Paul Volcker’s appointment by Carter as Chairman of the Federal Reserve in
1979. Volcker changed U.S. monetary policy with the aim of fighting inflation (even
when counter-inflationary measures hurt employment metrics). Volcker’s appointment as
Chairman of the Federal Reserve “symbolized the triumph of monetarist policies and
ushered in a period of deliberate, heavy deflation, widely imitated abroad, especially in
the U.K.” (Glynn et al., 1990: 40).
The neoliberal state is characterized by its sole role in creating and preserving an
institutional framework conducive to “strong private property rights, free markets, and
free trade” (Harvey, 2005: 2). In the Washington political arena, the neoliberal shift was
signaled by Ronald Reagan’s victory over Jimmy Carter in the 1980 presidential election.
Reagan promoted a conservative supply-side approach to the economy (also know as
“trickle-down economics” or “Reaganomics”), which consisted of major tax cuts, scaled
back government regulation, and inflation-reducing money supply policies. It was argued
that “high levels of government spending, high taxation of income and extensive
government regulation of economic affairs” stifled economic growth and the inherent

203

fruits of the free enterprise system (Bernstein, 2004: 130). Michael A. Bernstein (2004)
explains,
Excessive income taxation, Reagan’s adviser’s argued, stifled productive effort, for
example, by discouraging overtime work. It robbed individuals of the fruits of enterprise
and risk-bearing. Finally, it distorted economic decision-making so as to slow growth and
create the very fiscal pressures that contributed to the problems of “stagflation” in the
first instance. The purported solution involved a radical reduction in taxes, a systematic
shrinking of government spending programs and, thus, federal agency budgets, and the
elimination of what were claimed to be costly regulatory measures. In this respect,
Reaganomics involved, among other things, the systematic dismantling of the Cold War
political economy of the United States. (Bernstein, 2004: 130)

While the Reagan administration cut taxes, especially the top income tax rate,
military spending skyrocketed due to “the largest peacetime increase of American armed
forces and weapons systems” (Bernstein, 2004: 131). Debt held by the public as a share
of GDP increased from 26.2 percent in 1980 to 41 percent by the end of the 1980s.217
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the official end of the cold war two years
later, the conservative right used the “victory” of the cold war to justify a renaissance of
laissez-faire ideology. The irony, which has already been mentioned yet is worth
repeating here, is that this triumphalism was “indifferent to the fact that it was a uniquely
nontraditional capitalist system that had made the nation so prosperous after World War
II” (Bernstein, 2004: 133). Democrats basically followed the Republicans’ lead and
reacted by emphasizing tax relief for the middle-class. Bernstein (2004: 134) explains,
“So dependent had Cold War liberalism been on sustained growth as a vehicle of
redistributive betterment and justice that the first signs of macroeconomic instability,
with its inevitable stroking of racial and class divisions in American society, robbed it of
its voice and authority.”
It is, then, perhaps misleading to characterize neoliberalism as a “class project,”
as David Harvey (2005) does, since the entrenchment of neoliberalism is a result of the
continued absence of a Left politics and of the failure of liberal Democrats during the
third quarter of the twentieth century to secure social welfare gains made in the decades
prior to the entrenchment of neoliberalism. Bernstein (2004) argues,
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In many respects, the collapse of the Cold War coalition that brought conservatives
determined to confront Soviet influence in the wider world together with liberals focused
on social needs at home was the direct result of the “success” of the Cold War itself.
Liberals themselves, ironically enough, contributed to this remarkable script of political
economic deconstruction. Eager to criticize the errors of American foreign policy in the
wake of the debacle of the Vietnam war, the left nonetheless neglected to explore, in a
thorough and rigorous fashion, the close economic and political connections between
military-industrial spending, anticommunist containment strategy, and social welfare
initiatives that had defined the “New Deal order” since the end of World War II. As a
result, the primary mechanisms of fiscal and monetary control that had fostered the
progressive social agendas of the Cold war era were ripe pickings for a conservative
insurgency determined to destroy the vestiges of the New Deal while remaining
committed to the anticommunist containment goals of the past. (Bernstein, 2004: 141142)

The contention that the postwar regime has become “sedimented”218 must be
understood as the increasing penetration of a regime of critique containment into the very
fabric of American social relations: As Bernsetin (2004: 129) notes, “The legacies of
Cold War triumphalism reveal themselves in almost every aspect of American social and
political life: in an uncritical celebration of major events in the history of the Cold War;
in a virtual amnesia that surrounds discussion of the great political purges of the 1950s
and 1960s, and a resultant acceptance of the quite narrow range of acceptable political
discussion that passes for debate in the present.” In other words, the revival of laissezfaire and anti-statist ideology during the 1980s does not represent a fundamental break
with the post-World War II regime insofar as this regime is also understood as inherently
connected to a regime of critique containment.
There are, of course, a number of differences between the first two decades of
post-World War II capitalist development and the entrenchment of neoliberalism
throughout the late 1970s and 1980s. For example, with the shift away from Keynesian
style economic policies to neoliberalism, technical systems of control became more
extensive (Marglin, 1990: 12). This change was exemplified by “financialization” during
the 1980s and facilitated by the shift toward monetary, supply side economics and “the
empowerment of finance capital vis-à-vis the nation state” (Harvey, 1989: 168).219 There
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are also a number of indicators that would seem to support the claim that the post-World
War II regime, as inherently connected to a regime of critique containment, has become
even more ingrained throughout the last quarter of the twentieth century and into the
beginning of the twenty-first century. For example, with the shift from manufacturing to
a service-based economy, the last vestiges of the American working class have been
successfully integrated “into the moral order of capitalist society” (Dahms, 2000: 16); the
so-called military-industrial-academic complex is today alive and well; the welfare state,
although its parameters are debated, continues to be refined, albeit in ways quite different
from those in the 1950s and 1960s; and, perhaps most important for the purposes of this
dissertation, the political legitimacy of the nation-state continues to depend upon
“economic growth,” which, as indicated in chapter three, necessitates exponentially
increasing levels of biophysical throughput.
Even with these traces of the regime of critique containment, most political and
economic sociologists agree that the early 1970s economic crisis does in fact mark a
period of qualitative transformation.220 Giovanni Arrighi (1994), for example, argues that
the post-1973 downturn is indicative of the decline of U.S. hegemony. Arrighi’s analysis,
which he lays out in his 1994 book, The Long Twentieth Century, is an attempt to grasp
both the international development of capitalism and the growth of the system of nationstates (Arrighi, 1994: xi). Combining Braudel’s understanding of capitalism with
Polyani’s critique of the self-regulating market, Arrighi (1994: 11 [original emphasis])
follows the Braudelian (Braudel, 1977: 64-65) notion that “Capitalism only triumphs
when it becomes identified with the state, when it is the state.”
On the basis of his understanding of finance capital and the state, Arrighi (1994)
engages a comparative analysis of systemic cycles of accumulation and hegemonic states:
Our analysis is essentially a comparative analysis of successive systemic cycles of
accumulation in an attempt to identify (1) patterns of recurrence and evolution, which are
reproduced in the current hase of financial expansion and of system restructuring; and (2)
the anomalies of this current phase of financial expansion, which may lead to a break
with past patterns of recurrence and evolution. Four systemic cycles of accumulation will
be identified, each characterized by a fundamental unity of the primary agency and
structure of world-scale processes of capital accumulation: a Genoese cycle, from the
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fifteenth to the early seventeenth centuries; a Dutch cycle, from the late sixteenth century
through most of the eighteenth century; a British cycle, from the latter half of the
eighteenth century through the early twentieth century; and a US cycle, which began in
the late nineteenth century and has continued into the current phase of financial
expansion. (Arrighi, 1994: 10)

Arrighi’s (1994: 214-215) “temporal profile” consists of “three distinct segments
or periods” that can be identified across each cycle of accumulation: (1) an initial period
of financial expansion that develops “a new regime of accumulation within the old,” (2)
“a period of consolidation and further development of the new regime of accumulation,”
(3) another period of financial expansion through which “the contradictions of the fully
developed regime of accumulation create the space for, and are deepened by, the
emergence of competing and alternative regimes, one of which will eventually become
dominant.”221 The upward trajectory of each hegemon occurs through the development of
production and the expansion of trade. This material expansion ultimately results in a
crisis of over-accumulation, which is resolved through “financial intermediation and
speculation” (Arrighi, 1994: 215). The shift from the period of material expansion to the
period of financialization is what Arrighi (1994) calls the signal crisis of the regime of
accumulation. The “signal crisis” is distinguished from what Arrighi (1994: 215) calls the
“terminal crisis” of the dominant regime of accumulation, which signifies the “final
supersession” of the long century and regime by a rising new hegemon.
Arrighi (1994) dates the era of U.S. hegemony from 1939 to its decline during the
crisis of the 1970s. Key to the decline of U.S. hegemony, according to Arrighi, is the
collapse of the “warfare-welfare state”222: 1) increased inter-capitalist competition and
the rise of raw materials prices; 2) the fiscal crisis of the U.S. state which eventually led
to 3) the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange; leading to and
combined with 4) the unpopular war in Vietnam (Arrighi, 2010: 28-29). However, as
Postone (2009: 96-101) argues, Arrighi’s (1994) account of the rise and fall of U.S.
hegemony does not quite fit within the framework of systemic cycles of accumulation
Arrighi himself puts forth.
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Because Arrighi’s (1994) analysis is the occasion and not the point of this
discussion,223 I would like to indicate that, echoing Postone (2009), Arrighi (1994) fails
to adequately theorize the category of capital and, as Postone (2009: 97) points out,
Arrighi conflates the historical dynamic of capitalism with the rise and fall of hegemons.
As a result, Arrighi “substitutes a description of a pattern for an analysis of what grounds
the dynamic, and does so in a way that also brackets consideration of the ongoing
structuring and restructuring of labor and, more generally, of social life in capitalism”
(Postone, 2009: 97). Arrighi’s (1994) explanation of the fall of U.S. hegemony is rooted
in his interpretation of Marx’s falling rate of profit thesis. According to Postone (2009:
98), Arrighi (1994) interprets the tendency for the rate of profit to fall within the confines
of political economy and therefore (mis)interprets Marx’s theory as political economy as
opposed to a critique of political economy. This misinterpretation puts forth an
explanation of surface-level processes effectively severed from a more fundamental
dynamics (Postone, 2009: 98). Here the reader should recall Lukács’s (1971 [1923]: 110)
critique of Tugan-Baranovsky (who was Kondratiev’s mentor) because Postone’s (2009)
critique of Arrighi (1994) (who draws heavily from Kondratiev) is nearly identical to it.
Taking my lead from Hobsawm’s (1994) writings on the latter half of the
twentieth century, I am less interested in explaining the economic boom during the 1950s
and (to a lesser extent) the 1960s than I am in understanding the “unprecedented social
consequences” of the expansion of the capitalist system after the Second World War.224
What is important for the purposes of this dissertation is the response to the ecologicallydestructive effects of the post-World War II period. I shall return to this issue below.
At this point I would like to claim that the rise of neoliberalism, as Postone (1999,
2009) suggests, may be seen as an historically-specific illustration of a dialectic of
transformation and reconstitution whereby 1) “surface level” processes (e.g. the
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economic collapse of “Fordism” and the rise of neoliberalism) undergo constant
transformation, which 2) reconstitutes the underlying structural preconditions for the
capitalist production of value. Postone (1993) explains that these two processes of
transformation and reconstitution interact with one another by way of a dynamic
dialectic. Moreover, the rate at which these processes of transformation and
reconstitution change actually accelerates.225 It is important to recognize that the rate at
which these changes occur is central to the pattern Marx identified with his notion of
capital as self-valorizing value, meaning the tendency toward accelerating rates of
increases in productivity exhibits a “treadmill” pattern (Postone, 1993).
Postone’s (1993) analysis of the dialectic of transformation and reconstitution is
thus significant for my purposes here because it is an attempt to offer an alternative
explanation of capital's historical dynamic—one that is able to account for non-linearity,
especially in light of post-WWII economic expansion and developments in recent
decades. On this basis, the postwar regime did not expire in the 1970s but instead has
become engrained as critique containment through a process of sedimentation. In this
sense, neoliberalism, far from representing a fundamental break from the post-World War
II, cold war regime, is a manifestation of the social acceleration of the effects of the
postwar regime of critique containment—a regime that today defines and continues to be
defined by American society and much of the industrialized West.
To say that critique containment, has exhibited a remarkable degree of staying
power in American society does not mean, however, that critique containment has
remained static or that social critique flourished during a time long gone. Taking a lead
from Postone’s (1993) reinterpretation of Marx’s category of capital as structuring a
dynamic and contradictory social totality, I contend that critique containment has been
transformed and reconstituted in and through the entrenchment of neoliberalism at the
same time that neoliberalism has been transformed and reconstituted in and through
critique containment. I also contend that these two processes of transformation and
reconstitution interact synchronically. From within the categorial framework of Marxian
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critical theory, we can elucidate the subjective dimension of this dialectical dynamic as
intrinsically interrelated to its objective dimension and therefore understand this
dialectical dynamic as a historically-specific process grounded in historically-determinate
processes of social mediation.
At a basic level I suggest that the interrelation between the subject-object
dimensions of this dialectical dynamic (thus conceived) could be illustrated in the
opposition between proponents of laissez-faire ideology, on the one hand, and advocates
of a so-called “new New Deal,” on the other. The expressed opposition between these
two positions is intrinsic to the reproduction of the present insofar as the present insulates
itself from critique. In this sense, the affirmation of either position (i.e. laissez-faire or
“new New Deal”) actually transforms and reconstitutes critique containment in time. We
can see that the present insulates itself from critique, at least in part, through this type of
binary thinking, which itself is, to a significant extent, a consequence of the cold war.
Theoretical sociology—insofar as theoretical sociology claims to scrutinize the present—
must be able to grasp another form of social necessity that is non-identical to the present
(as critique containment), namely, that which would be necessary for society were it not
for the necessity of this present (Postone, 1978).
The long period of stagflation226 that came to define a good portion of the latter
half of the twentieth century is a consequence of the success of the post-World War II
configuration of business-labor-government relations, which coalesced—as the
configuration became “sedimented”—as a regime of critique containment. The success of
the post-World War II configuration has also produced new threats that cannot
adequately be conceived in purely economic terms. The environment-society
problematic, whose most manifest expression today is the threat posed by societallyinduced global climate change accompanied by the growth of public concern over this
issue, is certainly one of the most pressing consequences of the continuation (and
acceleration of) an ecologically-destructive form of society. Although the detrimental
effects of the postwar regime are becoming increasingly visible, “solutions” to these
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problems continue to be put forth in terms of the post-World War II regime, which
implies that these “solutions” are themselves mediated by critique containment. At the
same time, the subjective dimension of the environment-society problematic—that is, the
growth of widespread environmental attention and concern during the latter half of the
twentieth century—expresses a (historically-specific) growing need that (implicitly)
points beyond the present as continually redefined. If this need is historically specific,
then we must ask why environmental attention and concern emerged when it did in the
late 1960s and early 1970s, at the time when the postwar period of stability was ending.
4. Cold War Origins of Contemporary Ecological Subjectivity
Following the Second World War, the scale and scope of technological
development—facilitated in and through cold war infrastructure, especially the full-scale
development of various military-industrial-academic complexes—expedited
unprecedented levels of resource extraction, productivity, and global capital flows. Total
energy consumption in the U.S. alone nearly tripled from 1950 to 1973. The rise of
contemporary environmentalism as a global phenomenon during the late 1960s and 1970s
was a response to the tremendous spike in environmental degradation effected in and
through the exacerbation of the contradiction between wealth and value, which, as
discussed in chapter three, necessitates accelerations in the rate at which productivity
increases and, therefore, leads to an acceleration of exponential increases in the quantity
of biophysical throughput. Although the socio-ecological effects of the “golden age”
were quite significant, public concern for the environment was not widely expressed until
after 1970.
Contemporary American environmentalism emerged after the postwar period of
stability amid a generational and ideological shift marked by the questioning of authority.
The deployment of the atom bomb brought to light for the first time on a massive public
scale the possibility of civilizational collapse. This new prospect was joined by writings
that contended that the American free enterprise system was based on a flawed
understanding that humans were somehow separate from the biophysical world. Authors
such as Osbborn, Vogt, Bookchin, and Commoner criticized American society’s
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misrecognition of the environmentally-destructive effects of industrial society (Opie,
1998: 405). It is certainly no coincident that this criticism was articulated at the time
when the material expansion of the postwar regime had developed to such an extent that
it became possible to question its necessity.
Following two decades of historically-unprecedented expansion of industrial
production, the rise of contemporary environmentalism clearly expresses the fact that the
industrial mode of social organization is not adequate to biophysical well-being. Yet the
rise of contemporary environmentalism did not correspond to a related shift in how
society was organized. In fact, the exact opposite happened as the growth of
environmentalism throughout the 1970s and 1980s corresponded with the advent and
continuation of neoliberalism.
The final portion of this chapter examines the environment-society problematic in
societal context. I am interested in the linkages between specific patterns of continuity
and change between the decades following the Second World War (the period of statecentric capitalism, from 1950-1973) and the last quarter of the twentieth century, on the
one hand, and the rise of contemporary environmentalism in American society, on the
other. The purpose of this investigation is to make better sense out of not only why
contemporary environmentalism’s response to the environmental destruction of the 19501973 period did not correspond with a more environmentally-oriented shift in social
structure but also why the exact opposite occurred. A better understanding of this
problematic is particularly relevant today as environmental destruction continues to
accelerate despite the widespread growth of environmental attention and concern.
Although the second half of the twentieth century represents a shift in the organization of
productive activity, the postwar configuration of business-labor-government relations has
in fact become even more ingrained in American society. Additionally, a specific cold
war regime of critique containment took hold within and through the postwar
configuration. On this basis, the following examination argues contemporary American
environmentalism emerged within and through the context of the postwar, cold war
regime of critique containment. One aim of the following investigation is to elucidate the
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conditions of possibility of a specifically contemporary social conception of nature,
which I shall unfold in and through an immanent critique of contemporary American
environmentalism’s misrecognition of its own socio-historical context. It is important to
be aware that this misrecognition is not the result of an inherent fallibility located within
American environmentalism itself. Rather, this misrecognition is the result of the
objective context within which contemporary American environmentalism emerged: this
socio-historical context is defined by an apparent decontextualization exemplified in and
through the postwar, cold war regime of critique containment.
Drawing on an early essay by Moishe Postone (1978), I will theoretically ground
the historical specificity of what I call “contemporary ecological subjectivity.”
Contemporary ecological subjectivity is in line with both Lukács’s (1923) and Postone’s
(1993) categorial approaches, which attempt to elucidate the intrinsic interrelationships
between social structure and subjectivity that is grounded in determinate processes of
social mediation. From within this framework, contemporary ecological subjectivity is
grounded in the socio-ecological tensions underlying the production of value, which
became increasingly exacerbated in and through the postwar, cold war regime of critique
containment during the latter half of the twentieth century.
4.1 Contemporary Ecological Subjectivity as an Instantiation of Class-Transcending
Consciousness
In his analysis of the immanent source of capitalism’s possible negation,227
Postone distinguishes between class-constituting consciousness, on the one hand, and
class-transcending consciousness, on the other hand. This distinction, as Postone
explains, is an historical distinction. Class-constituting consciousness is “capital
immanent”; it “calls into question the conditions of labor and of remuneration, but not the
227

Recall that for Postone, the negation of capital entails the negation of value, and hence, the abolition of
commodity-detemined labor based on the production of value. Postone explains that if “the course of
capitalism is analyzed as a qualitatively changing development leading to the possibility that capitaldetermined labor be abolished, then the development of class consciousness can also be analyzed
historically—as having a qualitatively changing content. Revolutionary class consciousness could then be
considered as the historical reversal of class-constituting consciousness, which has the latter as its
historical assumption. If class is in fact a category of alienation, then revolutionary class consciousness
could only mean the desire to abolish and transcend itself” (Postone, 1978: 781).
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fact of doing immediate productive labor itself” (Postone, 1978: 782). Marx’s discussion
of the struggle over the working day is an example of the expression of class-constituting
consciousness, as it is in and through this struggle that the workers affirm their
commodity-mediated labor. (In other words, struggles over the working day presuppose
and thereby affirm the fact of a working day).
Class-transcending consciousness, in contrast to class-constituting consciousness,
calls into question immediate productive labor itself. Class-transcending consciousness,
as a historically specific form of subjectivity, assumes that the development of the usevalue dimension has reached a point where it becomes possible to question the technical,
instrumental control of nature. As Postone (1978: 784) explains, “The thesis is that valuecreating labor can, on the mass level, be directly experienced as alienating (rather than
as underpaid or oppressive) only once that historical point is reached where such labor
has become socially anachronistic in terms of the potential accumulated in the objectified
use-value dimension and, nevertheless, is maintained—albeit not “consciously”—only
because of the necessity for capitalism that value-producing labor continue to exist.”
To say that the distinction between the development of class-constituting
consciousness and class-transcending consciousness is a historical distinction does not,
however, as Postone explains, imply a linear trajectory between the two whereby “classconstituting consciousness is linearly superseded by class-transcending consciousness”
(Postone, 1978: 782). As Postone (1978) explains,
[C]rises in capitalism, by dramatically reestablishing the ‘necessary’ connection of labor
as presently defined and material reproduction, have the tendency to roll back elements of
class-transcending consciousness and to reinforce elements of class-constituting
consciousness—even if in militant form. The development is anything but linear.
(Postone, 1978: 782)

By focusing on the “contents of needs and consciousness” (Postone, 1978: 783)—
for example, struggles over the working day versus struggles against the harmful effects
of pesticides—Postone futher distinguishes between the “historical possibility” of
socialism and the “probability of revolution” and suggests that the distinction between
the two can be conceptualized as occupying different axes of historical time (Postone,
1978: 783). Within this framework, the problem of the possibility of socialism is clarified
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horizontally, as it were, “as the historical changing content, independent of degree of
militance” (Postone, 1978: 783). The problem of the probability of revolution, on the
other hand, is clarified vertically, “moving from an abstract analysis of the metahistory of
the social formation to a consideration of more immediate, concrete, and contingent
factors” (Postone, 1978: 783).
As discussed in chapter three above, Postone reconceptualizes the contradiction
between the forces of production and the relations of production as a contradiction
“between the actuality of the form of production constituted by value, and its potential”
(Postone, 1993: 28). Applied to the relationship between objective social structure,
contemporary ecological subjectivity as an instantiation of class-transcending
consciousness can be conceptualized as an attempt to mediate “social objectivity in which
a certain structure of labor has become anachronistic (…) even when this experience is
not politically articulated” (Postone, 1978: 784). Indeed, the attempt to relate the actual
recognition of contemporary ecological subjectivity in its relation to “historically
emergent contradictions of the social totality” (Postone, 1978: 785) is not direct.
Although the early environmentalist criticism was articulated at the time when the
material expansion of the postwar regime had developed to such an extent that it became
possible to question its necessity, the rise of contemporary environmentalism (as an
expression of contemporary ecological subjectivity) did not correspond to a related shift
in how society was organized. In fact, the exact opposite happened as the growth of
environmentalism throughout the 1970s and 1980s corresponded with the advent and
continuation of neoliberalism. Contemporary ecological subjectivity as an instantiation of
class-transcending consciousness is grounded in the socio-ecological tensions underlying
the production of value, which became increasingly exacerbated in and through the
postwar, cold war regime of critique containment during the latter half of the twentieth
century. Following Postone’s (1978: 781) contention that class-transcending
consciousness is a category of alienation, contemporary ecological subjectivity must be
understood in terms of alienation as well. Regarding the possibility of recognizing
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contemporary ecological subjectivity in its mediatedness, Postone (1978: 781) explains
that this implies “the desire to abolish and transcend itself” as a category of alienation.
Drawing on Postone’s distinction between class-constituting consciousness and
class-transcending consciousness, the category of contemporary ecological subjectivity as
an instantiation of class-transcending consciousness is significant because it allows us to
situate the emergence and growth of contemporary environmentalism as a global
phenomenon in relation to large scale structural transformations. In order to further this
understanding, I propose the following distinctions, which help us specify the widespread
growth of ecological consciousness at both the global and societal levels: 1)
contemporary ecological subjectivity as an instantiation of class-transcending
consciousness; 2) contemporary environmentalism as an expression of contemporary
ecological subjectivity; and 3) contemporary American environmentalism as a particular
societal manifestation of contemporary environmentalism. Table 5 below depicts
contemporary ecological subjectivity, contemporary environmentalism, and
contemporary American environmentalism in reference to their mode of existence and
level of analysis.

Table 5. Contemporary Ecological Subjectivity
Contemporary
Ecological
Subjectivity

Contemporary
Environmentalism

Contemporary
American
Environmentalism

Mode of
existence

Instantiation of class- Expresses
transcending
contemporary
consciousness
ecological subjectivity

Particular societal
manifestation of
contemporary
environmentalism

Level of
analysis

Global

Societal

Global
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Understood categorially, contemporary ecological subjectivity is a category that
delineates the contours of specific social mediations between social structure and
subjectivity. On this basis, contemporary environmentalism as a global phenomenon and
as an expression of contemporary ecological subjectivity allows us to further specify the
social mediations between social structure and subjectivity. Finally, we must specify
further still the particular manifestations of contemporary environmentalism, which will
be different within different sociohistorical contexts (e.g. contemporary American
environmentalism vs. contemporary French or German environmentalism, etc.). The
distinction between contemporary ecological subjectivity (as an instantiation of classtranscending consciousness); contemporary environmentalism, which as a global
phenomenon is an expression of contemporary ecological subjectivity; and particular
societal manifestations of contemporary environmentalism (e.g. contemporary American
environmentalism) can also be thought of in terms of levels of analysis: contemporary
ecological subjectivity circumscribes the more abstract, whereas particular societal
manifestations of contemporary environmentalism pinpoints the more concrete
manifestations of the abstract.228
By considering contemporary ecological subjectivity as an instantiation of classtranscending consciousness we are able to make better sense out of the paradoxical nature
of the environment-society problematic. For precisely when it became possible to
question socio-ecological destruction of the capitalist work regime during the 1970s, the
necessity of this regime reasserted itself: as unemployment rates skyrocketed, “work”
became a matter of increasing social necessity. At the (global) level of contemporary
ecological subjectivity, productivity expanded rapidly following the end of the Second
World War—a development which, in many ways, would continue to accelerate
throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. Contemporary environmentalism as an
expression of contemporary ecological subjectivity is reflected in some of the early
228

However, when thought of in these terms, one must bear in mind that contemporary ecological
subjectivity is a categorial category referring to both the subject-object dimensions, which must be
understood in terms of mediation.
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environmentalist critiques of the domination of nature by technology and industrial
society more generally. Because the conditions of possibility which allow us to
circumscribe something like contemporary ecological subjectivity emerged within and
through an accelerating international arena of socio-ecological relations and exchange, it
is no coincidence that the development of contemporary environmentalism as a global
phenomenon around the late 1960s and early 1970 corresponds with these larger
structural transformations.
These distinctions (contemporary ecological subjectivity, contemporary
environmentalism, and contemporary American environmentalism) inform my discussion
below, which focuses directly on contemporary American environmentalism. More
specifically, I focus on the linkage between cold war science and technology, on the one
hand, and a specifically contemporary social conception of nature, on the other. In order
to elucidate the significance of this linkage, my discussion aims to ground and elaborate
the following three propositions: 1) cold war science and technology are mediated by a
regime of critique containment; 2) cold war science and technology were crucial in the
production of a contemporary social conception of nature, which today remains central to
contemporary environmentalism; 3) contemporary American environmentalism as
mediated by critique containment does not recognize itself as such and therefore
misrecognizes its own sociohistorical context, including the immanent possibility of
moving beyond the environmental destruction that characterizes this context.
4.2 Contemporary American Environmentalism
Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, the post-World War II form of
“economic growth” increasingly outstripped the organizational ability of the nation-state
to control its environmental and social effects, which therefore necessitated the need for
more effective ecological management and control (Luke, 1997). This dynamic is
illustrated by the tremendous growth of technologies produced by and for the American
military-industrial-academic complex, many of which would later play a significant role
in climatology, earth science, and ecology. Without this knowledge production, it is
unlikely that awareness of global climate change, for example, would have occurred as
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rapidly as it did (Edwards, 2010, 2006). The cold war infrastructural boost in scientific
knowledge concerning biophysical nature (as mediated through the military-industrialacademic complex’s role in actively perpetuating a techno-scientific permanent war
economy) was instrumental in the production and development of contemporary
American environmentalism in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The contemporary earth
sciences, for example, are a product of military patronage during the first decades of the
cold war.229
McNeill and Unger (2010) explain,
The fear of communism and its inherent threat to individual liberty, economic prosperity,
and political freedom defined Western views of the environment to a large degree. The
effort to stabilize one’s individual and national standing vis-à-vis an apparently
totalitarian enemy resulted in the attempt to exercise as much control as possible over all
aspects of life – including the wild, unpredictable environment. This kind of applied fear
management clearly depended on science’s ability to understand the ways the
environment worked, and once scientists had made this knowledge available, it seemed
possible to influence even the behavior of the environment. (McNeill and Unger, 2010:
16)

Although politically- and ideologically-active environmentalists and scientists
alike attacked this technocratic view in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the very success
of environmentalism was actually facilitated by the cold war (McNeill and Unger, 2010:
17). In this sense the postwar, cold war regime produced a specifically contemporary
social conception of nature characterized by the need and desire to move beyond the
environmental destruction occurring from the 1950s to the 1970s while simultaneously
remaining bound intrinsically to this social structure.
The development of the contemporary American environmental movement is
complex and multifaceted. Although the growing debate over nuclear fallout during the
1960s (Divine, 1978), the growth of so-called “new social movements” (such as the civil
rights and antiwar movements) (Coontz, 1992), and the actual post-World War II
expansion of production and consumption (McNeill, 2000; Schnaiberg, 1980; Schnaiberg
and Gould, 2000) are important factors to consider, I will focus my analysis on the
229

The earth sciences and the biological sciences are the two scientific disciplinary forerunners of
contemporary American environmentalism (Doel, 2003). Doel (2003: 636) uses the term military patronage
to refer to “the assimilation of science into the highest levels of national security and foreign policy
planning.”
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contemporary social conception of nature produced by the rapid expansion of cold war
science and technology, whose direction was determined by the the military-industrialacademic complex mediated in and through the cold war regime of critique containment.
In other words, the social conception of nature crucial to contemporary American
environmentalism is an indirect product of the cold war regime of critique containment.
Due to the detailed and multifaceted nature of the connections between critique
containment, science, and the contemporary social conception of nature within the
postwar context, my discussion is limited to a brief sketch of the contemporary notion of
“limits” to growth and the related concept of “sustainability.” The purpose of this
discussion is to illustrate the linkage between cold war science and technology and a
contemporary social conception of nature, on the one hand, and contemporary American
environmentalism, on the other, as both were mediated by the postwar, cold war regime
of critique containment.
Aside from its initial expression with the founding of Earth Day,230 contemporary
American environmentalist discourse in the early 1970s took its lead from the Club of
230

When considering the significance of the first Earth Day in 1970, it is important to note the relationship
between the so-called “New Left” and environmentalism during the 1960s when the Left became
increasingly involved in environmental issues. Like the “old” social movements of the past, the
contemporary environmental movement is divided internally between so-called “radical” and “mainstream”
adherents. Today, for example, environmental politics remain situated in an uneasy relation to the Marxian
Left. On the one hand, the rise of the environmental movement in the 1980s, particularly in Europe, marked
the sharp migration of people drawn to Marxism in the 1970s to Green politics. On the other hand, a
common theme of environmentalism is to impose limits to growth; this theme is sometimes expressed in
conservative sentiments against things that the Marxian left historically took to be signals of progress, such
as technology, urbanization, and cosmopolitanism. The radical/mainstream division has characterized the
contemporary environmental movement since its inception. This division can be seen in the development of
the anti-nuclear movement in the United States, which (as mentioned above) is one of the most immediate
precursors of the contemporary American environmental movement. Gottlieb (2005 [1994]: 135), in his
history of the American environmental movement, initially presents a relatively optimistic view of the antinuclear movement: “By focusing on environmental impacts and dismissing the incessant ideological
messages of the Cold War, the protesters raised the possibility of a new politics that opposed both sides of
the Cold War equally for their nuclear testing.” Yet Gottlieb (2005 [1994]) also argues that the signing of
the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty indicated the anti-nuclear movement posed a serious threat to the
established order (i.e. the postwar regime) and had to be contained. In fact, most scholars agree that
contemporary American environmentalism had become more or less institutionalized by the late 1960s,
citing the first Earth Day in 1970 and the subsequent proliferation, institutionalization, and fragmentation
of environmental organizations as evidence (Brulle, 2000). According to Gottlieb’s (2005 [1994]) account,
the first Earth Day in 1970 represented a transition away from the tumultuous and destructive New Left
activist actions of the 1960s. As Gottlieb (2005 [1994]: 158) puts it, “With the banners folded up, the street
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Rome’s (1972) Limits to Growth and defined itself around limits and survival (Dryzek et
al., 2003). In doing so, American environmentalism, according to Dryzek et al. (2003:
58), challenged the state’s “core economic imperative.” American environmentalism was
initially incorporated into the state during the early 1970s (with, for example, the creation
of the EPA in 1970) because in the context of continuing civil rights issues and protests
against the Vietnam War environmentalism “appeared to be the least radical and
threatening aspect of the counter-culture” (Dryzek et al., 2003: 59).
Both the discourse of “limits” and the related concept of sustainability are
products of the postwar, cold war regime of critique containment. Taken together, these
two cold war products play a significant role in the development of a specifically
contemporary social conception of nature that, in turn, facilitated the emergence of
contemporary American environmentalism as a societal manifestation of contemporary
environmentalism, which as a global phenomenon, is an expression of contemporary
ecological subjectivity as an instantiation of class-transcending consciousness. The
complexity of the linkages between cold war science and technology, contemporary
environmentalism, and contemporary American environmentalism cannot be understood
within a uni-linear-causal framework that identifies a point from which social action
begins.231

barricades taken down, and the activists dispersed, the legacy of Earth Day remained to be found in the
continuing debates over what kind of environmental change was desired, how differing groups would seek
to shape a movement, and how such a movement would define itself in relation to the contemporary urban
and industrial order.” One of the key organizers and proponents of the first Earth Day in 1970 was
Wisconsin senator Gaylord Nelson, who wanted to stress the increasing importance of the environmental
agenda while at the same time to distance it from radical New Left countercultural activists (Gottlieb, 2005
[1994]: 148-149). “Radical” New Left environmentalists saw the event as a betrayal. President Richard
Nixon saw the event in terms of potential voters and shortly thereafter proclaimed the environment a key
issue, glorifying the new environmentalism as noble cause to be supported (Gottlieb, 2005 [1994]: 152).
Nixon wanted to link his presidency and administration to the environmental cause and advocated the
importance of searching for technology-based solutions to environmental problems (Gottlieb, 2005 [1994]:
152). At the same time, the business community began to embrace environmentalism over fear of possible
environmental legislation (Gottlieb, 2005 [1994]: 153). Companies in the early 1970s began to associate
themselves with environmentally-friendly pollution control technologies, and a number of large-scale
corporations gave financial contributions to help organize Earth Day.
231
Moreover, the linkages between cold war science and technology, contemporary environmentalism, and
contemporary American environmentalism involve an array of mediations, which compound one another.
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Neither the idea of “limits” to growth nor the related notion of sustainability (the
two hallmarks of contemporary environmentalism) would have been possible without
satellite photography and systems analysis—two quintessential cold war inventions.
Satellite photography brought the finitude of the spherical earth into view from space for
the first time in 1972.232 The Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth—also published in
1972— was the first study based on systems analysis and simulation modeling to acquire
the attention of a large number of the general populous (Edwards, 2010: 366). Limits,
which went on to sell over four million copies worldwide, became the document around
which the contemporary environmentalist discourse of limits and survival would form.
When taken together the image of earth from space and the idea of ecological limits are
central to the contemporary concept of sustainability, which gained widespread notoriety
only in the 1980s with the publication of the Brundtland Report in 1987.
Both satellite photography and systems analysis have a common cold war origin
at the RAND Corporation. The Air Force was the first to come up with systems analysis
studies as a way to prepare contract bids (Amadae, 2003: 41). Systems analysis soon
became a mainstay at the RAND Corporation, where it was promoted and utilized as “a
comprehensive and rigorous science of war” (Amadae, 2003: 43). America’s strategy of
containment and the so-called “missile gap” between the Soviet Union and the United
States are two examples based on prescriptions derived from systems analysis (Amadae,
2003).
My contention that both the idea of “limits” to growth and the related notion of
sustainability should be understood as products of the cold war regime of critique
containment does not imply that these technologies are somehow “bad” in and of
themselves. I want to emphasize that there is no doubt that without systems analysis and
computer simulations our knowledge about global climate change would be impossible
(see Edwards, 2010). However, the social mediatedness of such knowledge production
(e.g., the ideological context within which this knowledge is produced) raises the issue of
232

On computers and the cold war, see Edwards (1996). On satellites and the communications revolutions,
the “spin off” benefits of military-initiated technology in the private section, and the creation of the socalled “information society,” see Reynolds, 2010.
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the relationship between the centrality of science in identifying global environmental
problems and the socioeconomic, political, and ideational context within which such
problems are produced and reproduced. Although today’s worldwide ecological crises
(and the relation between people and biophysical nature more generally) are a
consequence of social relations, the importance of science in shaping actual
environmental problems, including our knowledge and discourse about these problems,
makes it seem as if the issue (and therefore the “solutions”) are simply technical rather
than social. Within a socio-historical context defined by the ever-increasing
objectification of nature via instruments of control, management is the raison d'être of
nature. The affinity with the strategic manageability of nuclear attack and mass panic via
civil defense measures,233 which brought home for the first time on a massive public
scale the “semblance”234 of the possibility of civilizational collapse, on the one hand, and
cold war public policy decision technologies (Amadae, 2003), on the other hand, is
difficult to exaggerate. Within this socio-historical context, “nature” is posited as an
external object that can be quantified, manipulated, and controlled.235
4.2.1 “Limits”, Degrowth, and Sustainability
That contemporary environmentalism, in both its mainstream and “radical” forms,
misrecognizes its own socio-historical context cannot and should not be explained with
reference to some inherent fallibility within contemporary environmentalism itself. This
misrecognition must be placed within socio-historical context. Insofar as contemporary
American environmentalism (in particular) is a product of the postwar, cold war regime
of critique containment, this socio-historical context is also one of apparent
decontextualization. This decontextualization implies that the notions of “limits” to
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See Oakes, 1994; Orr, 2006.
I use the term “semblance” here in the sense discussed above in connection with Adorno: that is,
socially necessary semblance is both artifice and real. For a discussion of the dynamic logic between these
two points of semblance, see Dahms (forthcoming).
235
It appears that efforts to assert control over the natural environment have given rise to new ecological
problems on a scale never before seen, thereby necessitating more control; hence, a dialectic of control
appears to be at work.
234
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growth and sustainability as well as recent discussions of “degrowth”236—so central to
contemporary environmentalism—do not, in and of themselves, constitute an opposition
to runaway growth.
The discourse of “limits”237 and recent discussions of “degrowth” serve as
indicators of the extent to which environmental thought misrecognizes its own sociohistorical context (i.e. its conditions of possibility). On the basis of the critique of SBPh
developed in this dissertation, the antagonism between runaway growth and “degrowth”
as a condition for ecological sustainability is itself relative to a historically-specific form
of social life dominated by capital and the commodity form of social relations. Efforts to
move toward ecological sustainability via “degrowth” that fail to recognize the
opposition between growth and degrowth as relative to the commodity form also fail to
recognize how this reification is integral to the transformation and reconstitution of
capital in and through space-time.
4.2.2 “Invisible” Ideology in Contemporary American Environmentalism
Although today’s environmentalist discourse is concerned with an essentially
ecological, interconnected view of the relationship between humans and the environment,
contemporary American environmentalism was initially concerned with the local
(Jasanoff, 2001). Rachel Carson’s (1962) Silent Spring, often cited as marking the
beginnings of contemporary American environmentalism, sparked scientific research into
the hazards of pesticide use, fueled public concern for the environment, and helped make
the issue of environmental degradation an issue concerning the quality of one’s life
(Gottlieb, 2005 [1994). Not coincidentally, community health also emerged in the 1960s
as a new topic for inquiry and action, as “experts in occupational health were drawn upon
for scientific and professional advice” (Hays, 2000: 30).
236

See e.g. Kallis, 2011; Martinez-Alier et al., 2010. “Degrowth” is different from “decoupling” economic
growth from environmental impacts. On “decoupling,” see Naess and Hoyer (2009).
237
According to Dobson (2000: 62-63), we can identify three elements of the limits to growth thesis that
have become crucial for what he calls “the radical green position”: 1) technological solutions will not in
themselves bring about a sustainable society; 2) “the rapid rates of growth aimed for (and often achieved)
by industrialized and industrializing societies have an exponential character, which means that dangers
stored up over a relatively long period of time can very suddenly have a catastrophic effect”; and 3) “the
interaction of problems caused by growth means that such problems cannot be dealt with in isolation – i.e.
solving one problem does not solve the rest, and may even exacerbate them.”
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The environmental issues Americans mobilized, at least initially, were related to
their immediate surroundings. According to Jasonoff (2000: 324), “These local events
added up to a problem of concededly national proportions.” The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) was created soon thereafter under President Nixon. Even the
“not in my backyard” movement (or NIMBY), ushered in by discovery of Love Canal in
1978 and seen as a hallmark of the environmental justice movement, has deep roots in the
ideational context of American society, particularly in the intense evaluative weight given
to private property. Related to this particularly American concern for private property is
the fact that valuation of public concern (i.e. the “publicity” of a given environmental
issue) is much more important in the American societal context (Thevenot, Moody, and
Lafaye, 2000: 253-54).
Like many other “new” social movements, contemporary American
environmentalism, as it developed in the 1960s, sought to address what it perceived as
quality of life issues.238 According to Lanthier and Olivier (1999: 67-68),
environmentalist discourse emerged from a critique of positivism, which had reached its
apex by the first half of the twentieth century. At the same time the politicization of
science, which had been incited during the Second World War and quickly receded
thereafter, was reignited in the 1970s (Hobsbawm, 1994: 250-257). The political and
ideological resuscitation of the natural sciences during this time was one of the “natural
consequences of the secular economic superboom” (Hobsbawm, 1994: 552). The socalled “greenhouse effect,” for example, only started to be seriously discussed in 1970
(Hobsbawm, 1994: 551).
The political question science found it could not side-step asked about the relation
between research and “the social consequences of the technologies it now, and almost
immediately, generated” (Hobsbawm, 1994: 555). The issue, as Hobsbawm (1994: 556)
indicates, is who sets the limits and directions of scientific research. According to
Hobsbawm (1994), the aforementioned question pertains to the political economy of
238

Within the sociological literature, the ideal type new social movement is largely cultural in character,
loose in organizational structure, and oriented toward life-style rather than conventional political issues
(Scott, 1990: 14).
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scientific research because scientific research is not unlimited and free and because
research is conducted in and through social institutions. While these concerns are valid,
the question of who sets the limits and directions of scientific research must be placed
within the context of alienated social relations as they structure and are structured by the
logic of capital.
4.2.3 American Environmental Politics
According to Opie (1998: 405-406) two crucial ingredients were required for the
emergence of a contemporary environmental perspective in the USA: 1) scientific
ecology and 2) the idea that government must intervene as environmental regulator
“because the private sector failed to correct abuses and provide answers.” The idea that
government must intervene as environmental regulator is itself a product of the postwar,
cold war regime of critique containment and is expressive of the “invisible” ideology I
discussed previously.
As with other Western industrialized nation-states, the political legitimacy of the
United States is contingent upon constant economic growth, which (as indicated in
chapter three) tends toward the acceleration of increases in levels of productivity and
therefore necessitates virtually exponentially increasing levels of biophysical throughput.
In American society, the state can maintain its core growth imperative while ceding to
environmental demands in the policy arena because, while there is likely to be much
debate from opposing viewpoints, the growth imperative is not necessarily incompatible
with, and may even be facilitated through, environmental policy.
The United States is perhaps the best example of what Dryzek et al. (2003) refer
to as a “passively inclusive” state. As the authors explain,
A passively inclusive state accepts and accommodates whatever constellation of interests,
groups, and movements that social forces generate. Acceptance can take the form of
lobbyists on behalf of interest groups walking the corridors of the legislature, a social
movement forming a political party to contest elections, representation of a movement’s
activists in the organizational structure of an established political party, or responsiveness
of a legal system to actions on behalf of a group’s interest (for example, by providing a
class action option). (Dryzek et al., 2003: 7)

While it is certainly the case that the United States may be classified as “passively
inclusive,” the critical theoretical framework put forth in this dissertation requires that we
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rethink what constitutes “successful” environmental politics. There is an overwhelming
tendency in capitalist democracies to determine the success or failure of
environmentalism on the basis of whether or not the movement “can penetrate the state’s
core” and achieve “entry into the state” (Dryzek et al., 2003: 2). Indeed, this assumption
is reflected in the contemporary social movement’s literature. Critical reflection on this
issue is not meant to downplay the role of the state in relation to contemporary
environmental issues and problems, to be sure. While the failure of the political system to
adequately deal with environmental problems is particularly acute in the American
context, this failure does not negate the fact that the nation-state is likely to be the
necessary means through which environmental action can be taken even though today’s
environmental problems are global in scope. In order to do justice to the intricacies of the
environment-society problematic today, analyses of environmental politics must
recognize both the possibilities of contemporary ecological subjectivity and the
repression of these possibilities within a regime of critique containment while at the same
time acknowledging that a society’s ability to confront today’s worldwide ecological
crises will differ from one society to another.
Claudia Jauß’s (2001) analysis of the American Clean Air Act illustrates the
exceptional character of environmental politics in the United States quite well. Jauß
(2001) explains that a particularly American dilemma results when attempts at
environmental regulation come into contact with American political culture:
The dilemma has its roots in an understanding of democracy that considers the
participation of individual citizens in political decisions to be ideal. According to this
idea, every member of the political unit should be able to introduce his or her position
and interests into the political process. The individual citizen is the final and decisive
authority; his or her will is essential in reaching collectively binding decisions. (Jauß,
2001: 129)

Although not every individual has the necessary resources to participate in the
decision-making process, the practical consequence of the aforementioned dilemma is
that the “legitimacy of the decision making processes is opposed to their efficiency”
(Jauß, 2001: 129). Stated hyperbolically, environmental regulation in the U.S. is
“functionally dysfunction.” For example, the said aim of the Clean Air Act is to improve
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air quality nationwide “with the help of ambient air quality standards that primarily aim
to protect human health and secondarily to protect the environment and other goods”
(Jauß, 2001: 130). This goal is to be pursued at individual emission sources only, and it is
typically approached by installing specific technologies at each particular source (Jauß,
2001: 130). Although this goal is in clear, direct conflict with the primary goal of
economic growth, “solutions” to this conflict, as Jauß (2001) notes, are implemented via
economic incentives. When compared to the regulations found in European industrialized
nations, the United States relies on market incentives to a far greater extent (Jauß, 2001:
130).
While new and imaginative ways of thinking about the “environmental state” are
indeed needed, we must not lose track of the fact that the separation of “the political”
from the social, economic, and cultural is in fact ideology.239 My discussion of the cold
war regime of critique containment as developing in and through the postwar
configuration, on the one hand, and the mediation of an infrastructure of perpetual war
and an “invisible” ideology conducive to the rationalization of capitalist democracy, on
the other, highlights the increasingly porous nature of such distinctions. With this in
mind, we must not lose sight of the fact that social democracy, and the so-called
“environmental state” in particular, refers to attempts to ameliorate environmental
destruction “within the framework of the necessity imposed structurally by capital”
(Postone, 1993: 95 [emphasis added]).
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Much of the current literature on the so-called “environmental state” overemphasizes the normative
dimension of “the political” and, as a result, fails to recognize how this dimension also is enacted by way of
effacing the concrete socio-ecological suffering currently preventing the actuality of ideals such as
“sustainability” (see e.g. Eckersley, 2004; Ekersley and Dobson, 2006). For a promising corrective, see
Chari’s (2008) political critique of reification.
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CHAPTER 5: ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY, SOCIOBIOPHYSICALITY,
AND CRITIQUE
This chapter discusses the dissertation’s contribution and elaborates the
implications of the previous two chapters. The project’s theoretical and empirical
implications are discussed as well. I conclude by indicating some areas for future
research.
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1. Sociobiophysicality and Critical Theory
The central theoretical contribution of the dissertation is the development of the
critical concept of “sociobiophysicality” (SBPh), which was advanced in chapter three
against the background of my exegesis of Lukács’s critique of reification, Adorno’s
critique of identity thinking; andPostone’s critique of traditional Marxism. It was
suggested that in light of the fact that Lukács (1885-1971), Adorno (1903-1969), and
Postone (1942- ) each wrote successively we might view the core critiques these theorists
engaged as attempts to “name” crucial aspects of the nature-society relationship at
different successive stages of the development of modern capitalist society. The
contribution of SBPh should be viewed in terms of an attempt to further this type of
critical theoretical research by moving toward a critical theory of the environment. As
such, SBPh is an attempt to “name” crucial aspects of the nature-society relationship, and
the critique of modernist SBPh is an attempt to “name” the elusively dynamic nature of
the environment-society problematic in particular. In this sense, SBPh is less a category
or concept to be applied than it is an attempt to “name” an inherently dynamic process
intrinsic to its “object” of study—an historical experience whose contradictions and
tensions are entwined with those of the thought attempting to comprehend it.
Relatedly, SBPh is rooted in alienation and reification, which, constituted by the
capitalist mode of production, are understood as key mediating processes between the
subject-object dimensions of the environment-society problematic. This theoretical
understanding of mediation—an insight developed by Marx and furthered by Lukács,
Adorno, and Postone, albeit in different ways, is also a theory of praxis. Because
mediation effects theory as well, the conceptualization of mediation must be adequately
contextualized to include an immanent and reflexive critique of its involvement in the
process whereby alienation240 and reification (qua alienation as “second nature”)241
simultaneously rewrite reality so as to inhibit these very same humans from
“consciously” recognizing that this is indeed the case. Understood dialectically, this
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On alienation as self-generated domination, see Postone (1993: 30-33, 68, 126, 158-159).
On alienation as “second nature”, see Dahms (2011).
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implies that people are both producer and product of alienated socio-ecological relations
of domination. The concept of SBPh combines Lukács’s focus on the subjective
dimensions of the commodity with Postone’s categorial appropriation of Marx’s
categories. This allows us to capture both objective socio-“structural” drivers of humanecological transformation as synchronous with the historical development of the
commodity form of social relations. Gleaning insight from Adorno, SBPh underscores
the reciprocal need of both the subjective and objective dimensions of the environmentsociety problematic while emphasizing the disproportionate priority of the objective
dimension, which, under existing social conditions, operates in and through individuals as
isolated particulars via the unfolding of “the inner composition of elements of nature and
elements of history within history itself” (Adorno, 2006 [1964/65]: 116). Such an
approach therefore illuminates the constellation of social forces which make up a form of
abstract (sociobiophysical) domination that effectively operates in and through actual
social and ecological destruction while recognizing these processes as non-identical to,
yet simultaneously shaping the possibilities of subjective experience.
Drawing on Postone’s critique of the double character of commodity-determined
labor, the concept of SBPh allows for a dynamic reconceptualization of reification in
terms of the sociobiophysical tensions underlying the production of value; i.e., the
necessary social-ecological destruction underlying value as the continual necessity of the
present, where the continual necessity of the present is recognized as immanently
dynamic. That is to say, capital, as self-valorizing value, tends toward accelerating rates
of increases in productivity, which in turn necessitates virtually exponential levels of
biophysical “throughput,” thereby effecting quantitative increases in “material wealth”
output, even though the resultant increases in value are effected only indirectly. The
increasingly anachronistic character of value as a measure of material wealth indicates
that the necessity of the present (i.e. value) points beyond itself. At the same time, value
remains a structural precondition of the capitalist mode of production. Value, as the
social necessity of the present, is the historically determinate nature of modernist
sociobiophysicality. In this sense, the necessity of virtually exponential levels of
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biophysical throughout—the form so-called “economic growth” must take—is a form of
social necessity within and through which sociobiophysicality is to the extent that both
the social and the biophysical are material bearers of objectified time (see Postone, 1993).
In other words, the ontology of the material realm—a realm so defended by
environmental “realists” emphatically is the ontology of the social mediation of time,
labor, and social domination, or, to use Adorno’s words, “the ontology of the wrong state
of things” (Adorno, 1973 [1966]: 11). On this basis, the concept of SBPh redirects our
attention to the “social mediatedness” of materiality, which, as stated above, is rooted in
an understanding of the reciprocal dynamism of the subject-object dimensions of the
environment-society problematic whereby the (heteronomous) objective dimension takes
priority insofar as this heteronomy always already is under existing social conditions.
SBPh makes recognition of this priority explicit because without such explicit
recognition, research efforts are unfortunately at the inherent risk of becoming
ideology.242 Research rooted in an understanding of SBPh, on the other hand, scrutinizes
the present via critique of such heteronomy, which is in line with critical theory’s attempt
to explode the analytic/political boundary. Critique of (modernist) SBPh is
simultaneously analytic, normative, and political.
Within environmental sociology, there is no critical theory of the environment and
I view my dissertation as a step toward remedying this deficit. SBPh is a needed effort in
this regard because it allows for a critical, dynamic, and reflexive account of the
entwinement of interhuman domination and the domination of the biophysical
environment. For example, critique of modernist SBPh draws our attention to the
socioecological tensions underlying reification and the production of value, and in this
way, provides a critical, dynamic, and reflexive account of so-called “economic growth”
in terms of the inextricable connection between the intensifying domination of people by
time, on the one hand, and the necessity of accelerating rates of environmental
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This is because, insofar as the priority of the objective dimension is always already defined as
heteronomous, failure to recognize this priority as such, and/or failure to make such recognition an explicit
and integral part of the activity of social research, de facto risks becoming a reflection of the present in
reified, alienated form.
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destruction, on the other. In other words, SBPh allows us to understand, theoretically, the
history of the present in which both people and biophysical nature, as constituted by the
capitalist mode of production, are increasingly rendered material bearers of objectified
time at an accelerating rate. SBPh is significant in this regard because it provides an
analytically vexing account of 1) the objective drivers of environmental destruction; 2)
why this destruction increases exponentially; and 3) how such destruction is intrinsically
related to subjectivity. SBPh therefore provides an account of the interrelationship
between the subject-object dimensions of the environment-society problematic in terms
of a theoretical understanding of mediation that is also a theory of praxis. Although this
theoretical understanding of mediation has its roots in Marx, the attempt to further such
an understanding via SBPh represents a significant contribution to both sociology and
environmental sociology, in part because it provides a much more adequate and
theoretically rigorous account of what is today typically subsumed under the framework
of “structure” and “agency.”
2. Critique Containment and Contemporary Ecological Subjectivity
Although still theoretically informed, the more empirical contribution of the
dissertation revolves around critique containment, cold war, and contemporary ecological
subjectivity. I view my analysis of the cold war regime of critique containment and
contemporary ecological subjectivity as a critical intervention into the growing
environmental discourse—one which provides a theoretical and empirical explanation for
why contemporary environmentalism and contemporary American environmentalism in
particular fails to engender the types of changes expressed by its needs and desires to
move beyond the environmental destruction that characterizes its own sociohistorical
context.
2.1 Cold War and the Contemporary Social Conception of Nature
One of the most significant indirect effects of the post-World War II, cold war
scientific and technological explosion was a new, sophisticated understanding of
biophysical nature.243 Without the cold war infrastructural boost in scientific knowledge
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See, e.g., Edwards, 2006, 2010; Luke, 1997; McNeill and Unger, 2010.
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about biophysical nature—mediated through the military-industrial-academic complex
and directed toward the active perpetuation of a techno-scientific war economy—the
growth of wide-spread environmental attention and concern, including the development
of contemporary American environmentalism in the late 1960s and 1970s arguably would
have taken much longer (Edwards, 2010, 2006). In the previous chapter I focused on the
concepts “limits” and “sustainability” because of the significant role these concepts play
in defining contemporary environmentalism and the related criticism of societallyinduced environmental degradation. Neither “limits” nor would “sustainability” would
have been possible without systems analysis and satellite photography. As products of the
cold war regime of critique containment, both systems analysis and satellite photography
emerged in and through—that is, are mediated by—the rationalization of capitalist
democracy and the military-industrial-academic complex.244 Here the theoretical
contextualization of chapter three was extended and specified at the institutional level.
On the basis of this contextualization I was able to investigate further the failure of
contemporary American environmentalism, in terms of its inability to approach the said
aim of effecting social change toward less environmental destruction. In fact, we can see
that, from the perspective of the early twenty-first century, the rate at which societallyinduced environmental degradation increases has been accelerating since the emergence
of contemporary American environmentalism in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
However, it is important to recall that the failure of contemporary American
environmentalism cannot and should not be understood with reference to some inherent
fallibility. Rather, the failure of contemporary American environmentalism must be
grasped in relation to the objective sociohistorical context within which it emerged.
However, insofar as this sociohistorical context is one of critique containment, it is
characterized by an apparent decontextualization and is therefore misrecognized as such.
Hence, my immanent critique of contemporary American environmentalism provides a
theoretical and empirical explanation for why contemporary American environmentalism
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My analysis in chapter four focused on 1) systems analysis, which was developed at RAND in order to
better facilitate cost-benefit analyses for the Air Force, and was later central in the development of the selfguiding missile; and 2) satellite photography, which is perhaps the quintessential cold war invention.
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fails to engender the types of changes expressed by its need and desire to move beyond
the environmental destruction that continues to mark its sociohistorical context.
My focus on the relationship between cold war science and technology and the
social conception of nature within the context of critique containment is not causal, to be
sure. I am not implying that cold war science and technology cause(d) contemporary
environmentalism. For the sake of clarity, it will be helpful to restate here some of the
more fundamental aspects of the dissertation’s theoretical orientation. First, recall that the
understanding of mediation advanced throughout this dissertation is also a theory of
social practice, whereby people create and are created by social “structure.”245 To critique
contemporary environmentalism, then, is to critique a specific form of social mediation
structured by the commodity form of social relations. Such critique requires a certain
degree of self-reflexivity in order to recognize its own active involvement in a social
context constituted by alienated social relations. Reification, as social mediation thus
understood, produces and is produced by compounded levels of social mediation.246 As
such, reification plays an important role in terms of key processes of mediation through
which people relate to other people and the biophysical environment. Similarly, the
linkage between cold war science/technology, a contemporary social conception of
nature, and contemporary environmentalism is structured by the commodity form of
social relations. This implies that the problem of the development of contemporary
environmentalism as a product of cold war science and technology is a social
development, which cannot be understood solely in terms of the effects of technology.247
Although science and technology scholars have produced impressive accounts of the
social history of science and technology, this work tends to focus more on outcomes with
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I use “structure” in quotes because the conventional notion of structure tends to imply structure as
somehow separate from social actors. Here it is important to recall that social action is constituted and
constitutive of social structure. In other words, social structure is not separate from social action. Critique
of contemporary environmentalism logically extends to include critique of various societal manifestations
of contemporary environmentalism, such as contemporary American environmentalism.
246
See Mészáros (2005 [1970]: 99-114) for a discussion of compounded levels of alienation in relation to
science.
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Here I am indebted to Postone’s superb analysis and discussion of the relationship between abstract
mathematical time and the commodity form of social relations (1993: 200-217), which parallels my
approach of cold war science/technology and contemporary environmentalism in important respects.
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reference to technical developments.248 Consequently, the significance of social
mediation tends to be either downplayed and unrecognized, or ignored altogether.
Following Postone (1993: 203), I would suggest that this work might be enhanced by
incorporating 1) a reflexive account of sociohistorical context within which specific
technical developments emerged; and 2) a critical and dynamic account of how such
developments interrelate to a sociohistorical process that they, in turn, reinforce.249
2.2 Contemporary Ecological Subjectivity
My discussion of contemporary ecological subjectivity aimed to draw attention to
the fact that, as an instantiation of class-transcending consciousness, contemporary
ecological subjectivity emerged after nearly two decades of global expansion and
increases in productivity; in other words, precisely when it became possible to call
immediate productive labor itself into question. Although global, particular societal
manifestations of contemporary environmentalism (which express contemporary
ecological subjectivity) will likely differ in accordance with differing sociohistorical
contexts. At this more concrete level—the level of particular societal manifestations of
contemporary environmentalism—my immanent critique of contemporary American
environmentalism directs researchers toward a more pointed focus on specific social
institutions in terms of mediation between the more abstract category of contemporary
ecological subjectivity, on the one hand, and the concrete societal manifestation of
contemporary environmentalism, on the other.250 The nuanced elements of this approach
resist the conceptualization of “globalization” as a singular, unifying process (let alone
one driven by a monolithic cause). My position is also at odds with approaches that aim
to critique grand historical narratives and place primacy on the role of historical
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See, e.g., Basalla, 2006.
Paul Edwards’s (1996) impressive analysis of cold war technology and political discourse can be seen as
an attempt to move in this direction, although this work is perhaps less theoretically coherent (Edwards
himself is not a social theorist, to be fair). For a thoroughly contextualized analysis, see Jackie Orr’s (2006)
semi-autobiographical genealogy of panic disorder in post-World War II American society.
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Here I would ask the reader to recall my mention of Adorno’s 1964 lecture on mediation in chapter three
above. In this lecture, Adorno identifies three conceptual elements, which, in addition to empirical analysis
of the concrete, he contends are central to historical analysis: 1) “the complexity of the pattern”—that is,
“the overall process that asserts itself”; 2) “the dependence of that global process on the specific situation”;
“and then again the mediation of the specific situation by the overall process” (Adorno, 2006 [1964]: 37).
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contingency, focusing instead on the multifaceted nature of sociohistorical and cultural
relativity.251 Such an approach should be amendable to a variety of methodologies and
empirical research efforts rooted in a critical and reflexive perspective. I therefore view
the concept of critique containment and the category of contemporary ecological
subjectivity as a critical intervention into the growing environmental discourse—one
which furthers recent historical work on the relationship between cold war and
contemporary environmental thought by recasting the significance of this linkage in
terms of social mediation.
3. Sociobiophysicality and the Treadmill of Destruction
My discussion of critique containment and contemporary ecological subjectivity
is consonant with recent environmental sociology literature on the treadmill of
destruction (see e.g. Clark and Jorgenson, 2012; Hooks and Smith, 2005, 2012). Drawing
on C. Wright Mills (see Mills, 2000 [1956]), Hooks and Smith (2005) put forth the idea
of the “treadmill of destruction” in an attempt to specify the environmental impact of
militarism as separate, yet related to the treadmill of production identified by Schnaiberg
et al. While stressing the distinction between the inner logic of militarism and capitalist
production, (Hooks and Smith, 2005: 23) also indicate the need for researchers to
“examine the manner in which these two treadmills intersect (often amplifying
environmental impacts) in specific times and places.” Of course, the relationship between
these two treadmill logics depends on how one conceptualizes capitalism, on the one
hand, and political and military power, and the other—and how researchers utilize these
conceptualizations to better understand how such processes relate to degradation of the
social and biophysical environment. I will return to this in a moment.
As discussed above, treadmill of production theorists justify their focus on the
capitalist production process, in part because of the tremendous decision-making power
exercised by economic elites, especially with regard to decisions concerning biophysical
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Admittedly, this raises a complex set of issues, which I do not intend to address in detail. However, my
position is in line with critical theory’s emphasis on the significance of reflexivity. That is, modern
capitalist society is directionally dynamic, and this dynamic is immanent. This dynamic is also what allows
reflexivity, including concepts such as social and cultural distance and relativity.
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throughput. From this perspective, insofar as they are confined to the logic of
profitability, elite decision-making regarding the production process is antithetical to
social and biophysical well-being. Viewed in this light, military decision-making
regarding actions that can (and do) have devastating social and biophysical consequences,
such as the use of nuclear weapons amid geopolitical competition, or the recent spike in
“drone” (unmanned aerial vehicles) strikes, cannot be reduced to the logic of profitability,
even though these decisions as well as their socio-ecological consequences, may indeed
be interconnected with the treadmill of production.
However, if we conceptualize capitalism in terms of its historically specific form
of abstract domination, as structured by labor (á la Postone), which directs our attention
toward the socio-ecological tensions underlying reification and the production of value
(see chapter three above), then the focus on elite decision-making within social
institutions such as the military, state, or economy is redirected away from these
particular individuals and social groups and toward a more pointed focus on social
institutions as mediators of a historically specific form of social organization. In other
words, a critical theory perspective indicates a shift of focus away from vested “interests”
as operating in and through social institutions and toward a conceptualization of social
institutions as operating in and through people. For neither the logic of militarism, nor
economic decision-making by corporate actors can be adequately understood if confined
to an understanding of the decision-making efforts of individual actors. My dissertation
points toward a reconceptualization of social institutions, such as the military, university,
corporation, and state, in terms of the facilitation of social action.252 Elite decisionmaking within these institutions could then be reconceptualized in terms of an “external”
social necessity (e.g., the type of social necessity that Postone talks about in his
reinterpretation of Marx’s notion of socially necessary labor time). This is not to deny the
fact that certain individuals benefit from the way the system is organized, to be sure.
However, we must recognize that the inner workings of the system cannot be explained
by this fact.
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Cf. Boltanski, 2011.
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A more pointed focus on social institutions in terms of mediation is in line with
my analysis and discussion of the relationship between the cold war regime of critique
containment and the contemporary social conception of nature. The theoretical
understanding of mediation advanced here has the potential to enhance recent treadmill of
destruction research (see e.g., Hooks and Smith, 2005, 2012) by examining the ways in
which militarism impacts concrete human-ecological transformation and the social
conception of nature, including the conceptualization of human-ecological
transformation. Future research in this area might include empirical work grounded in a
reflexive recognition of the simultaneous domination of human and non-human natures
and focused on the specificity of the treadmill of destruction. For example, this work
might examine the defining institutional infrastructure of the treadmill of destruction in
terms of the cold war regime of critique containment, thus shedding light on both the
subjective and objective dimensions of the environment-society problematic. This
research is likely to have an increasing amount of theoretical and empirical purchase as
the environmental effects of America’s military efforts abroad continue.253 In this sense,
the dissertation’s focus on American society quickly becomes global, as the artifacts of
American militarism are crucial elements of modernist sociobiophysicality, most of
which take the form of weapons of mass destruction.
It appears as though the treadmill of destruction has accelerated since the end of
the Second World War. However, as its environmental effects are becoming increasingly
expansive, the social space militarism occupies appears to be shrinking (Hooks and
Smith, 2005: 31). According to Hooks and Smith (2005: 31), this contradiction between
expansions of environmental destruction amid a shrinking social space within which such
destruction might be located is of utmost significance in an era of scientific and
technological explosion. As the authors explain,
It is counterintuitive to think of the military as posing a greater threat to the environment
as its “social space” shrinks. Nevertheless, this contradiction is at the heart of the
treadmill of destruction in an era of science-intensive WMD [weapons of mass
destruction]. Moreover, this contradiction stands in sharp contrast to the dynamics
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Indeed, this is an area of research that has received little to no attention, in part because of the various
problems involved in obtaining transparent, reliable information about this problem.
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propelling the treadmill of production. The contradictory features of contemporary
militarism are driven by a treadmill dynamic. That is, the military is not shrinking
because the pressures of geopolitics and arms races have abated. Rather, the declining
social space and the concomitant growth in its insulation from democratic oversight are
driven by strategic planning and efforts to stay ahead of military rivals. But this smaller
military force wields weapons that are increasingly horrific and military research and
development is working to make still deadlier weapons. (Hooks and Smith, 2005: 31)

The aforementioned contradiction is currently in the process of unfolding. Barack
Obama’s presidency, for example, has been defined in part by his endorsement of the
military’s usage of drones as a new model for targeted counterterrorism. While military
drone usage does decrease the number of certain (irreplaceable?) foot soldiers, there is
little evidence that the social and environmental impact of drone strikes is less than
conventional counterinsurgency techniques. There is need for future research
investigating the complexities of such processes. No doubt a consideration of the linkage
science/technology and the social conception of nature in terms of mediation will likely
enhance related research efforts.
Another related implication of my dissertation, which promises to shed light on
the contradiction between expansions of environmental destruction amid a shrinking
social space, involves (re)considering and incorporating a critical theoretical
understanding of temporality. Here I would suggest that treadmill of destruction research
could be furthered by considering Postone’s work on the temporal dimensions of
productivity and value and my discussion of the socio-ecological tensions underlying
reification and the production of value in particular. As already mentioned, Postone’s
analysis provides an immanent critique and analytically vexing account of the dynamic
whereby both people and biophysical nature are increasingly rendered material bearers of
objectified time at an accelerating rate. Another related consideration, which is likely to
advance theoretical understanding of the contradictory global dynamics of the treadmill
of production, is Postone’s reinterpretation of Marx’s notion of socially necessary labor
time in terms of an external social norm impelled via the acceleration of objectified time.
Here it is important to recall that this acceleration of objectified time is a process
whereby time literally becomes denser at an accelerating rate, as a virtually exponential
acceleration in the rate at which biophysical throughput increases is necessitated by the
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production of value. In other words, the production of more and more “stuff” is required
to effect less and less (indirect) increases in value.254
4. Cold War and Critique
The concept of critique containment and the dissertation’s focus on cold war is
potentially significant for the discipline of sociology more generally, which, with few
exceptions,255 has not paid adequate attention to the cold war. Such inattention is
significant because, as this dissertation makes clear, the lingering effects of the cold war
continue to define the present in significant, often unrecognized ways.256 For example,
issues of social democracy, governance, and legitimacy, as well as the linkage between
economic growth and political legitimacy are issues that cannot be adequately understood
unless situated within the context of the cold war, including the significance of its
lingering effects. The social discourse on both society and democracy, for instance, is
historically specific and quite actually quite recent. For it was only after the Second
World War and during the Cold War in particular that democracy became a social issue.
Here my dissertation indicates the more general significance of theoretical, historical, and
societal contextualization. Such contextualization is particularly important in light of the
fact that issues such as economic growth and political legitimacy are likely to become
increasingly pertinent vis-à-vis the continual looming threat posed by global warming,
which will no doubt require more theoretically rigorous and empirically exact
understandings of the politics of global climate change.
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Hartmut Rosa is another contemporary social theorist working on what he calls the temporal structures
of social life. The English translation of Rosa’s theory of social acceleration, which is also a theory of
modernity, is likely to be a source of insight in this regard (for a discussion of the state and military as
institutional accelerators, see Rosa, 2013: 195-207). According to Rosa (2013: 198), the institutions of the
nation-state and the military, which were previously driving forces of acceleration, are, at the beginning of
the twenty-first century “threatened with erosion (…) by the very forces of acceleration it [the institutional
ensemble of nation-state and military] set in motion.” Cf. Mann’s (2013: 361) contention that the
advancement of processes of globalization are complete, having “hit up against the limits of the earth and
then ricocheted back on us,” as it were, in a sort of boomerang effect. Perhaps the most obvious indicators
of the “limits of globalization” can be seen in terms of the current threats posed by global climate change
(see Mann, 2013: 361-399).
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See, e.g., Abbott and Sparrow, 2007; Dahms, 2006b; Steinmetz, 2005)
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Here I would direct the reader to Postone (2006), who indicates some of these lingering effects,
especially in terms of the absence of a critique of the present. Müller (2010) provides a fruitful account of
the cold war in terms of how we today understand the late twentieth century.
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The dissertation has implications for the recent ongoing debate within critical
theory regarding social critique (see e.g. Boltanski, 2011; Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005;
Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999, 2006; Celikates, 2006, 2012; Jaeggi, 2005). Put simply,
my project suggests that this debate might be circumvented altogether via a return to the
early Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory, which would require confronting and
working through the intricate nuances of the subject-object paradigm. While this move is
perhaps most obvious for a critical theory of the environment, the critical confrontation
with materiality via subject-object has the potential to ground the recent critical theory
discourse on critique in a way that is more empirically relevant. Unfortunately, critical
theory has suffered from a severe Habermasian hangover for quite some time now, hence
critical theory’s recent discourse on the failure of its discourse on discourse.257 I would
suggest Postone’s (1993) critical assessment of Habermas as a starting point to begin
rethinking the communicative turn along the lines pursued in this dissertation.258
What is striking about the recent critical theory discourse on critique is that what
is perhaps most obvious—namely, the absence of a critique of the present—has not been
addressed, at least not adequately. Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2005) The New Spirit of
Capitalism is perhaps the most proximate example that I am aware of. My discussion of
critique containment in the previous chapter is similar in many ways to the issues
Boltanski and Chiapello engage in their book. In fact, I had initially thought about
drawing on Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) in order to frame what became my analysis of
“critique containment,” only later to discover that their analysis was too confined to the
French experience to be applicable to my focus on American society. Boltanski’s (2011)
On Critique is also in line with many of the issues pursued in this dissertation, although
much of what I find interesting in this work is more or less a restatement of what he and
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Readers should take this somewhat tounge-in-cheek comment with a grain of salt, as it is certainly not
my intention to minimize the breadth or depth of Habermas’s rather expansive theoretical work.
258
Such reconsideration would need to provide an assessment of the first generation of critical theorists
associated with the Frankfurt School in light of patterns of sociohistorical continuity and change from the
1930s to today (see, e.g., Dahms, 2011).
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Chiapello discussed previously in The New Spirit of Capitalism.259 One could, for
example, use Boltanski’s discussion of critique in terms of truth tests and reality tests
(Boltanski, 2011: 103-110) to describe the critique of environmentalism (e.g. the critique
of “growth”). In this way one could show that the validity claims of environmentalism
depend on the science of ecology, whereas environmentalism’s positive counterpoint (i.e.
its proposals for effective action) depends on the regulatory state. In this sense, one could
then describe the “tests” that environmentalism employs—the science of ecology and the
regulatory state—as institutionalized. On this basis, one might be able to explain how the
critique of environmentalism actually reinforces the existing order, including its
environmental destruction.
While my dissertation might have benefited from an engagement with Boltanski’s
recent work on critique, I should also note that, in my view, Boltanski and his colleagues
place an unwarranted primacy on the “everyday” perspectives of “ordinary” actors.260
Although I would certainly not be the first to acknowledge that sociology is today in
disrepute, I also believe that the discipline has an important role to play and that
sociology should be more relevant publically than it currently is. This is not to say that a
sociological perspective (whatever this means) is “superior” to the perspective of
“ordinary” actors, but sociology should be able to provide publically relevant knowledge
just as geologists provide publically relevant information regarding earthquake hazards.
5. Future Research
My dissertation points toward a number of areas for future theoretical and
empirical research. The project points toward future theoretical research on SBPh and a
critical theory of the environment. A critical theory of the environment, as opposed to a
critical sociology of the environment, is rooted in an immanent critique of the
inextricable connection between inter-human domination and the domination of
biophysical nature. A critical theory of the environment also involves a rather rigorous
259

See, for example, Boltanski’s discussion of complex, or managerial domination as a new political
regime of domination. What distinguishes complex, or managerial domination is a unique way of
controlling critique—namely, by incorporating it into a system of expertise in order to orient change in
accordance with the existing order. See Stoner (2012) for a critical assessment of Boltanski’s book.
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See Stoner (2012) for a succinct overview of this debate and the pertinent issues involved.
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degree of self-reflexivity, as this theoretical approach must be immersed in its “object” of
study (i.e. the simultaneous domination of human and non-human natures) as an
historical experience whose contradictions and tensions are entwined with those of the
thought attempting to comprehend it. As such, the dissertation points toward the need for
empirically grounded theoretical work on mediation. I would suggest that a theoretical
comparison of the concept of mediation in Adorno and Postone’s work, in light of a
consideration of Adorno’s “anti-system” and his so-called “theory” of mediation, on the
one hand, and Postone’s notion of capital as Geist, on the other, would be a distinctive
place to start; specifically, a return to Adorno’s critique of identity thinking, and his
notion of “socially necessary semblance” in particular, in conjunction with Postone’s
critical Marxian theory. Indeed, there is presumably much to uncover by way of a careful
theoretical comparison of these two contemporary critical theorists. This comparative
effort would also benefit from taking on an empirically-based historical analysis in order
to actively engage an encounter between Adorno, who does not put forth a systematic
theory of mediation (but see O’Connor, 2006, 2013; cf. Tonon, 2013), and Postone, who
for his part attempts to distance himself from early Frankfurt School theorists.
At a more methodological level, the dissertation indicates how an adequate
understanding of (modernist) SBPh and the environment-society problematic in particular
is impossible without dialectics.261 An analytic approach alone simply cannot confront
the elusively dynamic nature of the environment-society problematic. However, analytics
is still necessary and important in circumscribing the contours of the nature-society
relationship. The Anthropocene discourse is one of the most recent (and striking)
examples of how an analytic perspective can help us situate the historical specificity of
modern society’s increasingly destructive impact on the biophysical environment. Indeed,
scientists have been able to pinpoint changes in earth system processes as a result of
human behavior with an increasingly accurate degree of precision. However, although
scientific research measures the severity of societally-induced environmental
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It should be stressed, however, that both analytics and dialectics are necessary in order to further
research efforts accordingly (see Hazelrigg, 2009).
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degradation, indicating the increased visibility of such degradation, increased visibility
does not necessarily correspond with a greater ability to understand this degradation, let
alone directly pursue action that might move toward ameliorating societally-induced
environmental degradation. Although not an explicit theme of this dissertation, it would
seem as though a critical theory of the environment might find itself fighting on two
fronts at the same time when confronting the issue of science. That is, against the naïve
championing of progress through science, as well as against an approach that may too
readily dismiss science as “ideology.” However, despite the various complications (and
there are many), it is clear that a critical theory of the environment must confront the
issue of science head-on, especially considering the significant role played by science in
the identification, definition, and legitimation of environmental problems.262
There is also the related issue of climate change denial, which, especially in the
United States, tends to divide the so-called political “left” (democrats) and “right”
(republicans), which has received a lot of attention recently.263 The critical theory
approach of this dissertation and of Adorno in particular, sheds light on new and exciting
areas for future research on the politics of climate change denial. Here I would suggest
reconsidering Adorno et al.’s (1950) study on the authoritarian personality264 to
investigate the possibility of an authoritarian element common to both climate change
deniers and environmental activists in the U.S. One could then, drawing on contemporary
civil society discourse and Marcuse’s notion of “repressive desublimation” and
“repressive tolerance,” examine the differences and similarities between the political
“right,” whose adherents are typically climate change skeptics, and the political “left,”
262

Here I would again emphasize the importance of conceptualizing social institutions in terms of social
mediation, as such a conceptualization directs our focus in relation to societal context. More specifically,
this focus allows us to tune into social institutions as facilitators of scientific activity through which the
domination of human and nonhuman nature is exercised. This is especially important when considering the
interrelationships between institutions such as the state, corporation, and university, within and through
which the activity of science takes place. As mentioned, the dissertation’s emphasis on cold war, science,
and the social conception of nature, in terms of a focus on social institutions conceptualized in terms of
mediation is in line with recent treadmill of destruction research, which, as indicated above, could be
enhanced by the critical theoretical approach advanced here.
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See, e.g., Gauchant, 2012; McWright, 2011; Poortinga et al., 2011.
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See Stoner and Lybeck (2011) for an example of the contemporary relevance of Adorno et al.’s original
study.
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whose adherents generally insist on the reality of climate change and the severity of its
consequences. On this basis, one could then argue that “progressive” forces, instead of
moving toward their said goal of ameliorating environmental degradation, may actually
be transforming and reconstituting societal processes of environmental degradation,
insofar as their stance on climate change is defined solely via their opposition to the
“right.” In this sense, one could provide a critique of the political “left” and their
response to climate change as a reified response to a reified understanding of the
problem. Additionally, one might examine the issue of global climate change and public
trust in science by questioning the qualitative difference between the political “left” and
the political “right.” If the separation between these two political positions is less distant
than analysts typically assume, then the issue of climate change and public trust in
science can be pursued further. For example, under perfect conditions (i.e., an unalienated and un-alienating society), science would be x. In current reality, however,
science is x'—a version of science largely, but not entirely, bound to the existing
structure of politico-economic power (i.e., a “lesser” version of science as x). “Leftist”
critics point this out, and “rightist” critics recognize this too, but at a very different level.
Because the left/right political dichotomy refers to apparently opposite reference frames,
we get similar diagnoses, yet radically different conclusions. “Leftists” want to transcend
existing conditions and science as x' in order to move toward science as x; whereas
“rightists” want to force existing conditions to be conducive to science as x, but refuse to
understand the contradiction between existing conditions and this ideal of science, let
alone how existing conditions create and maintain science as x'. In reaction to the
cognitive dissonance “rightists” experience, they turn on science as x', taking it to be
science as x, and reject both science as x and as x' without differentiation. Future research
in this area promises to contribute to an understanding of the current irrationality of
American politics. This work might also provide valuable insight into some of the
underlying ideological dynamics currently fueling America’s failure to adequately
address environmental issues at home and abroad.
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Regarding the continual looming threat of global warming and the need for
related research mentioned previously, my dissertation points toward future crossnational comparative research focusing on the linkages between political legitimacy and
the form of economic growth that emerged in the advanced industrialized democracies
following the Second World War.265 Although today’s worldwide ecological problems
require global solutions, the nation-state is likely to remain important as the ability of
different societies to confront current and future ecological problems will likely differ in
accordance with different sociohistorical contexts,266 including differing manifestations
of contemporary environmentalism within these sociohistorical contexts.267
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These nations continue to have a disproportionate impact on global ecological despoliation (see Barnes
and Gilman, 2012), although China is not far behind.
266
Münch et al. (2001) provide an excellent example of this type of comparative research.
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Thévenot, Moody, Lafaye (2000) comparative analysis of French and American forms of valuing nature
and modes of justification in environmental disputes is in line with the type of comparative work on
societal manifestations of contemporary environmentalism I am suggesting here.
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this dissertation has been to provide a better grasp of the
environment-society problematic by situating it in theoretical, historical, and societal
contexts. An important concern of this contextualization has been to elucidate the
significance of a critical theory of the environment in helping us comprehend humanity’s
predictable ecological apocalypse. My investigation of sociobiophysicality has shown
that a critical theory of the environment focuses our attention on the co-determination of
the destruction of biophysical nature as well as our inner nature, whereas my critique of
modernist sociobiophysicality has shown the increasing need to scrutinize the
simultaneous destruction of the planet and of ourselves in a radical, immanent manner.
Central to the critique of modernist sociobiophysicality developed in the
dissertation has been the concept of social mediation. My investigation has shown
alienation and reification as key mediating processes through which both the objective
destruction of human and non-human natures as well as the subjective misrecognition of
such destruction is continuously perpetuated anew. My investigation of cold war, critique
containment, and contemporary ecological subjectivity has shown these processes of
alienation and reification to be compounded further by additional levels of historically
specific social mediations such as the post-World War II configuration of business-laborgovernment relations, which continues to be geared toward perpetual war, the
rationalization of capitalist democracy, and environmental destruction while becoming
increasingly less recognizable via the sedimentation of critique containment.
Although some of the greatest risks associated with societally-induced
environmental destruction (e.g., sea-level rise) are predictable (Oppenheimer, 2008), the
possibility that humans might rationally confront the actuality of these risks in a
manageable way is continuously precluded by the acceleration of an array of social
mediations, such as those just mentioned. Research efforts aimed at advancing a critical
theory of the environment have an important role to play in confronting this situation by
scrutinizing these mediating processes and their effects in terms of how our lives are
248

organized and how we relate to the planet. For if we are able to grasp the historically
specific social mediations that structure the entwinement of inter-human domination and
the domination of biophysical nature, then we will be in a much better position to
critically recognize the alienated core of our modern being. Such recognition is a
necessary precondition for the possibility of moving beyond human-ecological
transformation in its current self-destructive form.
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